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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the discourse and strategy of two contrasting 
French anti-racist movements – SOS Racisme, the consensus-seeking 
centrist movement founded in 1984 and the Mouvement des Indigènes de 
la République (MIR), the radical anti-colonial movement founded in 2005 
– over the years 2005 to 2009, a period which I argue is defined by a 
conservative and potentially exclusionary conception of national identity 
on the part of Nicolas Sarkozy and his political allies, as well as by an 
intense debate on colonial legacies and memory (typified by Sarkozy’s 
rhetorical attacks on ‘repentance’), a widespread rejection of 
multiculturalism and communautarisme, and a cross-party consensus on 
the language of republicanism but not the underlying definition of the 
concept. 
 
I find that the central ideological difference between the two movements 
can be found in their respective relationships with republicanism.  
Whereas SOS, in line with the traditions of the French anti-racist 
movement, bases its ideology on universalist republicanism and sees 
France’s mainstream political culture as fundamentally supportive of anti-
racist aims, MIR is highly critical of republicanism, highlighting the way in 
which ‘universalist’ principles have been used in French history as a 
justification for colonialism, racism and discrimination.  The thesis argues 
that the positions of the movements on the defining themes of the period 
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identified above have caused them substantial issues in campaigning, 
with MIR’s questioning of republicanism, emphasis on colonial memory 
and support for multiculturalism diametrically opposed to the prevailing 
political climate, and SOS’s favoured republican ideology, thanks to its 
inherent flexibility, being used by Sarkozy as an implicit means of 
stigmatising minority populations. 
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis emerged out of research carried out as part of an MA 
dissertation entitled ‘Redefining Frenchness? – the roots of the 
contemporary immigration and identity debate’.  In the dissertation I 
aimed to analyse the provenance of the dominant discourse on national 
identity in contemporary France, considering its historical origins and its 
transposition into politics and law.  In the conclusion to the dissertation, I 
suggested that one social movement capable of challenging this 
dominant discourse and promoting a counter-discourse was the anti-
racist movement.  The question of whether the French anti-racist 
movement could indeed challenge the type of defensive, narrowly defined 
and backwards-looking conception of national identity associated 
particularly with Nicolas Sarkozy therefore provided the platform for my 
doctoral research.  As the research continued however, it became clear 
that anti-racism in the political context defined by Sarkozy was a 
substantially (and surprisingly) under-researched area: the majority of 
scholarly publications on French anti-racism focus on earlier and very 
different political contexts, particularly that of the early to mid-1980s, 
when the Left was in power under Mitterrand, and the movement was 
more visible in the public debate than at any point before or since.  
Consequently, I decided to concentrate on the reactions of two 
contrasting anti-racist organisations – SOS Racisme (SOS) and the 
Mouvement des Indigènes de la République (MIR) – to Sarkozy and his 
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national identity discourse, and on these movements’ own discourses and 
preoccupations over my chosen period.   
 
Underpinning my argument is the question of republicanism, and I shall 
seek to show that both movements have had to adapt to a context within 
which the consensus on the language of republicanism is accompanied 
by a semantic ambiguity permitting its use in support of almost any 
political position – including one which implicitly stigmatises minority 
populations (Noiriel 2007a).  I argue that the political and ideological 
stances of the two movements I am considering are strongly conditioned 
by their dialectal relationship to republicanism, a relationship which 
affects each movement in complex and contradictory ways. 
 
SOS, this thesis argues, aims to protect and enforce the Republic’s 
proclaimed values of liberté, égalité and fraternité, and frequently 
proposes practical action aimed at making them a truly universal reality 
throughout France.  At the same time however, it is critical of the way in 
which these principles are used by those in political power; and has 
difficulty both in taking targeted action against racial discrimination (due 
to its belief in republican ‘colour-blindness’ and consequent rejection of 
ethnic statistics), and in making critical analyses of colonial history and its 
ideological links with universalist values (due to its belief that France’s 
mainstream republican political culture is fundamentally just, and 
supportive of anti-racism).   
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MIR, on the other hand, adopts a more oppositional stance towards 
‘republican values’, seeing their supposedly emancipatory nature as a 
myth and preferring to emphasise their use over French history as a 
justification for colonialism, racism and discrimination.  Paradoxically 
however, even despite this self-definition, in defining itself against 
republicanism MIR still ultimately finds itself determined by the concept.  
Furthermore, although highly critical of the uses republican universalism 
has been put to, it could be argued that MIR is in favour of a genuine 
universalising of the Republic’s proclaimed values of liberté, égalité and 
fraternité (even if the movement sees this as highly unlikely to happen 
without a fundamental rethinking of French society).  The 2010 manifesto 
of the PIR (Parti des Indigènes de la République), for example, makes a 
clear statement to this effect, claiming as a goal ‘la fraternité universelle 
et l’égalité entre les individus, entre les communautés et entre les 
peuples’ (‘Principes politiques généraux du Parti des Indigènes de la 
République’, 2010). 
 
In the broader context where, as Denis Sieffert puts it, ‘La république [...] 
a cessé d’être sous la menace d’un système concurrent’ (2006: 133), a 
significant proportion of contemporary French political debate is based 
around the idea of republicanism, and its meaning and significance.  This 
thesis argues that it is within this political and cultural context that the 
anti-racist movement must be analysed and understood.     
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When writing on any given subject it is necessary to consider its meaning.  
In the case of anti-racism, however, this is not a simple question.  
Although it is possible to identify several points of convergence in the 
beliefs of the majority of anti-racist organisations – as Alastair Bonnett 
argues for instance, nearly all forms of anti-racism agree that ‘racism is 
an intellectual error’; that ‘racism distorts and erases people’s identities’; 
and that ‘racism is anti-egalitarian and socially unjust’ (2000: 6) – a 
watertight definition of anti-racism has proven elusive.  Even within 
Bonnett’s minimal definition of inherent beliefs within the anti-racist 
movement, it is possible to find contradictions, particularly relating to the 
status of race.  As he notes, ‘if we accept that the notion of race is an 
intellectual error and a cause of both inequality and the destruction of 
identity, then it follows that enabling people to express their own racial 
identity and to be accorded equality, and rights, as races is problematic.’ 
(2000: 7)  The tension identified by Bonnett is particularly salient in the 
French context, within which republican ideology has a long tradition 
(derived from the Enlightenment universalism which forms its foundations) 
of deep discomfort with the official acknowledgement of race and 
difference.  As the republican centre-left politician Éric Ferrand argues for 
instance: 
 “La République exclut [...] toute forme de régression du sentiment 
national à l’identité ethnique, culturelle ou religieuse, et toute évolution 
conduisant à la création de sous-communautés sur de tels critères.  La 
Nation telle que la conçoit le républicain, c’est la nation citoyenne garante 
de la cohésion sociale.” (2007: 10) 
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Any attempt to define the essence of anti-racism is further complicated by 
the influence on the movement of the mainstream political culture of a 
given society.  As Alana Lentin argues: 
 “Just as racism could be differentially conceived as either 
fundamentally opposed to the ideologies of the state or undeniably 
grounded within them, so too anti-racism could be interpreted as either 
upholding the values of the West incorporated in the state or as a 
challenge to their usage in practice.  These values – democracy, freedom, 
fraternity, human rights, equality – could at once be seen as the very 
principles upon which the modern state is built and, therefore, the ideals 
that an anti-racism that seeks widespread public support should uphold, 
or alternatively, as the hypocritical anchorings of the state in principles of 
equality and rights that belie the selective nature of their application.” 
(2004: 310) 
This thesis argues that in the French case there is a substantial division 
within anti-racism, one which follows closely the contours of Lentin’s 
analysis.  On the one hand are mainstream associations – such as SOS 
Racisme – which seek to defend and enforce republican liberté, égalité 
and fraternité and Enlightenment universalism, and therefore do not see it 
as their role to fight for a radically new conception of society.  On the 
other hand are anti-system associations – such as the Mouvement des 
Indigènes de la République – which seek to challenge the very structures 
on which inequality is seen as being founded and reproduced. 
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The consensual, republican SOS Racisme, founded in 1984, and the 
radical, anti-colonial Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, 
founded in 2005, therefore represent, in a number of ways, two very 
different conceptions of French anti-racism.  Comparing the reactions of 
these two movements to the same political context and the same key 
themes illustrates the diversity of opinions and positions within French 
anti-racism, as well as some of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
organisations’ respective approaches.  Theoretically speaking, all anti-
racist movements want the same thing.  To put it as broadly as possible, 
any movement calling itself ‘anti-racist’ is against racial discrimination, 
and in favour of equality of treatment amongst (at the very least) citizens 
of its own country, regardless of ethnic origin.  Beyond this, however, 
there are almost infinite variations relating to ideology, worldview and 
priorities.  In the French case, SOS and MIR can arguably be located at 
opposite ends of the spectrum of anti-racism, and thus provide a striking 
contrast for comparative study.  Let us consider some of the areas of 
discord between the two organisations.   
 
As we have now seen, the central difference to be noted in the 
positioning of the two movements relates to one of the central issues 
addressed in the current work, France’s self-proclaimed political culture of 
universalist republicanism.  SOS chooses to base its discourse and 
actions around republican values, with particular emphasis on equality.  
The movement takes them entirely at face value, sometimes seeing faults 
in their implementation by the French political class, but never seeing 
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faults with the ideas themselves.  MIR, on the other hand, challenges and 
calls into question republicanism, seeing ‘universal’ values as being 
applicable only to white populations of European origin, and seeing the 
Enlightenment values which have inspired all of France’s republican 
regimes as being used as ideological cover for colonialism. 
 
A further difference, analysed in chapter 5, relates to the positioning of 
the two movements on the question of colonialism, and its legacy in 
contemporary France.  For MIR, anti-colonialism is absolutely central to 
anti-racism: indeed, it is inextricable. One of this movement’s central 
arguments is that France has never ‘decolonised’: that is to say, post-
colonial immigrants and their descendants are still effectively seen as 
colonial ‘subjects’ and are treated accordingly, being consigned to 
‘ghettos’ on the peripheries of major cities, discriminated against in 
access to employment, and treated unequally by the police and justice 
system.  SOS, on the other hand, is sceptical about over-emphasising the 
links between the past and the present.  Whilst it accepts that the colonial 
period should be properly remembered, it refuses to bring the discussion 
out of the domain of history, prioritising instead the importance of tackling 
racism and discrimination here and now, and seeing too much emphasis 
on history as potentially dangerous, in that it can end up trapping ethnic-
minority populations in the role of permanent victims.   
 
A similar story pertains to the two movements’ discourse on race, a 
question which forms the topic of chapter 6.  Once again, for MIR this is a 
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vital issue for French anti-racism.  The movement’s position is that race 
(or perhaps more accurately, visible ethnic difference) is responsible, 
more than any other factor, for determining the life chances of an 
individual in contemporary France.  This positioning leads MIR to 
emphasise the ‘racial question’ over the traditional left-wing terrain of the 
‘social question’.  SOS, on the other hand, sees the question of race 
through the prism of traditional republican ‘colour-blindness’, and 
therefore, in my view, does not see it at all.  Because of this refusal to 
take into account ethnic difference, SOS’s position, by necessity, is to 
conceive of equality in economic and social terms.   
 
There are further differences between the two movements in their 
respective relationships with the political system.  Whilst SOS no longer 
has any official links with the Socialist Party, there remain numerous links 
at the level of personnel (Harlem Désir, SOS President turned PS First 
Secretary, being of course the most well known).  What is more, much of 
SOS’s action aims to influence the political process from within, via 
lobbying of sympathetic political figures, rather than challenge it from 
outside.  By way of contrast, MIR aims to be entirely autonomous, and 
works outside and against a political system seen as perpetuating 
discrimination against and stereotyping of post-colonial populations.   
 
All in all therefore, choosing to examine these two movements enables a 
comparative analysis of two distinct types of French anti-racist movement.  
The first of these, as represented by SOS, is the mainstream movement; 
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working within the system, searching for consensus, basing its appeal 
around republican values and lobbying for concrete action (investment, 
infrastructure, housing, job creation, and so on) on France’s social 
problems.  The second meanwhile, as represented by MIR, is the anti-
system movement; working outside the system (seen as a source of 
problems rather than solutions), calling into question the ideological and 
historical basis of French society and aiming to raise awkward questions, 
for example around colonialism and the influence of race, that are 
frequently ignored within mainstream political discussion.    
 
Anti-racist discourse and action additionally needs to be understood in 
relation to the specific political context within which it takes place.  It is my 
argument that the years 2005-2009 represent a unique context for anti-
racism, due firstly to the pervasiveness of a conservative and implicitly 
exclusionary conception of national identity in the discourse of Nicolas 
Sarkozy, the most visible French political figure over this period; and 
secondly to the way in which this debate, along with the associated 
issues of immigration and security, was repeatedly brought to the surface 
of political discussion by a number of key events.  In order to frame the 
socio-political context of my thesis, I will begin by considering the defining 
significance of Sarkozy’s discourse on national identity during the period 
2005-2009. 
 
Whilst the question of national identity is a long-standing preoccupation 
within political life in France, I would argue that it exploded into public 
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consciousness during my chosen period initially as a result of the riots 
which spread across French cities in the autumn of 2005.  The ‘grand 
débat’ on national identity launched by the UMP government in late 2009 
marked the end of this explosion.  Assuming, as seems likely, that this 
debate had the aim of shoring up support for the UMP ahead of the 
regional elections of early 2010 it was a resounding failure, with the 
Socialist Party winning in 21 of the 22 regions of metropolitan France.  At 
the height of the discourse’s success and influence however, during the 
2007 presidential election campaign, Sarkozy, faced by what Étienne 
Balibar calls the ‘impuissance du Tout-Puissant’ (2001: 75) – that is, the 
powerlessness of national governments in relation to the economic forces 
which define citizens’ lives and prospects – was able to play upon the 
fear and insecurity of large parts of the French population, diverting it 
away from the (economic) causes and towards the (‘identitarian’) 
symptoms, thus practising what the Cette France-là collective (2012) 
called ‘xénophobie d’en haut’.  Evidence from multiple opinion polls was 
ignored that the French public’s chief preoccupations were employment 
and pouvoir d’achat (plus retirement, education, healthcare and social 
inequality, see 2012: 22), in favour of the creation and imposition of an 
agenda foregrounding immigration and identity.  In doing this, Sarkozy 
implicitly – and always implicitly, the targets of his discourse being 
insinuated but never identified – presented immigrants as threatening a 
supposedly ancient and hereditary national identity (a link formalised in 
the decision during the 2007 campaign to create a ‘Ministry of 
Immigration and National Identity’), and furthermore presented France’s 
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Muslim population as threatening ‘republican values’ through his 
recurrent discourse on communautarisme.  The identity discourse of 
Sarkozy and his fellow-travellers in politics and the media therefore 
served to stigmatise and discriminate against a substantial section of the 
French population: immigrants, citizens of ‘immigrant origin’ and Muslims, 
categories frequently blurred and elided together within this discourse.  
This was a complex context for both of my chosen movements, despite 
their substantial ideological differences.  SOS saw its favoured republican 
language being used as a rhetorical tool to paint immigrants and Muslims 
as dangerous and inherently incompatible with French values.  MIR’s 
emphasis on colonial memory and support for immigrants’ rights to 
cultural expression were caught up in a pervasive discourse on the 
dangers of ‘repentance’ and communautarisme, respectively.  Both, 
meanwhile, were strongly opposed to Sarkozy’s rhetoric on national 
identity, seeing it as closed-minded and unwelcoming, presenting 
immigration solely as a threat, rather than an opportunity or a legitimate 
component of French identity. 
 
As noted above, this discourse was kept at the top of the political agenda 
throughout the period examined in the thesis by a number of key events.  
Firstly, early 2005 saw the foundation of MIR, the new movement’s anti-
colonial ideology proving highly pertinent in a political climate where 
debates around France’s colonial past were particularly intense, fired by 
the controversy surrounding the infamous law of 23rd February 2005 
demanding acknowledgement of the ‘positive role’ played by France in its 
 21 
colonies and its teaching in schools, and by the appearance in public 
discourse of the ideology of ‘anti-repentance’ courtesy of conservative-
leaning academics such as Daniel Lefeuvre, an ideology taken up with 
enthusiasm by Sarkozy in the 2007 campaign.  Secondly, the chronology 
can be continued with perhaps the central event of recent French history, 
the widespread urban disturbances of 2005, during which, as Nasser 
Demiati (in Mucchielli and Le Goaziou (eds), 2007) argues, ‘Nicolas 
Sarkozy a délibérément choisi de jouer le jeu de la provocation des 
jeunes des quartiers populaires et d’y faire monter la tension’ (2007: 59), 
setting out a discourse which includes as its key features the 
'dénonciation d'une culture juvénile populaire anti-institutionnelle', 
'euphémisation des raisons socio-économiques de leur émergence' and 
'théorie du complot dont les acteurs principaux sont les dealers, les caïds 
et les islamistes' (2007: 68).  This zero-tolerance approach, emphasising 
order over understanding, placed Sarkozy – at the time Interior Minister 
under his great party rival Jacques Chirac – at the centre of the official 
response to events, and firmly cemented him in the public consciousness.  
Indeed, it is quite possible to argue that without the visibility afforded to 
him at this time, Sarkozy would never have become President.  The third 
key event is central to the thesis, and marks the height of the 
predominance of ‘national identity’ in recent French political history.  The 
2007 Presidential election campaign, as can be seen in chapter 2, was 
fought by Sarkozy on the grounds of national identity to an 
unprecedented extent, with the consequences noted above, immigration 
and France’s Muslim population being presented as a threat to the 
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country’s values and wider well-being.  As was also noted above, a 
further key event was announced during the campaign, that of the 
creation of the new ‘Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de 
l'Identité nationale et du codéveloppement’, a Ministry which gave a legal 
basis to the supposition that immigration was not intrinsic to French 
national identity, as claimed by a movement like SOS, but must be placed 
in opposition to it: as the post-colonial historian Catherine Coquery-
Vidrovitch puts it, ‘[le ministère] pose brutalement la question de la place 
des immigrés, à quelque époque que ce soit, dans la construction de 
l’identité nationale (2009: 165).  What is more, despite its claims to favour 
‘integration’, it appeared in practice to be much more concerned with 
removing vast numbers of immigrants from French territory, its target-
driven approach in this domain being attacked by SOS in a 2009 
campaign entitled ’30,000 expulsions, c’est la honte’.  The final event to 
be taken into consideration is the 2009 ‘identity debate’ launched by 
Sarkozy and Minister of Immigration Éric Besson, which while claiming to 
promote ideas such as vivre ensemble, liberté, égalité and fraternité, 
laïcité and equality between men and women (‘Éric BESSON lance un 
grand débat sur l’identité nationale’, immigration.gouv.fr, 2009), again in 
reality promoted a conservative and narrowly-defined conception of 
national identity supposedly under threat from immigration and Islam.  
The reactions of my two chosen movements to this debate give a clear 
picture of the reasons for their rejection of Sarkozy’s discourse, and of 
their preferred models of society and identity: SOS argues for a 
république métissée, which promotes both physical mixing of populations 
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(for example in housing and schools) and openness to cultural influence 
from immigrant populations; while MIR argues for multiculturalism and a 
rethinking of concepts such as citizenship and nationality. 
 
Having considered the rationale for the choice of the two movements 
examined in this thesis, and the rationale for the choice of timeframe, I 
would like now to discuss the sources to be used in this work.  My 
methodology combines a detailed analysis of primary documentation with 
a wide corpus of secondary literature on anti-racism, national identity and 
republicanism.  Particularly useful in assembling the corpus of primary 
sources are the two movements’ online archives at www.sos-racisme.org 
and www.indigenes-republique.fr – MIR’s in particular is exceptionally 
comprehensive, assembling every piece written by a member of the 
movement since its foundation in 2005.  The thesis draws on a wide 
range of relevant material from these archives, including press releases, 
opinion pieces, petitions, manifestos and mission statements, providing a 
detailed picture of the movements’ discourse and action.  Further material 
on the movements’ own ideology and self-perception was provided by 
their official publications (Qu’est-ce que SOS Racisme, 2006; Manifeste 
pour l’égalité, 2007; Nous sommes les Indigènes de la République, 2012), 
as well as those of their leaders and key thinkers: for SOS, Sopo (2005, 
2007), Boutih (2001), Désir (1987) and Dray (1987); and for MIR Khiari 
(2006, 2009), Tévanian (2007, 2008) and Lévy (2010).  In the case of 
SOS, information on currently-active campaigns (for example those 
aiming to fight discrimination in housing and employment) was also 
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obtained on a 2011 visit to the organisation’s headquarters.  Finally, 
although this was not the main focus of the thesis, semi-structured 
interviews with representatives of each organisation clarified and 
deepened my understanding of their ideologies and actions, and of their 
reaction to the political climate examined in the thesis.  Certainly, the 
objection could be raised that focusing mainly on the movements’ own 
discourse and self-perception is unlikely to produce balanced and neutral 
material.  However, throughout the thesis I have attempted to examine 
this material from a critical perspective, using secondary sources to add 
to the discussion of the key themes identified (see below).  Additional 
primary sources used were contemporary newspaper articles, which 
served to add context and depth to discussions of both government and 
anti-racist action; and extracts from the transcripts of a number of Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s speeches, many taken from the exceptionally useful database 
maintained by Jean Véronis of the Université de Provence 
(http://sites.univ-provence.fr/veronis/Discours2007/), which enabled me to 
develop a clearer and more detailed view of the political context faced by 
the French anti-racist movement than would otherwise have been the 
case. 
 
Although primary sources are at the centre of the thesis and the case for 
its originality, the present work also makes use of an extensive range of 
secondary sources.  Firstly, the thesis draws on the (not extensive) 
contemporary critical literature on the two movements examined.  In the 
case of SOS, particularly relevant material can be found in the work of 
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Robert Gibb (1998, 2003a, 2003b), which discusses key issues such as 
the consistency or otherwise of SOS’s republican positioning since its 
foundation, the problems caused by too great a focus on anti-
discrimination action, and the meaning of the organisation’s discourse on 
métissage.  Analysis of SOS’s ideology can also be found in a number of 
wider-focused texts on racism and anti-racism in France such as Lentin 
(2004) and Fysh and Wolfreys (2003), while its foundation is discussed 
critically by former activists in the 1980s’ Beur movement such as 
Abdallah (2000) and Bouamama (1994).  In the case of MIR, the 
movement been the subject of a number of chapters and papers, for 
example from Sharif Gemie (2010), Stefan Kipfer (2011) and Jérémy 
Robine (2006, 2011), which cumulatively provide a clear background on 
the movement’s preoccupations and ideology.  Taking specifically 
publications in the period of time since 2005 (the start of my timeframe 
and the year of MIR’s foundation) there is undoubtedly more writing on 
MIR than on SOS, perhaps due to its novelty, its controversial, 
iconoclastic positioning and its proximity to debates on postcolonialism.  
The central use for secondary sources in the thesis, however, is for 
background and theory.  Cited particularly regularly are theorists who 
have addressed the question of the relationship between anti-racism and 
French republicanism – a key theme in the thesis – for example  Étienne 
Balibar (1992, 1997, 2001, 2007), who like MIR sees racism as structural 
and systemic, and Pierre-André Taguieff (1987, 1996, 2000), who refuses 
to countenance any form of anti-racism which deviates from republican 
universalism.  Other authors cited on this theme include Silverman (1992, 
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1999), Lloyd (1998) and Koopmans et al. (2005).  The endlessly flexible 
idea of republicanism itself is also a fundamental concept underlying the 
present work, and its meaning is discussed throughout the thesis with 
reference to authors such as Hazareesingh (1994), Sieffert (2006), 
Berstein (2007) and Ferrand (2007).  Additionally, the discussion in the 
thesis of the political context within which the anti-racist movement had to 
operate over 2005-2009 refers to some of the many works on Sarkozy 
and national identity which appeared over this period, for example Noiriel 
(2007a), Martigny (2009), Maillot (2008), De Cock et al. (2008) and 
Meyran (2009).  This is not an exhaustive overview of my secondary 
sources, but to sum up, the secondary sources used establish a 
theoretical and political background; the former focusing particularly on 
the key theme of republicanism and its relationship with French anti-
racism, and the latter on the national identity discourse which defined my 
timeframe.  With this theoretical and political background established, 
primary source-based material is then used to add specific foreground 
detail on my two chosen movements.    
 
With the rationale and parameters of the thesis thus determined, let us 
now consider the structure of the present work. 
 
I will begin in chapter 1 by examining existing perspectives on the issue 
of anti-racism in France, as a means of placing the thesis in academic 
context.  The chapter will be divided into three sections.  The first of these 
considers the central issue of republicanism: what is meant by the term, 
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and most importantly its relationship with French anti-racism.  As I note 
above, the position taken in relation to republicanism is a central dividing 
line between SOS and MIR, and the same dividing line can be seen in 
academic discussion of my chosen subject.  Therefore, in this section I 
look at the contrasting positions taken by key theorists such as Étienne 
Balibar, who questions Enlightenment universalism and sees racism as 
ingrained within France’s republican political structures, and Pierre-André 
Taguieff, who sees no alternative to republicanism as an ideological basis 
for anti-racism.  The second section looks at works focusing on the 
political context of the early-mid 1980s, and more specifically the new 
ideas of the Beur movement and the rise to prominence of SOS Racisme, 
as a means of illustrating still unresolved debates within the anti-racist 
movement, debates relating to issues such as autonomy, and the tension 
between radicalism and consensus.  In the third section, finally, I consider 
the limitations of existing works, noting in particular the substantial 
differences between the political context examined by the majority of 
these works, under Mitterrand in the early-mid 1980s, and the political 
context examined in the present work, under Sarkozy in the early 21st 
century. 
 
Having looked at the academic context of the thesis in chapter 1, chapter 
2 then looks at the political context within which anti-racist organisations 
had to operate over my chosen period: a context which I argue poses 
unique challenges to the movement, and a context whose relationship 
with anti-racism is largely unexamined.  As argued earlier in this 
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introduction, the years examined in the thesis are defined by Nicolas 
Sarkozy and his discourse on national identity, and it is this discourse 
which forms the subject of the chapter.  Taking examples from Sarkozy’s 
speeches across the period, I identify three recurrent themes which are at 
the heart of his conception of national identity.  The first relates to history, 
seen not as complex and multifaceted but as singular and simplistic; a 
parade of ‘Great Men’ and heroic military feats, with immigration 
presented solely as a threat, and the colonial period either ignored or 
seen through the prism of the mission civilisatrice.  The second relates to 
‘anti-repentance’, a term which can be understood as referring to a 
rejection of critical analysis of the more controversial or shameful parts of 
the French past.  This term is used by Sarkozy to present anyone who 
disagrees with his conception of history – critical historians, for example, 
or immigrants whose family histories lead them to view France’s colonial 
history as not wholly benign – as almost akin to traitors, thus reinforcing 
his populist, anti-intellectual, anti-immigrant appeal.  The third, finally, 
relates to the Republic.  The chapter argues that the concept is used by 
Sarkozy as an empty signifier of national identity whose ‘values’ are 
anything he supports.  These values, furthermore, are presented as being 
under threat from immigrants who are charged with ‘not wanting to 
integrate’, and, most of all, from communautarisme.  This term refers 
literally to populations whose primary loyalty is to an ethnic or religious 
group rather than to the Republic, but is used by Sarkozy as a code-word 
which, drawing upon years of negative and exaggerated media reporting, 
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serves to stigmatise France’s Muslim population, presented as inherently 
incompatible with the Republic and its principles. 
 
Chapter 3, meanwhile, is the final contextual chapter ahead of the three 
thematic case-studies which form the centre of the thesis.  This chapter 
serves to analyse in detail the two movements examined in the thesis.  It 
considers each movement in relation to Alana Lentin’s useful idea of a 
continuum of proximity to and distance from mainstream political culture, 
finding SOS to be at the ‘proximity’ end of the spectrum thanks to its view 
of republican political culture as both inherently just and inherently 
favourable to anti-racist aims, and MIR, conversely, to be at the ‘distance’ 
end due to its calling into question of republicanism and anti-system 
conception of the anti-racist struggle (2004: 1).  The chapter considers, 
furthermore, the circumstances of each movement’s foundation, 
illustrates each movement’s ideology with reference to material from 
press releases, official publications and interviews, and illustrates the 
movements’ respective strategies with representative examples of 
initiatives taken over the period examined in the thesis.  Here, SOS’s 
2006 ‘États Généraux pour l’Égalité’, which brings together local anti-
racist movements with sympathetic political figures in an attempt to find 
concrete solutions to problems relating to issues such as employment, 
education and housing, shows the movement’s pragmatism, moderation 
and position at least partially within the political system.  This can be 
contrasted with the anti-colonial and anti-system anger of MIR’s marches 
 30 
in memory of the Sétif massacre of 1945 and the killing of Algerian 
demonstrators in Paris in October 1961. 
 
As noted above, this thesis centres upon three thematic case-study 
chapters, each examining the positions of the two movements in relation 
to three key themes which illustrate the difference between the 
movements, while placing particular emphasis on the contrast in their 
relationship with France’s republican political culture and their adaptation 
to the political climate underlying the present work.  The first of these, 
chapter 4, looks at the movements with regard to national identity, the 
defining theme of my chosen period.  In this chapter, I consider the 
reasons for the movements’ rejection of Sarkozy’s discourse on the 
theme, and then look at the question of whether the movements have 
their own alternative conception.  To take the first of these questions, 
SOS rejects Sarkozy’s presentation of immigration as being in opposition 
to national identity, rejects his use of the language of republicanism in his 
identity discourse, and sees his backwards-looking and exclusionary 
conception of national identity as harmful to the future of French society.  
MIR too is critical of Sarkozy’s presentation of immigration in terms of 
threat, and rejects his conservative and exclusionary identity discourse, 
but additionally makes links between national identity and colonialism, 
and between national identity and what they see as the negative aspects 
of republican universalism.  To take the second question, SOS’s 
alternative vision of society is based around the concept of a République 
métissée, which envisages a single French culture, but a ‘hybrid’ one 
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open to influences from immigrants and their descendants.  MIR on the 
other hand argues for a decoupling of citizenship from rights, and for a 
multicultural model of society, within which immigrants are encouraged to 
preserve and express their own identities. 
 
Chapter 5 moves on to consider the second key theme, that of 
colonialism, which, as in other areas, is framed by the attitude that the 
respective movements display towards republicanism.  Here, the 
movements differ substantially on the questions of whether colonialism – 
or perhaps more accurately colonial memory – has any part to play in the 
anti-racist movement, whether it has any part to play in wider society, and 
the importance of the colonial legacy in understanding contemporary 
society.  SOS, although it acknowledges that colonialism is an important 
area of historical study, is wary of making links between colonialism and 
its favoured republican ideology.  Moreover, it is highly critical of the idea 
that colonial legacies have to be taken into account by anti-racist groups, 
and the idea that colonial memory should contribute to the self-perceived 
identity of post-colonial populations.  In both cases, the movement argues 
that putting too much emphasis on the colonial past leads such 
populations to either be seen as, or see themselves as, eternal victims.  
For SOS, this is a dangerous distraction from the central task of fighting 
inequality and discrimination happening in the present.  MIR, conversely, 
places colonial legacies at the centre of its analysis of contemporary 
society: the police and justice systems are seen as treating post-colonial 
populations comparably to their ancestors during the colonial period; 
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representations of colonial populations are seen as still being at work in 
the discrimination faced by their descendants in modern France; and the 
ideological justification for colonialism is held to exist within France’s 
republican political structures. 
 
Finally, in chapter 6, I consider the issue of ‘race’ (or as there is not 
biologically speaking a French race, ‘visible ethnic difference’) the effect it 
has in society, and whether the acknowledgement of ethnic difference 
has any part to play in the anti-racist movement.  Again, there are 
substantial differences between the two movements on this question, 
differences whose origins can be found in the movements’ contrasting 
views on France’s mainstream republican political culture: whilst SOS 
criticises the government’s implicit racism and discrimination by 
demanding that it remains true to foundational republican principles, MIR 
rejects republicanism, seeing it as an inherent source of racism and 
discrimination.  In this chapter I begin by looking at SOS and its reasons 
for rejecting the idea of ‘race’ in principle.  I then look at an example of 
what this rejection of ethnic classification means in practice, by 
considering the organisation’s initiatives against social inequality and 
discrimination over the period examined in the thesis.  In the second half 
of the chapter, I then look at MIR, and the way in which it sees 
discrimination and racial hierarchies – burned indelibly into France’s 
collective minds by colonialism – as ingrained within the country’s political 
and social structures.  This analysis leads MIR to conclude that the 
central cleavage in French society is not based on wealth, or class, or 
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opportunities for social advancement, but race.  The conclusion to the 
thesis, finally, recaps its central arguments, and considers three 
questions that have emerged from this thesis: what have been the 
strengths and weaknesses of the two movements’ discourse and action 
over my chosen period?  Have the movements had any success in 
imposing their own agendas?  And is the anti-racist movement in fact 
best placed to fight issues such as racism and discrimination, as opposed 
to the State, which theoretically has the ability to ameliorate the 
conditions which encourage racism via action on issues such housing, 
education and (most of all) employment? 
 
To recap, the aim of the present work is to offer a comparative 
perspective on two contrasting anti-racist movements – SOS Racisme 
and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République – and the ideological 
division within French anti-racism which they represent: that is to say, 
their widely differing perspectives on France’s public political culture of 
republicanism.  It will bring in to the public domain a substantial number 
of previously unused primary sources; contribute to debates around the 
meaning and application of republicanism (a vital issue in an apparent 
period of ‘republican consensus’); and will go some way towards making 
up for the lack of sustained academic analysis of the two chosen 
organisations, and of anti-racism itself in the French context.  Perhaps 
most importantly, the analysis is situated within a distinctive political and 
ideological context, based upon both the republicanism mentioned above 
and the predominance of a conservative and potentially exclusionary 
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conception of national identity.  For different reasons, this is a challenging 
context for the movements being examined: SOS finding its chosen 
republican ideology being used – by one of the most powerful political 
organisations in France (that is, the UMP and in particular Sarkozy) – for 
purposes often in contradiction with its own, and MIR’s emphasis on 
colonial memory and multiculturalism being rejected due to a widespread 
hostility towards ‘repentance’ and communautarisme.  This thesis is 
therefore highly relevant to contemporary political and social debates, 
and aims to add to the sum of knowledge within its field, the study of two 
contrasting organisations enabling an in-depth analysis of the complex 
relationship between anti-racism and republican ideology in the French 
context.  The first chapter, as we have seen in the structure outlined 
above, will consider existing scholarship on these key themes of 
republicanism and anti-racism. 
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Chapter 1 
French anti-racism and republicanism: contrasting perspectives 
 
 
The central theme of this chapter is the relationship between anti-racism 
and republican ideology.  The idea of republicanism is unavoidable in any 
discussion of French politics and society, whether at the level of parties or 
the level of non-governmental organisations, and is of specific relevance 
to the anti-racist movement, which has historically constructed itself with 
reference to universalist republicanism.  As Catherine Lloyd argues, ‘the 
republican settlement is predicated on the liberatory and progressive 
power of Enlightenment ideas’, ideas which are ‘echoed in contemporary 
discourses in which they are used to legitimate antiracism’ (1998: 1).  It is 
my argument that contemporary anti-racism in France is defined by its 
relationship with republicanism, but that this relationship works in 
complex and contradictory ways.  This complexity has been exacerbated 
by the political context examined in the thesis (over the years 2005-2009), 
which combines a consensus on the language of republicanism with an 
apparent lack of consensus on its underlying meaning, leading to a 
situation in which this language could be used as rhetorical cover for 
almost any political position.  As Denis Sieffert puts it, ‘La référence 
républicaine fait l’objet de toutes les manipulations.  C’est le danger pour 
ceux qui s’y réfèrent avec une authentique sensibilité sociale.’ (2006: 
128).   
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I argue furthermore that many previous works on anti-racism in France 
have looked at republicanism in a binary way, that is to say, simply as 
something positive or negative, when the relationship between the two 
concepts is in reality highly nuanced.  This close but complex relationship 
is visible in my two chosen movements – SOS Racisme and the 
Mouvement des Indigènes de la République – both of which, like the 
French anti-racist movement in a wider sense, can arguably be defined 
by their relationship with republicanism.  SOS sees its role as promoting 
and protecting ‘republican values’, and ensuring that they are properly 
applied throughout society by the political authorities.  To quote the 
association’s 2007 mission statement, 
 “Il est [...] de notre rôle de rappeler que les valeurs de la 
République sont les seules à même de permettre à chacun de s’épanouir 
dans la société.  Il est de notre rôle de défendre ces valeurs lorsqu’elles 
sont attaquées et remises en cause. [...] Défendre la République, c’est la 
faire considérer comme une source d’émancipation, c’est la rendre 
crédible en faisant que ses valeurs soient vécues par tous et partout dans 
le quotidien.” (‘SOS Racisme, ‘Nos Missions’, 2007) 
In their frequently proclaimed enthusiasm for republicanism, SOS’s 
positions overlap substantially with those of France’s mainstream political 
parties, all of which similarly declare themselves to be supporters of 
republican values – a state of affairs made possible by the existence of 
both left- and right-wing versions of republicanism.  As Sudhir 
Hazareesingh notes: 
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 “[T]he republican tradition was never simply the preserve of a 
particular political formation.  At the height of its ideological influence it 
expressed a vision of society and its basic institutions which appealed to 
a broad range of political organizations, ranging from progressive groups 
on the Left (forces of ‘movement’) to relatively conservative forces of the 
centre Right and even Right (forces of ‘order’).” (1994: 65)  
 
Over my chosen period, however, the association found itself opposed to 
numerous initiatives taken by these self-proclaimed ‘republican’ parties, in 
particular those of the UMP, whose leader Nicolas Sarkozy used 
republican rhetoric to a substantial extent in a highly conservative and 
arguably exclusionary discourse on national identity, one which, entirely 
contrary to the positions of the similarly ‘republican’ SOS, served to 
scapegoat immigrants and France’s Muslim population.  
 
MIR, too, had a somewhat ambiguous relationship with republicanism 
over my chosen period.  Certainly, the organisation – almost uniquely 
within the French anti-racist movement – defined itself largely against 
republicanism, France’s dominant political ideology being seen as 
providing rhetorical justification for colonialism, and as incorporating 
implicit racial hierarchies and stereotypes still having a negative effect on 
the lives and prospects of ‘post-colonial’ populations today.  Referring to 
Jacques Chirac’s televised address during the large-scale urban 
disturbances of autumn 2005, in which the former President represented 
mainstream republican orthodoxy by stating that ‘Je veux dire aux enfants 
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des quartiers difficiles, quelles que soient leurs origines, qu’ils sont tous 
les filles et les fils de la République’, Jérémy Robine notes of MIR that: 
 “C’est précisément ce que les “Indigènes de la République” 
contestent, arguant que cela n’est pas le cas [...] mais aussi que cela n’a 
jamais été le cas, et que cela ne le sera jamais.  La nation française est 
analysée comme essentiellement raciste, du fait d’une construction 
historique longue.  Il s’agit donc de rompre avec celle-ci, au profit d’une 
lutte des populations issues de l’immigration des ex-colonies, en leur nom 
propre.  Or, celles-ci ont été dominés dans la colonisation et les traites 
comme ils le sont dans les ghettos, au motif de leur “race”.” (2011: 149) 
Despite MIR’s radical anti-republican discourse, however, it is possible to 
find in the organisation’s literature preoccupations shared with republican-
based movements, and even uses of republican-influenced language.  In 
the Appel des Indigènes de la République of 2005 for example, MIR 
argues that ‘Il est urgent de promouvoir des mesures radicales de justice 
et d’égalité qui mettent un terme aux discriminations racistes dans l’accès 
au travail, au logement, à la culture et à la citoyenneté’; links ‘la lutte anti-
coloniale’ with ‘[le] combat pour l’égalité sociale’ (stating that ‘Dien Bien 
Phu n’est pas une défaite mais une victoire de la liberté, de l’égalité et de 
la fraternité!’); and proclaims the need for ‘un combat commun de tous les 
opprimés et exploités pour une démocratie sociale véritablement 
égalitaire et universelle.’  As we have seen then, although both SOS and 
MIR can arguably be defined by their relationships with republicanism, 
these relationships are far from being clear-cut. 
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The first section of this chapter will set out the theoretical background and 
context, considering what is meant by republicanism, and why French 
anti-racism has traditionally been so closely linked with the concept.  In 
the second I will move on to consider the positions of a number of 
analysts of French anti-racism on the relationship of the movement with 
the Republic and its principles, contrasting analysts who call into question 
republicanism (arguably the most prominent in the French case being 
Étienne Balibar) with those who see it as the only acceptable 
organisational principle for the movement such as Pierre-André Taguieff, 
perhaps the best known writer on questions of racism and anti-racism in 
France.  In the third section meanwhile, I retrace the roots of 
contemporary debates around anti-racism and republicanism via a 
discussion of the movement in the 1980s, a period in which differing 
conceptions of the role of anti-racism were represented on the one hand 
by the autonomy and new thinking of the Beur movement, which in some 
ways served as a model for MIR, and on the other by SOS, which then as 
now represented the mainstream, consensual, republican perspective.  I 
end the chapter, finally, with a discussion of the limitations of previous 
works and provide a rationale for the originality of this thesis through 
comparing and contrasting the political context examined by many 
previous works with that examined in the thesis.  Let us begin, then, by 
considering the theoretical context of the chapter. 
 
 
Why anti-racism and republicanism? 
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Alastair Bonnett defines the fundamental meaning of anti-racism as 
‘those forms of thought and/or practice that seek to confront, eradicate 
and/or ameliorate racism.  Anti-racism implies the ability to identify a 
phenomenon – racism – and to do something about it.’ (2000: 4).  The 
form that this ‘thought’ and ‘practice’ takes, however, varies substantially 
between different national political contexts.  In the French case, 
republicanism – a long-standing belief system derived from 
Enlightenment universalism and summed up by the ideals of liberté, 
égalité and fraternité – is central to any discussion of anti-racism, whether 
of mainstream organisations like SOS which define themselves as being 
in favour of republican values (and present anti-racism as being inherent 
to such values), or of anti-system movements like MIR which largely 
define themselves against republican values.  As such, I would like to 
begin this section by considering further what is meant by republicanism.  
Although the term can be understood in a number of different ways (for 
example as referring to a type of political regime with a strong President, 
centralised institutions and a tradition of seeing the State as ‘protecteur 
des plus faibles’ (Berstein 2007: 10)), I intend to focus here on 
republicanism as an ideology; a system of ideas which is bound up with 
the exercise of political power in the French context. 
 
A number of authors have attempted to define the key ideas found within 
republican ideology.  Sieffert, for instance, outlines the beliefs of a typical 
21st century republican as follows:  
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 “[C]’est un personnage à la fois préoccupé par la question sociale 
et profondément laïque, c’est- à-dire soucieux de maintenir une ligne de 
partage ferme entre la sphère privée propre à chaque individu et l’espace 
public. [...] On ajoutera qu’il regarde toujours le phénomène religieux 
avec méfiance, sinon avec hostilité, qu’il a en horreur l’affirmation des 
particularismes identitaires.” (2006: 13) 
 
Many of the features of republicanism identified by Sieffert fit comfortably 
with the ideas of mainstream anti-racist movements such as SOS: the 
emphasis on the ‘social question’ (that is, how to solve problems around 
socio-economic inequality and discrimination); the belief in laïcité; and the 
discomfort with the expression of particularist – generally ethnically- or 
religiously-based – identities.  Much the same could be said for the 
‘République laïque, sociale et progressiste’ outlined by Éric Ferrand 
(2007: 10), which claims for ‘valeurs républicaines’ ideas such as ‘la 
primauté du politique sur l’économique et de l’intérêt général, mieux, la 
volonté générale sur les intérêts particuliers, mais aussi la promotion par 
l’égalité des chances, le travail comme droit et comme fondement du droit 
social.’ (ibid) 
 
Perhaps unfortunately for the anti-racist movement however, 
republicanism is not simply a matter of equality of opportunity, full 
employment, laïcité and concern for the ‘social question’.  It is important 
to note that over my chosen period every political party and social 
movement aiming to participate in the mainstream has attempted to lay 
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claim to republican values, a state of affairs made possible by the 
inherent flexibility of the concept.  As Berstein notes, in contemporary 
France there exists ‘une culture politique républicaine de caractère 
consensuel, de plus en plus fréquemment invoquée par les gouvernants 
de gauche et de droite comme le socle du pacte social garantissant 
l’identité nationale.’ (2007: 13)  It is this combination of consensus and 
flexibility which leads to a situation in which different political groupings 
use the language of republicanism for seemingly irreconcilable purposes.  
Hence, as Sarah Waters argues, at the same time as the Left’s debates 
around republicanism ‘often involve a re-examination of political traditions, 
the legacy of the Revolution and the significance of republican values in 
order to devise responses to today’s social problems’ (2012: 43), the 
Right is able to use the Republic ‘to justify the most hardline and 
discriminatory laws against immigrants, implemented in the name of 
strictly defined republican ideals and in particular, the principle of 
secularism.’ (2012: 42).  Republicanism, therefore, is not a neutral system, 
but is closely linked with relationships of power within the French political 
arena.  In a context where every mainstream political organisation 
declares itself to be in favour of republican values, but what exactly these 
values are is not the subject of consensus, the battle to define the way in 
which they should be interpreted is a highly important one in the French 
political arena, perhaps even the most important battle of all.   
 
But what of the relationship between anti-racism and republicanism in the 
French context?  This has traditionally been a close one, due to the way 
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in which mainstream anti-racist groups have had a tendency to conceive 
of France’s republican political culture as inherently compatible with their 
aims, often drawing on key historical touchstones such as the Dreyfus 
Affair and the Resistance.  Alana Lentin sums up this tendency well in her 
2004 book Racism and Anti-racism in Europe: 
 “The importance periodically placed on anti-racism in French post-
war politics reflects the extent to which, rather than being the preserve of 
groups of the racially marginalised, it has been constructed as inherently 
French, and therefore hegemonic.  The ideals of anti-racism have been 
construed as universally applicable through their connection with the 
republican principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, strongly 
emphasised by the large established anti-racist organisations: the LICRA, 
LDH, MRAP and, more recently, SOS Racisme.” (2004: 115) 
The French anti-racist movement in many cases traces its lineage to the 
Enlightenment, and to the universalist ideals associated with it, a linkage 
made explicit by Loïc Rigaud of SOS Racisme’s comité national, who in a 
2011 interview defined the organisation’s conception of ‘national identity’ 
as follows:  
 “Pour nous, c’est la France des Lumières. [...] Une France 
progressiste, qui accueille tout le monde; basée sur les principes 
universalistes, républicaines, d’égalité.  À savoir, on ne considère pas 
l’origine des gens en fonction de leur situation sociale.  On pense que 
notre identité nationale serait l’identité des droits de l’homme; l’identité 
d’une France terre d’immigration.” (Interview with Loïc Rigaud, 29.3.2011) 
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The movement in France, at the mainstream level at least, is therefore 
representative of what Koopmans et al refer to as ‘universalist antiracism’ 
(2005: 225): ‘In France’, they write, ‘antiracism is clearly grounded in 
universal principles, notably of unity of humanity, and a denial of 
particular identities in order to obtain a strict equality between individuals 
belonging to the same national community.  Equality between groups and 
tolerance for plural identities would constitute a major breach of 
republican ideals.’ (2005: 230) 
We therefore have a situation in which anti-racism is conceived of as 
inherently compatible with republican ideals, a situation which has two 
major consequences.  Firstly, anti-racism is seen by its mainstream 
practitioners not as challenging the political system and its ideological 
basis, but as part of the same system and the same traditions.  As Lentin 
notes, this leads ‘majoritarian’ organisations (such as SOS) to ‘use the 
myths and symbols generally associated with patriotism to attack racism’ 
(2004: 126), hence her term ‘hegemonic’ to describe republican anti-
racism.  And secondly, only one way of being an anti-racist movement is 
seen as acceptable to respectable political opinion: one which rejects 
multiculturalism, communautarisme and particularist identities in favour of 
an emphasis on universalist republicanism.  Whilst there is nothing 
intrinsically wrong with republican values as a basis for French anti-
racism – it is hard to object in principle to liberté, égalité and fraternité – 
this lack of flexibility within mainstream French anti-racism leads to a lack 
of room for manoeuvre with regards to the creation and promotion of new 
discourses and conceptions of society, and furthermore leads it to be 
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vulnerable to the appropriation of republican language by more powerful 
political actors – such as Nicolas Sarkozy over the years examined in this 
thesis – who may use it for purposes which go against those favoured by 
anti-racist organisations.  
 
Certainly, the existence of this link between anti-racism and 
republicanism has been challenged.  The MIR-affiliated sociologist Pierre 
Tévanian for instance, like the movement of which he is part, argues that 
republicanism should be associated not with the fight against racism but 
with racism itself.  He writes: 
 “Il est vrai [...] qu’”au nom de la République”, ou plus précisément 
de “ses principes”, la liberté, l’égalité et la fraternité, des luttes 
d’émancipation ont été menées.  Mais, justement, si la signification d’un 
mot dépend des forces qui s’en emparent, il est patent qu’aujourd’hui, le 
mot “République” est plus souvent prononcé pour justifier une inégalité et 
“remettre à leur place” les immigrés et leurs enfants que pour revendiquer 
une réelle égalité de traitement.” (2007: 8) 
What is less clear, however, is how this analysis translates into reality.  It 
is undoubtedly possible to argue that republican rhetoric has been used 
as cover for the stigmatisation of immigrants and their descendants; that 
‘l’État républicain a rarement été fidèle à ses idéaux’ (Tévanian 2007: 9); 
and that anti-racism should therefore be separated from republicanism.  
In practice however, anti-racist groups operating within the French 
political context are in somewhat of a bind, in that they effectively have to 
advocate republican principles in order to participate in the political 
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mainstream.  Of course, movements which challenge republican 
orthodoxy – such as MIR – have always existed.  However, movements 
which choose to take this position, almost without exception, are 
restricted to the status of outsiders.  
 
In the first section of this chapter I have aimed to set out its conceptual 
background, considering what is meant by republicanism and some of the 
reasons why the ideals implied in it have traditionally been closely linked 
with anti-racism.  In the next section I will move on to examine the 
perspectives of notable analysts of French anti-racism on the question of 
republicanism: does it act as an impediment to the movement?  Is racism 
embedded within the structures of the republican state?  Or, on the 
contrary, is republicanism the only effective means of organising the fight 
against racism? 
 
 
Republican ideology and French anti-racism: benefit or impediment? 
 
Having considered in the previous section the close relationship between 
French anti-racism and republicanism, in this section I intend to look at a 
number of contrasting viewpoints on the consequences of this 
relationship, asking whether an emphasis on republicanism undermines 
the anti-racist cause, or on the contrary acts as a sound ideological basis 
for the movement.  I will begin by considering Étienne Balibar, whose 
ideas – such as linking the Enlightenment universalism which underpins 
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the Republic with the creation of racial stereotypes and hierarchies – 
have proved highly influential amongst radical, anti-system movements in 
the field of anti-racism in France.  I will then look at the perspectives of 
several Anglophone critics, many (Alana Lentin and Max Silverman, for 
example) influenced by Balibar themselves, on the question of the 
relationship between French anti-racism and republicanism, finding a 
common belief that republicanism is overly inflexible and forms an 
obstacle to the movement adapting to contemporary society.  Finally, by 
way of contrast, I will consider the positions of Pierre-André Taguieff, 
perhaps the best-known analyst of French anti-racism, who sees a solid 
foundation in universalist republicanism as a prerequisite for a movement 
which is both effective and grounded in French political tradition.        
 
Perhaps the most prominent French analyst of anti-racism to take an 
‘anti-system’ position and thereby call into question the Republic1, the 
nation-state and France’s self-image is the post-Althusserian political 
philosopher Étienne Balibar.  Along similar lines to MIR over the period 
examined in the thesis, Balibar sees racism not as alien and external, but 
as inherent within the structures of French society.  As he puts it in Les 
frontières de la démocratie (1992): 
 “La thèse principale que je défends est celle de la structure 
institutionnelle du racisme.  Tout racisme n’est pas un racisme d’État, 
mais tout racisme est ancré dans la structure des institutions et dans le 
                                                 
1 Or at least, to engage critically with republicanism, for example through his idea of 
égaliberté, within which Balibar posits that equality and liberty are inseparable, but that 
both are frequently denied to parts of the population; leading him to reflect on the 
contradictions of universalist discourse in politics (see Balibar 1992, 2010)  
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rapport conscient ou inconscient des masses à ces institutions.” (1992: 
11) 
And as Catherine Lloyd sums up Balibar’s position: 
 “[Balibar] sees the institutional structure of racism in contemporary 
France as arising from a contradiction between the egalitarian claims of 
the liberal state and its citizens’ limited enjoyment of such rights.  Racism, 
he contends, is a strategy of dominant groups to reproduce their 
conditions of domination.” (1998: 16)  
For Balibar therefore, racism is inherent within republican political culture, 
this culture being seen as resulting from the Enlightenment ideals which 
form the basis of much of modern Western political thought.  According to 
Balibar’s critique, this fact results in a major paradox in the relationship 
between anti-racism and the republican state.  Whilst he argues that 
racism exists within the (republican-based) structures of French society, 
at the same time ‘l’État est en même temps officiellement “antiraciste”’ 
(1992: 87), due to its insistence on the equality of every citizen regardless 
of origin.  This potential disconnect between reality and self-perception 
can be seen in the practice of anti-racist action, for instance in Sopo’s 
account of his organisation’s fight against racial discrimination: the 
attitude of many of those in political power, he writes, was that ‘[les 
discriminations] ne peuvent constituer un phénomène généralisé puisque 
la France les refuse, comme la devise républicaine en atteste’ (2005: 39). 
 
Balibar develops further his ideas on race, the state and republicanism in 
his discussion of nationalism in Race, nation, classe (1997).  Here Balibar 
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notes that theoretical racism is implicitly based on principles of 
classification and hierarchy; on the idea of what it is to be ‘human’ and 
‘civilised’.  These concepts of course figure strongly in the Enlightenment 
notions of progress and perfectibility which intellectually underpinned the 
Revolution, European modernity and the formation of the French nation 
state.  The Enlightenment sought to define ‘universal’ values, related to 
the human hierarchy (although it can be argued that this thinking was not 
‘neutral’ or ‘universal’ at all but rooted in Western European culture of the 
18th and 19th centuries, but that is another question).  These ‘universal’ 
values, however, were made or claimed in relation to the ‘fictive identity’ 
of the civilised nation state, of which France saw and sees itself as the 
apotheosis.  As Balibar acknowledges, this makes the business of 
opposing racism all the more difficult.  He writes: 
 “Il n’y aurait pas tant de difficultés à organiser intellectuellement la 
lutte contre le racisme si le “crime contre l’humanité” ne se perpétrait pas 
au nom et au moyen d’un discours humaniste.” (1997: 85) 
That is to say, ‘racism’ claims – at the theoretical level – to be defending 
universalistic, ‘civilised’ human values within the particular national 
context, based on the human hierarchy implicit within such values.  This 
questioning of republican universalism, and vision of ingrained racial 
hierarchies existing within France’s ostensibly egalitarian political culture, 
follows similar lines to the critiques made by MIR over the period 
examined in the thesis.  However, it also has potential implications for 
SOS: by choosing to participate in the ‘republican consensus’ – a 
consensus which operates at the level of language, but not at the level of 
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its underlying meaning – the movement, despite of course not favouring 
racial division and hierarchy, has serious difficulties in differentiating its 
discourse from that of political actors who use the language of republican 
universalism to implicitly racist and/or discriminatory ends. 
 
As we have now seen then, Balibar sees racism as inherent to the 
structures of French society, state and nation and in fact as existing 
within the Enlightenment thinking which forms the background of French 
political culture to the present day.  If Balibar’s critique is to be accepted, 
how can anti-racist groups hope to challenge the dominant discourse in 
this area?  On the basis of his analysis of the Beur movement, to be 
considered shortly, he would say that it was the job of such groups to 
promote new thinking around the ideas of citizenship and nationality.  
However, in the political climate of 2005-2009, which was largely hostile 
to anything outside traditional republican values, could a group 
advocating such new thinking make itself heard?  And if racism exists 
within the Enlightenment thinking which underpins republican ideology, 
can a group like SOS Racisme, which strongly advocates this ideology, 
hope to solve France’s problems in this area? 
 
Although Balibar is focused on anti-racism more indirectly than directly – 
in that, if as he claims racism is systemic, and inherent to the 
Enlightenment values which underpin the Republic, it would seem 
counterproductive for the anti-racist movement to base its appeal on 
‘republican values’ – he does address the movement in his writing on the 
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Beur movement of the early-mid 1980s; a period in which Balibar saw the 
potential for a ‘profond bouleversement idéologique et politique de 
l’identité nationale’ (1992: 71).  Balibar’s writing on this subject raises an 
important question, one which has arguably been the central argument in 
French anti-racist circles since the early 1980s: should the anti-racist 
movement fight for a new conception of society, or should it focus simply 
on promoting and protecting republican values?  As may be expected, 
Balibar is very much in the first of these camps, and as can be seen in his 
discussion of the Convergence 84 march, he saw in the Beur movement 
possible directions for this new vision of society.  The Convergence 
marchers, he argues, denounce ‘le faux “problème de l’immigration”’ and 
demand ‘la pure et simple reconnaissance de leurs droits’ (1992: 73).  
They are not unaware, furthermore, of ‘les rapports de forces et de 
classes’ (ibid), designating their ‘vrais problèmes’: 
 “Celui du racisme, ancré dans les institutions avant de l’être dans 
les consciences (et les inconscients); celui de l’inégalité devant la fortune, 
l’emploi, la culture, le pouvoir, qui règne dans la société française à 
l’encontre des intérêts du plus grand nombre.” (1992: 74) 
Balibar, therefore, sees the demands of the Beurs as beneficial to French 
society as a whole, and at that point in time seemed hopeful of a new 
direction in anti-racism inspired by the movement, calling for ‘une volonté 
politique collective capable de peser en permanence sur les choix 
gouvernementaux’ (1992: 78).  However, returning to the question in the 
introduction, written several years later, he finds the movement ‘divisé et 
affaibli, sous l’effet de ses conflits internes, de son isolement dans la 
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société française, de l’aggravation de la “galère” dans les banlieues et de 
la stratégie dilatoire des pouvoirs publics’ (1992: 12).  Balibar argues that 
it is thanks to the Beur movement that notions of ‘intégration’, ‘droit à la 
différence’ and ‘la contradiction citoyenneté / nationalité’ (1992: 11) were 
brought to the forefront of political discussion, and with the benefit of 
further hindsight he was right to do so.  Certainly, such issues have never 
enjoyed a higher profile than they did in the early-mid 1980s, and what is 
more, it has no obvious heir as a relatively visible and publicly-known 
movement bringing to the surface complex questions like these.  It could 
perhaps be argued that although MIR, as an autonomous movement 
challenging republican orthodoxy and claiming to support an ambitious 
restructuring of French society, follows the lead of the Beur movement in 
some respects, we will see later on that it is less widely-known, positions 
itself further away from the mainstream, and places more emphasis on 
colonialism and, relatively speaking, less on questions of social justice.  
Whilst Balibar in 1992 seems to see some prospect of the Beur 
movement, or something like it, returning to prominence, in the period 
under discussion in the thesis this prospect arguably seemed further 
away than ever, with any organisation based on ethnicity or religion being 
seen as an example of communautarisme, and thus to be instantly 
dismissed by the mainstream.2  
                                                 
2 The rise of communautarisme as the subject of intense political debate is discussed by 
the sociologist Fabrice Dhume, who in a 2010 paper argues that ‘la diffusion quantitative 
de ce néologisme typiquement français va de pair avec un changement qualitatif de la 
configuration du discours politique.  Cette nouvelle catégorie autorise un réarmement de 
l’idéololgie ethnonationaliste qui soutient l’État-Nation, et permet la diffusion dans le 
“débat” national de thèmes de plus en plus interprétés sous l’angle de la menace à 
l’égard d’un “ennemi intérieur”’ (L’emergence d’une figure obsessionelle: comment le 
“communautarisme” a envahi les discours médiatico-politiques français, REVUE 
Asylon(s), No. 8, juillet 2010)  
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Balibar’s writing here is arguably heavily influenced by the context of the 
early-mid 1980s, one in which the anti-racist movement was setting out 
ideas for a radical rethinking of national identity, some of which coincided 
with Balibar’s own thinking, notably on the link between citizenship and 
rights, and how to re-articulate such rights within the (republican) nation-
state.  As a post-Althusserian political philosopher he would not be 
claiming to make a sociological study of anti-racist movements; 
furthermore, his attitude to state institutions is a complex one.  As we 
have seen, a key theme in Balibar’s work is ‘la structure institutionnelle du 
racisme’ (1992: 11), hence his critique of political institutions and the 
formation of the modern nation-state.  At the same time however, Hewlett 
(2007) criticises Balibar for having ‘too much faith in the capacity of the 
modern state and its structures in bringing about radical transformation 
(2007: 140).  For Hewlett, Balibar ‘appears to believe that the necessary 
political as well as socio-economic upheavals have been achieved to 
bring about the flowering of a profoundly democratic and just society’ 
(ibid).  If Hewlett’s position is to be accepted, there would be a 
contradiction between Balibar’s ‘positions in support of emancipatory 
investigations on one hand and political positions which would effect 
relatively little change on the other’ (ibid).  Although anti-racism is not the 
primary focus of Balibar’s writing, his work raises numerous questions 
relevant to this thesis.  As Hewlett writes, ‘at the heart of [Balibar’s] 
definition of the political is the notion of emancipation, with the defiant 
actions of ordinary people taking centre-stage’ (2007: 116).  Lloyd too 
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appears to agree with this interpretation of Balibar’s work, arguing that 
‘[Balibar] supports an antiracist strategy which promotes the autonomous 
organisation of immigrants and mobilises communal traditions of 
resistance to exploitation’ (1998: 17).  Hewlett, then, identifies a tension 
between on the one hand Balibar’s endorsement of agency and 
autonomy as prerequisites for meaningful political action and on the other 
hand the way in which, elsewhere, Balibar appears to lend more weight to 
the constricting political frameworks within which anti-racism frequently 
has to operate. 
 
The perspective that an inflexible emphasis on republican values is 
harmful to French anti-racism appears also to be particularly widespread 
in the Anglophone literature on the movement, perhaps due to scepticism 
over French claims to ‘universality’.  Lentin, for instance, sees the ‘colour-
blindness’ and discomfort with difference embodied by republicanism as 
an impediment to identifying and dealing with the genuinely existing 
‘racialisation’ of substantial sections of the French population: 
 “French anti-racism’s unease as regards the idea of ‘race’ 
undoubtedly, as Varikas (1998) rightly points out, stems from the wish to 
delegitimise its biological and hierarchical connotations.  However, the 
forcefulness with which the egalitarianism of French republican culture is 
upheld as a panacea for all forms of discrimination means that there is a 
failure to conceive of racism differently from other discriminations.  
Racialisation is therefore stripped of its continual power to exclude and 
violate.” (2004: 116) 
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Max Silverman, meanwhile – on similar lines to MIR, and to Balibar – 
sees racism as intimately bound up with the formation of the nation-state, 
and consequently sees a serious contradiction in the mainstream French 
anti-racist movement’s emphasis on republican patriotism: 
 “The structural nature of racism within the nation-state (so blandly 
effaced in simplistic notions of the universalist, individualist and 
assimilationist tradition) creates problems for the Left’s opposition to 
racism, as the nationalist tradition is also a fundamental part of its own 
ideology.” (1992: 119) 
 
A further example of the tendency towards criticism of republicanism in 
the Anglophone literature on French anti-racism can be found in Peter 
Fysh and Jim Wolfreys’ The Politics of Racism in France (2003), a work 
whose focus is on two interlinked questions: the unexpected strength of 
racism in France – as demonstrated by the enduring success of the Front 
National, the main focus of their work – and the failure of the anti-racist 
movement successfully to combat it.  They argue that the French 
Republic has never truly lived up to its promises of universalist equality: 
 ““We argue that anti-racism in France, when confronted by the rise 
of the National Front, suffered from two key weaknesses.  One was 
overestimation of the degree to which the principles of political liberty and 
administrative and cultural uniformity, exalted by the country which has 
enshrined the ‘Rights of Man’ in a succession of republican constitutions, 
would or could guarantee fair and equal treatment of newcomers.  The 
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other is an inadequate understanding of the principal racist organisation 
in France, the National Front.” (2003: 3) 
Along similar lines to a number of writers – Gildea (2002), to take one 
example – Fysh and Wolfreys argue that the Republic’s ‘founding 
principles’ are often ‘founding myths’: that is, they are aspirational rather 
than effectual (a sentiment perhaps echoed in the distinction made by 
MIR between the ‘République rêvée’ and the ‘République réelle’, as will 
be seen in chapter 3).  They go on to make the case that because of the 
deep embedding of the theory of uniformity mentioned above, anti-racist 
groups have too often been weak at defending even small aspects of the 
‘right to be different’, in their view limiting the effectiveness of these 
groups.  Moreover, they go as far as to say that French anti-racist 
movements have tended to be ‘undermined by the republican model’ 
(2003: 208); in this sense directly challenging the ideas of a thinker such 
as Pierre-André Taguieff (to be discussed later on in this chapter), who 
favours consistent rational argument and a reliance on the traditional 
social mechanisms of republican integration in the fight against racism. 
 
Analysts such as Lentin, Silverman and Fysh and Wolfreys, therefore, 
examine anti-racism’s relationship with republican discourse through the 
prism of the limitations that this relationship creates.  How can this 
positioning be judged?  In many ways such analysts are correct to be 
critical of the Republic and its role in French anti-racist discourse.  It is 
justified to say (like Fysh and Wolfreys) that republicanism has frequently 
not lived up to its promises of universalism and equality in reality, a 
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problem acknowledged and discussed at length by former SOS President 
Dominique Sopo – a commentator highly favourable towards 
republicanism – in his 2005 book SOS antiracisme: 
 “Comprenons-nous bien: les personnes issues de l’immigration ne 
sont pas tant frustrées par leur situation objective d’infériorité dans la 
société française que par le fait que la République ne semble pas leur 
offrir de perspectives de progrès pour elles et leurs enfants.  Elles ont 
conscience, pour l’immense majorité d’entre elles, que la disparition des 
ghettos urbains, du racisme et des discriminations sera un chemin 
nécessairement long.  Elles demandent juste que ceux qui ont la charge 
des politiques publiques empruntent ce chemin.” (2005: 46) 
It is justified, furthermore, to say (like Silverman) that Enlightenment-
influenced universalism, which went on to form the ideological basis of 
republicanism, and thus also of mainstream anti-racism in France, has at 
times been used not as a means of promoting equality, but as a 
rationalisation for the creation of racial hierarchies and inequality, in 
particular in the context of colonialism and the so-called mission 
civilisatrice (Balibar 1997, Khiari 2006, 2009).  And it is justified to say 
(like Lentin) that republican-based French anti-racism is indeed highly 
uncomfortable with the idea of difference, to the extent that movements 
like SOS have frequently attempted to fight ethnically-based 
discrimination using initiatives which refuse resolutely to take into account 
ethnicity, even as a means of judging the efficacy of such initiatives 
(Simon 2006, De Rudder 2000).  
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At the same time however, it could be argued that such critiques 
underestimate a number of factors about France’s relationship with 
republicanism, and the relationship between republicanism and French 
anti-racism.  The first factor to be underestimated is the extent of the 
attachment to and pride in republican values in France – even if their 
exact definition is up for debate – and their centrality to the country’s self-
image (the statement in the introduction to SOS’s Manifeste pour l’égalité 
that ‘La devise de notre République renferme en elle les valeurs les plus 
belles et les plus universelles’ (2007: 11) is representative of this 
viewpoint).  It is perhaps unrealistic to say simply that they are a myth 
and the anti-racist movement should leave them behind, whatever 
elements of truth are contained in the proposition.  The second factor to 
be underestimated, very much linked to the first, relates to the practical 
issues raised earlier in this chapter: that anti-racist groups effectively 
have to emphasise republicanism in order to participate in the political 
mainstream.  Again, whilst greater ideological flexibility within the 
movement may be beneficial (for example in allowing the use of ethnic 
statistics to gauge the effectiveness of anti-discrimination action, or 
placing greater emphasis on colonial memory) building a new, non-
republican ideological framework whilst continuing to influence 
mainstream debate is easier said than done.  The third factor to be 
underestimated is the willingness of republican-influenced anti-racist 
activists to question and critique their favoured ideology.  As can be seen 
in the quotation from Sopo above, there is acknowledgement that the 
republican system is not running as it should, and that it needs to improve 
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and live up to its promises if immigrants and their descendants are not to 
become alienated from and hostile towards French society: the discourse 
of movements like SOS is not just unthinking and abstract proclamations 
of republican patriotism.  The fourth factor to be underestimated, finally, is 
the effectiveness of universalist republicanism as a rhetorical basis for 
movements, like anti-racism, which aim to promote equality.  As Tzvetan 
Todorov argues for instance (directly contradicting the argument of MIR, 
which links Enlightenment universalism with racism and colonial 
subjugation), ‘The anti-colonialist movements were [...] directly inspired 
by the principles of the Enlightenment, in particular when they posited 
human universality, equality between peoples and individual freedom.’ 
(2009: 31)  Pierre Tévanian, who raises the issue of republicanism solely 
to attack it as a justification for racism, acknowledges himself that ‘Il est 
vrai [...] qu’”au nom de la République”, ou plus précisément de “ses 
principes”, la liberté, l’égalité et la fraternité, des luttes d’émancipation ont 
été menées’ (2007: 8).  It is undoubtedly the case that there has always 
been significant tension within anti-racist and anti-colonial movements 
between the emancipatory power of universalist republican language and 
its potential use as a justification for racial hierarchies and discrimination 
(as noted by authors like Balibar and Silverman and movements like MIR).  
Despite the imperfections and contradictions contained within republican 
values however, liberté, égalité, fraternité remains a succinct, effective 
and resonant call for social justice.  Indeed, it often appears that in the 
French context, even analysts critical of republicanism can never entirely 
separate themselves from the idea.  Just as MIR has periodically utilised 
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the language of republicanism as a means of demanding a genuine 
universalising of its principles, Balibar’s ideas on ‘new citizenship’ can 
also be seen from this perspective: while he critiques the link between 
nationality and citizenship, his emphasis on citizenship as a concept is 
itself somewhat ‘republican’.     
 
In this section of the chapter I have considered different authors’ 
perspectives on the effect of France’s republican political culture on anti-
racist groups.  So far, I have examined the viewpoints (seemingly, it must 
be noted, much more widespread in the critical literature than in than in 
mainstream political debate) that this culture could limit the effectiveness 
of anti-racist movements, and that racism is in fact inherent within the 
social structures of the republican state (the position of Balibar and, as 
we will see later on in the thesis, MIR).  Before ending the section 
however, I would like to consider the positions of Pierre-André Taguieff, 
perhaps the most influential and prolific writer on anti-racism in France, 
who looks at the issue from an entirely different angle: his central 
argument on the theme is that close adherence to universalist republican 
principles is the only way to organise the movement, and that any other 
approach is both contrary to French political traditions and inevitably 
doomed to failure. 
 
Throughout his work, Taguieff therefore makes clear his rejection of non-
republican conceptions of anti-racism.  In 1996’s La République menacée, 
for instance, he dismisses the idea of ‘une démocratie multi-ethnique et 
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pluriculturelle, fondée sur le principe de l’égalité entre “communautés”’ 
(1996: 72) – an idea similar to that which would later be proposed by MIR, 
whose concept for reforming ‘national identity’ is based around 
multiculturalism and equality between cultures as well as individuals – as 
‘[une] utopie confuse, dangereuse’ (ibid).  Similarly, he has warned 
consistently of the dangers of allowing communautarisme and 
particularist identities into the anti-racist movement.  As he puts it in a 
1996 article entitled ‘Les raisons d’un échec patent: Les sept péchés de 
l’antiracisme’ (in Bitterlin (ed.) 1996): 
 “Les arguments particularistes sont également distribués chez les 
“antiracistes” et les “racistes”, dont le principe commun est ainsi 
formulable: à chacun son groupe, son identité ou sa différence, qu’il lui 
faut défendre contre des ennemis haïssables.  Ce qui paraît une véritable 
nouveauté, dans l’espace public français, c’est la naissance d’un 
antiracisme communautaire, ethnocentré, élevant un obstacle inattendu 
devant les efforts déployés par les partisans iréniques du modèle 
républicain d’intégration.” (1996: 19) 
In making such a critique, Taguieff arguably anticipates the mainstream 
‘republican’ consensus on anti-communautarisme found over the period 
examined in this thesis, a consensus which at times led both SOS and 
Sarkozy, despite their substantial differences in orientation, to denounce 
the concept with equal vehemence.  He also arguably anticipates the 
criticisms that would go on to be made of MIR, which even if it claims to 
base its action ‘sur une identité politique plutôt qu’ethnique’ (Robine 2011: 
152), has been the subject of a certain amount of suspicion from pro-
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republican commentators, due to its emphasis on multiculturalism, 
colonial memory and Islamophobia, and its high concentration of 
members with origins in France’s former colonies in North Africa: as 
Robine acknowledges, ‘La nature du “nous” de l’appel a été l’un des 
motifs principaux de critique.  Il serait “communautariste” d’après ceux qui 
se sont le plus frontalement opposés à la démarche des Indigènes de la 
République.” (2011: 153) 
 
As may be expected given this strong rejection of multiculturalism and 
particularist identities, Taguieff has consistently argued in favour of 
republicanism.  In La République menacée, for example, he argues that 
the central political project in France should be the following:  
 “Redéfinir et surtout réaffirmer clairement la légitimité et la 
nécessité actuelle du cadre national à la républicaine, replacer l’idéal de 
laïcité au cœur du civisme, faire enfin de la citoyenneté française un motif 
de fierté.” (1996: 56) 
He goes as far as to argue that the central division in French society is 
between the Republic and its ‘enemies’: 
 “Ce qu’il faut défendre et illustrer, c’est l’idée républicaine.  Le 
grand clivage se situe entre les républicains et les ennemis de la 
République (mondialisateurs, racistes, nationalistes xénophobes, 
communautaristes radicaux, intégristes, etc.).” (1996: 113) 
Underlying Taguieff’s beliefs is a long-standing faith in universalism.  
Certainly, he acknowledges that the concept can have its dangers.  It can 
have, he writes in 1987’s La force du préjugé, a ‘tendance à 
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l’immodération: l’exigence d’universalité doit être l’étoile guidant une 
quête, non le drapeau flottant sur l’assurance d’être dans le vrai et le 
bien’ (1987: 489).  Nevertheless, Taguieff argues that the idea should 
form an essential ideological basis for the anti-racist movement:  
 “Universalisme ou barbarie: telle est la forme de l’alternative qu’il 
convient malgré tout d’affirmer face aux célébrations exclusivistes de la 
différence, face aux archéo-nationalistes qui proclament “La France aux 
Français” ou, de façon euphémisée, “Les Français d’abord”.” (1987: 489) 
 
For Taguieff therefore, the task of French anti-racism is to promote 
republicanism and make it work in reality.  He sets out elements of what 
he sees as the role of anti-racism in a second contribution to Bitterlin’s 
1996 volume, entitled ‘De l’antiracisme médiatique au civisme républicain’.  
Here, he argues for a ‘nouveau républicanisme’ (1996: 295), based on 
the understanding that ‘l’État-nation républicain n’est pas la communauté 
ethnique, exclusiviste et xénophobe’ (1996: 296).  A ‘new republican’ anti-
racism, he argues, would recognise that ‘le racisme est un phénomène 
multifactoriel, et doit se dire au pluriel’ (1996: 303); move ‘de l’éthico-légal 
au politique, du rappel des principes à l’affrontement des problèmes 
réels’ (ibid); and define itself as ‘une lutte contre toutes les formes de 
mises à l’écart, de traitements discriminatoires, de désocialisation’ (1996: 
302).  It would focus on making republican integration work in practice as 
in theory, prioritising ‘le fonctionnement de tous les instruments 
d’intégration traditionnels (l’école, les syndicats, l’entreprise etc.) ou 
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émergents (les associations), qui contribuent à supprimer certains 
facteurs de racisation’ (1996: 305).  And finally, it would: 
 “Lutter tout d’abord, et inséparablement, contre l’exclusion sociale 
et contre l’auto-exclusion, ou l’auto-ségrégation des catégories mises à 
l’écart.  Ce qui implique de lutter contre les tendances aux 
regroupements sur des bases ethno-religieuses ou nationales-
communautaires; lutter contre les mécanismes producteurs de 
ségrégation résidentielle.” (1996: 306) 
As noted above, Taguieff’s model for the French anti-racist movement 
here shares numerous similarities with that proposed by SOS over the 
period examined in the thesis: both emphasise republican values; both 
argue that concrete action should be prioritised over simple declarations 
of principle; both see the fight against discrimination as a central role for 
the movement; and both see the need to fight both communautarisme 
and ghettoïsation.  Despite these similarities however, it is clear from the 
article that Taguieff believes that no anti-racist movement has succeeded 
in implementing a plan which aligns with his beliefs.  As is almost 
invariably the case in Taguieff’s work, no actual anti-racist movements 
are named in the discussion: the piece operates very much on the level of 
theoretical recommendations, seemingly giving little thought to what anti-
racist movements actually do, and failing to consider the possibility that 
aspects of his recommendations may already exist within anti-racist 
organisations. 
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This failure to make a link between his detailed theoretical discussions 
and the way anti-racism works in reality is a serious issue in Taguieff’s 
work.  As Robert Gibb argues in a 2003 paper: 
 “[The main weakness of Taguieff’s approach] is its lack of 
grounding in a sociological understanding of the heterogeneous nature 
and evolution of the anti-racist movement and its action in contemporary 
France.  He presents a highly selective account of anti-racism, which 
ignores whole sections of the anti-racist movement and shows little 
appreciation of developments after (around) 1985.” (2003a: 87) 
This apparent lack of interest in the real-life workings of anti-racism has 
arguably led Taguieff to fail to take into account instances where anti-
racist organisations focus not on the differentialist multiculturalism he 
frequently denounces in theoretical terms, but on republicanism.  Gibb 
writes: 
 “His claim that the media-oriented anti-racism of the late 1980s 
was characterised by multiculturalist ‘anti-nationalism’ [...] fails to take into 
account the role played by associations such as SOS Racisme during this 
period in the promotion of a type of ‘republican nationalism’ (Lorcerie 
1994) based on the notion of a distinctive – republican – model of 
citizenship and integration.” (2003a: 88) 
Although Taguieff has published little on anti-racism in recent years, 
focusing more on political populism and, particularly, anti-Semitism, on 
the evidence of an article published on www.diplomatie.gouv in 2000 the 
issues in his work on the theme remained unaddressed at this point.  
Here, once again, he denounces what he sees as the anti-racist 
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movement’s ‘combat ultramédiatisé contre l’extrême droite’ and its 
‘antinationalisme’ and even ‘antinationisme’.  He reiterates his emphasis 
on Enlightenment-derived universalism, defining anti-racism as ‘la 
poursuite du combat des Lumières contre les ténèbres de l’ignorance ou 
des idées préconçues’; and suggests that action against racism should 
be focused around ‘lutte intellectuelle, éducation, action sur les causes 
sociales et économiques, sanction judiciaire et action politique’.  Again, 
no specific groups are analysed, and again, there is no acknowledgement 
that his suggested focuses for the anti-racist movement – political action, 
legal work, action against the social and economic causes of racism, 
education, Enlightenment universalism as a theoretical inspiration – 
match those of SOS almost exactly.  It must be acknowledged that 
Taguieff has analysed anti-racism in greater theoretical detail than almost 
any other analyst.  It could perhaps be argued however that his work on 
the subject can be read only on the levels of abstraction and polemic, 
telling the reader little about the way anti-racist organisations function in 
reality. 
 
In this section I have considered the differing viewpoints of a number of 
key authors on the relationship between French anti-racism and the 
country’s central political ideology of universalist republicanism.  I began 
by looking at the ideas of Étienne Balibar, perhaps the best-known 
analyst of French anti-racism to take a position critical of republicanism, 
noting that (like MIR) he sees racism as an inherent part of France’s 
political structures, due to the implicit links between racial classification 
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and hierarchy on the one hand, and Enlightenment conceptions of what it 
means to be ‘human’ and ‘civilised’ on the other.  I then noted the related 
viewpoint, seemingly widespread in the Anglophone literature in this field, 
that strict adherence to such ‘republican values’ serves to hold back the 
movement, preventing it from fully understanding and adjusting to a 
genuinely pluralistic society.  Finally, by way of contrast, I looked at the 
key ideas of Pierre-André Taguieff, probably the best-known critic of 
French anti-racism, finding him strongly favourable to republicanism (and 
therefore almost certainly closer to mainstream opinion in France than the 
authors previously examined), but at the same time noting that his ideas 
have limited applicability to real life; in that his models are highly 
theoretical and inflexible, and that no actual anti-racist movement 
appears to live up to his expectations, even those (like SOS Racisme) 
whose worldview is arguably as republican-based as Taguieff’s own.  
 
 
Origins of contemporary debates on anti-racism and republicanism 
 
Up to this point in the chapter I have considered the relationship between 
anti-racism and republicanism in the French context, examining the 
meaning of republicanism and its ideological connections with the 
movement, and the perspectives of a number of prominent authors on the 
value and utility of these connections.  It is my contention that 
contemporary debates around French anti-racism are defined by this 
complex and contradictory relationship with republicanism, with my two 
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chosen organisations, SOS and MIR, representing opposite conceptions 
of this relationship.  In this section meanwhile, I argue that the roots of 
this fundamental debate can be found in the early to mid 1980s, a period 
when new thinking around anti-racism was briefly visible in the 
mainstream political debate, and when much of the French public 
became aware for the first time of conceptions of anti-racism other than 
the Droits de l’Homme-influenced, classically republican model. 
 
At this point therefore (that is, during the early to mid 1980s), the central 
debate on anti-racism was between a conception which emphasised a 
questioning of social and political structures, and which promoted a 
rethinking of society encompassing a radical redefinition of ideas such as 
citizenship and nationality; and a conception which sought consensus 
and compromise based on a reaffirmation of republican principles.  The 
first of these positions was taken in the 1980s context by many activists 
within the Beur movement, and (although there are important differences) 
was developed in the context of 2005-2009 by MIR, while the second was 
taken in both contexts by SOS, an organisation which has throughout its 
history been part of the ‘majoritarian’ wing of French anti-racism. 
 
This debate brings also to the surface issues of autonomy.  Of course, 
there is the question of political autonomy; that is to say, whether 
movements should work inside the system with political parties, or 
challenge and question it from the outside.  However, there is also the 
related question of autonomy of thought and ideology, encompassing 
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issues such as the balance to be struck between ‘pure’ but often 
unsuccessful radicalism and inevitably compromised consensus, and in 
relation specifically to my chosen area of study, whether it is the job of 
French anti-racism to fight for new conceptions of nationality, citizenship 
and society, or whether it should stick to defending republican values.  In 
many ways, SOS and MIR can be seen as representative of different 
perspectives on these issues.  SOS, whilst now officially independent 
from the Socialist Party, retains numerous links at the level of personnel, 
and furthermore frequently operates within the political system via 
lobbying of sympathetic politicians.  This positioning arguably leads the 
organisation to prioritise consensus over confrontation (a stance, as we 
shall see, seen by its critics as lack of ambition and avoidance of difficult 
questions), and thus to emphasise the importance of widely-held 
republican values as a basis for anti-racism.  MIR, on the other hand, 
operates outside the mainstream party system and frequently calls it into 
question, and therefore feels able to demand a radical rethinking of 
French society without concern as to whether it is realistic, or whether 
political partners are in agreement.  Although the political context of the 
early-mid 1980s is a very different one to 2005-2009, many of the 
debates and issues raised in the former period – conceptions of 
citizenship and nationality, the relationship between anti-racism and 
mainstream politics, the balance between radicalism and consensus – 
are still far from being resolved. 
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In relation to structure, the section will focus on two central themes.  The 
first of these considers some of the key ideas brought to the surface by 
Beur activists, whose anti-system positioning and questioning of 
consensus conceivably served as a model for MIR.  The second, 
meanwhile, examines perspectives on the rise of SOS, a movement 
which represents a move away from the radicalism of the Beur movement, 
and towards a more consensual form of anti-racism based around the 
egalitarian principles of the French Republic.  Doing this will allow me to 
consider some of the continuities within debates around French anti-
racism, ahead of the third and final section of the chapter, which in 
contrast will consider some of the limitations of previous works on the 
subject. 
 
The early 1980s’ upsurge of interest in anti-racism can largely be 
attributed to the emergence in the public consciousness of the Beurs, 
second-generation ‘immigrants’ (in fact generally French citizens) with 
origins in France’s former colonies in North Africa.  While the sociologist, 
former Beur activist and current MIR member Saïd Bouamama (1994) 
traces the movement’s roots as far back as the Algerian War and anti-
colonial activism, it was widely perceived by the French public as a 
rupture with previous forms of collective action and previous generations 
of immigrants (1994: 23), a perception which arguably contributed to its 
initial success.  Following the key formative event of 1983’s ‘Marche pour 
l’égalité et contre le racisme’, this perceived new generation of political 
actors would go on to challenge mainstream thinking on national identity, 
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citizenship and republican ideology in the discourse behind Convergence 
84, the second and arguably the last major manifestation of the Beur 
movement.  Bouamama identifies three key ideas in this discourse.   
 
The first of these is ‘L’affirmation multiculturelle’ (1994: 102): that is, the 
demand for France to be recognised as a multicultural society, implying a 
‘rupture avec le mythe d’une nation homogène’ (ibid) and promotion of 
the idea that the existence of numerous communities and cultures should 
not be considered as a threat to the unity of the nation.  As we will see in 
chapter 4, this is very similar to the conception of national identity 
promoted by MIR, a conception which also questions the Republic’s 
tendencies towards assimilation and uniformity, proposing instead ‘de 
reconnaître et d’encourager le développement des cultures portées par 
les populations issues de l’immigration coloniale, de favoriser enfin des 
échanges interculturels égalitaires’ (Mouvement des Indigènes de la 
République, ‘Il faut une véritable alternative à la politique raciste de 
l’”identite nationale”’, 6.11.2009).   
 
The second key idea is ‘L’exigence d’égalité’, which is to be considered a 
necessity for life in a multicultural society because, as Bouamama writes, 
‘le droit à la différence sans l’égalité sociale, économique et politique ne 
constitue qu’un processus visant à maintenir les injustices’ (ibid).  It could 
perhaps be argued that the use by the Beurs of vocabulary associated 
with universalist republicanism was part of the reason for the movement’s 
initial mainstream acceptance, and for its inadvertent role in the rise of 
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SOS Racisme, which to the present day has placed great emphasis on 
the question of equality.  It could also perhaps be argued that this 
discourse differentiates the Beurs from MIR, which in some ways sees 
itself as the heir to this radical and autonomous strain of French anti-
racism.  As Jérémy Robine notes, although there were numerous 
differences of opinion on strategy within the French anti-racist movement 
circa 1983-1984, ‘Il n’y a pas alors de controverse quant aux finalités du 
mouvement: tous revendiquent l’égalité républicaine.  Ce n’est que bien 
plus tard que seront contestés l’universalisme républicain et les fameuses 
“valeurs” de la République.’ (2011: 109)  While the Beur movement was 
ethnically-based, its demands of justice and equality could be supported 
by a sympathetic government without calling into question France’s 
political ideals.  MIR, on the other hand, is far more uncompromising – 
claiming that racism and inequality, inherited from colonialism, are 
intrinsic to the very structures of French society – and gives little idea of 
realistic reforms which could contribute to achieving its aims.  This overt 
(post-) colonial dynamic within contemporary social movements led by 
activists of ‘immigrant origin’ is a key difference from the 1980s: as 
Abdellali Hajjat (in Stora and Temime (eds.), 2007) points out, while 
‘l’héritage colonial est devenu un enjeu politique majeur dans la France 
contemporaine’ (2007: 195), ‘la reconnaissance des crimes coloniaux est 
pratiquement absente des revendications de la Marche pour l’égalité et 
contre le racisme de 1983.’ (2007: 196).   
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The third key idea, finally, is referred to by Bouamama as ‘Vers une 
nouvelle citoyenneté’: this states that if equality is a requirement in 
contemporary society, everything which prevents equality should be 
challenged.  Therefore, it is argued, the link between nationality and 
access to rights – in particular citizenship – must be broken (Bouamama 
1994: 103).  In making this argument the movement is pointing out a 
contradiction within French political culture which has been the subject of 
debate for well over two centuries, but which has yet to be resolved: the 
contradiction between the universalistic rights of man, on the one hand, 
and the particularistic rights of the citizen, on the other3. 
 
The discussion around anti-racism in the early-mid 1980s also brought to 
the surface questions of autonomy, of action but also of thought.  During 
this period, Robine writes, there was a ‘conflit entre ceux qui estiment 
qu’un mouvement doit, pour réussir, réunir le plus largement possible [...] 
et ceux qui prônent au contraire un mouvement autonome des personnes 
issues de l’immigration’ (2011: 108).  Alongside the closely related issue 
of the movement’s links with republicanism, this notion of autonomy is at 
the heart of debates around the second key issue in this section of the 
chapter, the rise of SOS Racisme.  The difficult questions faced by 
French social movements can be illustrated by the dilemmas faced by the 
Beurs.  As Fysh and Wolfreys write, ‘if mainstream French associations 
or parties [...] were allowed to join the march and the support committees, 
was there not a danger that they would attempt to take over, imposing 
                                                 
3 A contradiction also discussed by Balibar: see for example the chapter ‘”Droits de 
l’homme” et “droits du citoyen”: La dialectique moderne de l’égalité et de la liberté’, in 
Les frontières de la démocratie (1992)  
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their own slogans, and then take credit for whatever the march managed 
to achieve?’ (2003: 170)  At the same time however, ‘those who warned 
against the manipulative and self-interested tendencies of the French left 
were accused of proposing a purely ‘ethnic’ strategy, a repli 
communautaire, which would have little resonance for the thousands of 
Beurs whose cultural references were already mostly French and 
succeed only in condemning the ‘community’ to continued marginality and 
discrimination’ (ibid).  For movements operating outside the mainstream, 
or movements aiming to bring radical ideas into the mainstream, these 
dilemmas have remained identical ever since.  Indeed, the second 
dilemma identified by Fysh and Wolfreys, that relating to the difficulty of 
proposing an ethnically-based strategy, has become even more acute 
since this period, with an almost hysterical discourse on the dangers of 
communautarisme arguably reaching its peak during the period examined 
in the thesis.  Due to the relatively narrow range of expressible positions 
within the French political mainstream, it is perhaps the case that any 
anti-racist organisation hoping to exercise any influence has to work on a 
basis of consensus, compromise and (supposed) shared values: implying, 
of course, a republican-based campaigning discourse.  SOS Racisme, for 
the most part, was and is such an organisation.  As Robine puts it:  
 “La vision politique qui anime SOS Racisme est très républicaine 
[...]  Dès le début, ses dirigeants font l’analyse que la réussite de la 
première marche [pour l’égalité et contre le racisme] et donc le futur 
succès de leur association tiennent précisément au fait qu’il s’agit d’une 
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mobilisation de toute une génération, consensuelle et “morale”.” (2011: 
113) 
 
Bouamama makes the case that the rise of SOS was seen by many Beur 
activists and jeunes des cités as a usurping.  With its ‘consecration’ (1994: 
119) as the public face of anti-racism, young people and the Beurs, the 
original marchers felt the history and memory of their movement was 
being taken away from them.  Furthermore, he claims, there was a 
conscious decision on the part of the new movement not to focus 
explicitly on anti-Arab racism, as it was feared that such actions, in a 
context of social, economic and identity crisis, could increase support for 
the Front National.  Thus the anti-racist movement is transformed from 
one denouncing ‘inégalités concrètes’ (1994: 121) and making specific 
demands into one making a moral, abstract denunciation of racism.  He 
argues that the government was uneasy about action on the part of 
immigrant-origin youth making specific demands, as it may lead to an 
obligation to make policy commitments that would be difficult to reverse.  
There was, however, a desire to mobilise young people to its advantage; 
accordingly, a ‘consensual’ anti-racist movement could be used to draw a 
dividing line between Left and Right.  During the mid-1980s the FN had 
succeeded in imposing the issue of ‘national identity’ in the national 
debate, and it had seemingly touched a chord with voters.  The ‘identity’ 
discourse of the new movement therefore had to be acceptable to these 
voters: it must not be seen to endorse the multi-cultural nature of French 
society; more precisely, it must not be seen to recognise the existence of 
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an Arab identity in France (1994: 123).  In addition, Bouamama writes, 
the movement had to be compatible with an increasingly restrictive 
immigration policy (1994: 124) and offer a ‘third way’ between the 
discourse of multiculturalism and that of ‘national identity’, which came in 
the promotion of ‘métissage’: even if the population was mixed, ‘l’identité 
française reste unique et monolithique’ (1994: 123).   
 
Bouamama’s analysis makes a number of perceptive and accurate points.  
For example, he is right that SOS was able to come to prominence 
largely because of the specific political context of the early-mid 1980s, 
and right that it drew on the energy and momentum created in the anti-
racist movement by the Beurs.  He is also correct in his analysis of SOS’s 
position on identity and multiculturalism: as we will see in chapter 4, 
‘métissage’ is still at the centre of the organisation’s discourse over the 
period examined in the thesis, allowing it to reject both multiculturalism, 
seen as shading too easily into communautarisme, and Sarkozy’s 
inflexible and  backwards-looking vision of national identity.  As touched 
upon earlier however, it must be noted that Bouamama was active in the 
Beur movement, and later on in MIR, so is unlikely to be neutral in his 
writing on SOS: his account of the movement’s origins at times comes 
across more like a conspiracy theory than a balanced analysis.  What is 
more, critics of SOS such as Bouamama often seem to start from the 
debatable assumption that the creation of a consensual, republican-
based anti-racist movement is inherently a bad thing, forgetting that 
republican principles are both widely supported and – according to most 
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interpretations at least – highly compatible with the egalitarian aims of 
anti-racism.  Indeed, over the years examined in the current work SOS’s 
emphasis on equality and social opportunity has led to it making far more 
‘concrete’ proposals (on issues such as housing, employment and 
education) than a more radical, anti-system movement like MIR, which 
deals mainly in theory and abstraction: a state of play entirely the 
opposite to that described by Bouamama. 
 
Despite the potential issues with Bouamama’s argument, a similar 
critique is made by a number of authors.  Alana Lentin, for example, 
writes of SOS’s ‘success in overturning the serious political challenge 
posed by the Mouvement Beur in favour of a republican project of anti-
racism based on the teachings of collective memory inherited from the 
longer-established organisations [...] and the rejection of ‘difference’ in 
favour of a vision of a unified youth, unhindered by particularist 
attachments’ (2004: 125).  In other words, it could be argued that SOS 
took away ownership of the anti-racist struggle from both militants at 
street level and the wider group of those arguing for the development of 
an ‘openly multicultural vision’ (ibid) of a future French society, thus re-
grounding the anti-racist movement more strongly within a republican 
framework.  Abdallah (2000), like Bouamama a former Beur activist, also 
makes a similar point, underlining what he sees as the need for anti-
racism to remain autonomous from the parliamentary Left.  He argues 
that the new social dynamic embodied by the Beur movement, and 
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Convergence 84’s project for a new conception of citizenship, were 
eclipsed by the new movement and its consensual, ‘moral’ approach: 
 “Quand un pouvoir politique fait de la morale et non plus de la 
politique, c’est suspect: pas de prêchi-prêcha, il faut transformer les 
conditions économiques et sociales.” (2000: 69) 
For Abdallah, the problems with SOS’s approach are summed up in its 
‘touche pas à mon pote’ slogan: it involves, he argues, a (white) French 
anti-racist addressing a (white) French racist, in order to protect a ‘pote’ 
of immigrant origin.  Thus, as SOS’s conception of anti-racism becomes 
dominant, immigrant origin youth cease to be seen as political actors in 
their own right, instead becoming passive and anonymous; a legacy 
against which MIR, with its aim to create ‘[une] puissance politique 
autonome des indigènes’ (‘Principes politiques généraux du Parti des 
Indigènes de la République’, 2010), arguably defines itself.   
 
The focus on autonomy, it could be argued, is embodied in critical 
reactions to SOS from analysts currently or formerly within the far-left.  
Bouamama, Abdallah, Lentin and Fysh and Wolfreys (the first two of 
whom were themselves involved in the movements they analyse) to a 
greater or lesser extent all appear to see SOS as representing 
‘incorporation’ and all its attendant dangers.  Conversely, all seemed 
hopeful that the Beur movement could help to redefine French political 
culture, though in the event all were disappointed (as was Balibar, who 
does not discuss the rise of SOS in his writing). 
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Although the desire for an autonomous anti-racist movement rethinking 
national identity and challenging republican norms is, as we have seen, 
quite widespread within the literature on the subject, its salience within 
the wider political debate should perhaps not be overstated.  It is 
illustrative in this regard to note SOS Racisme’s own self-perception at 
this time.  The organisation’s founding President Harlem Désir, in his 
1987 book SOS Désirs, locates anti-racism squarely within the traditional 
values of French politics.  It is not, he argues, a marginal concern, but 
one based on ‘une certitude absolue’: that ‘la France du racisme n’est 
pas la France’ (1987: 20).  His stance is unequivocally integrationist: 
France ‘invented’ integration; the process has worked in the past, and, he 
argues, can work again in the future if some of the obstacles and false 
ideologies preventing it from doing so can be continually challenged.  He 
attempts, furthermore, to claim for anti-racism a different narrative of the 
‘true France’ from that propounded by the Right and parts of the media: 
 “La France de SOS, ce n’est pas celle du sang ou de la race, ce 
n’est pas celle des frontières et de l’exclusion.  Ce n’est pas la France de 
Barrès et de Maurras.  La France de SOS, c’est celle de 1789, celle du 
libre contrat et des droits respectés.” (ibid) 
For Désir, therefore, a French citizen who truly lives up to such values is 
‘celui qui accepte la culture des droits de l’homme: c’est le point décisif, 
qui met hors jeu toutes les conceptions raciales et culturalistes, qui fait 
passer la liberté et ses principes avant l’atavisme du sol et des ancêtres’ 
(1987: 21).  Whilst many of the authors studied so far in this section have 
been sceptical about this kind of discourse, one which eschews radical 
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change in favour of a reassertion of universalism and the Rights of Man, it 
is undeniable that the argument is framed in language which would have 
resonance with a substantial constituency across French society: one 
which simultaneously rejects racism and a narrowly defined national 
identity, favours traditional republican values, and does not favour radical 
questioning of such values.  Perhaps surprisingly, given the moderate 
nature of Désir’s language and its appeal to republican principles, 
Taguieff (1987, 1996) is noticeably hostile to SOS in his writing on this 
period, criticising what he sees as its ideologically empty ‘spectacle 
antiracism’ and its ‘manipulation’ by the PS.  It is interesting to note that 
SOS, despite being by far the most popular and high-profile anti-racist 
movement during this period (or perhaps, because of this), thus ends up 
being attacked in the literature from both radical left and traditionalist 
republican perspectives. 
 
In this section of this chapter I have considered a number of perspectives 
on the anti-racist movement in France in the early-mid 1980s, noting that 
although the political context was significantly different to that examined 
in this thesis, many of the underlying questions facing the movement 
remain the same.  Studying the short-lived prominence of the Beur 
movement and the rise of SOS Racisme brings to the surface a number 
of debates around the question of the role of anti-racism, such as 
autonomy, the balance between radicalism and consensus, and whether 
the movement should demand new thinking in relation to issues such as 
nationality and citizenship, or stick to defending universalist republicanism.  
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The Beur movement, which was arguably responsible (initially at least) for 
the coming to prominence of the anti-racist movement during this period, 
could in general be placed at the autonomous and free-thinking end of 
the spectrum.  In this way it could be said to be a model for a movement 
like MIR, although there are differences between the two worldviews; the 
demands of the Beurs being less focused on colonial memory, and more 
focused on social justice and the genuine universalising (ie. to non-
citizens as well as citizens) of rights.  SOS Racisme, meanwhile, has 
consistently represented a more mainstream, consensual conception of 
anti-racism, working within the political system and emphasising the 
defence of republican values.  A number of former Beur activists like 
Bouamama and Abdallah, and academics sympathetic to the movement 
like Lentin, favour autonomy and present the rise of SOS as a ‘usurping’.  
Whilst there is an element of truth here, this argument serves to downplay 
the genuine attachment of much of the French population to republican 
values, and fails to take into account that such values have the potential 
to be a sound basis for the anti-racist project.  Both of these basic truths 
were skilfully taken up by Désir in the mid-1980s, and have formed the 
basis of SOS’s worldview ever since. 
 
 
Limitations of existing works 
 
Although there are a number of important continuities between the central 
debates in French anti-racism in the early-mid 1980s and those of my 
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chosen period in the early 21st century, at the same time there are a 
number of potential limitations in previous key works on the subject.  
These limitations are in part conceptual: as I note below, few existing 
works provide a balanced discussion of the implications of the 
relationship between French anti-racism and republicanism, and of the 
complexities of this relationship.  To a large extent however, such 
limitations relate to the timeframe on which these works are focused: the 
central works examined in this chapter were almost all published prior to 
my chosen period, and all focus at least in part on a very different political 
context; that of the early to mid 1980s, when anti-racism was at its height 
of visibility and influence under the Presidency of François Mitterrand.  In 
this final section, therefore, I aim to identify some of these issues, and 
thus consequently to make a case for the distinctiveness of the 
perspective offered by the current work. 
 
Let us begin, then, by noting two potential issues relating to existing 
works on the theme of anti-racism in France.  Firstly, it is noticable that 
many of the best-known analysts of the field had moved on to study 
different areas by the time examined in the thesis.  To take two prominent 
examples, much of Taguieff’s later work focused on issues such as anti-
Semitism (La nouvelle judéophobie, 2002) and political populism 
(L'illusion populiste, 2007), rather than the critical analysis of anti-racism 
with which he made his name.  Similarly, it is undeniable that Balibar is a 
highly influential figure in the autonomous, anti-system wing of French 
anti-racism – encompassing movements such as MIR – due to his 
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questioning of Enlightenment-influenced republicanism and his 
presentation of racism as institutionalised within the political system.  
However, the majority of his work, outside that written in the context of 
the early-mid 1980s when he saw in the Beur movement the potential for 
new conceptions of citizenship, nationality and identity, focuses not on 
anti-racism per se, but on an analysis of state institutions, his central 
argument being that such institutions exist primarily to perpetuate the 
capitalist system.  There is a relative lack, therefore, of works focusing on 
anti-racism during my chosen timeframe – certainly in comparison to the 
number which focus on the subject in the mid-1980s under Mitterrand, a 
very different political context, as we will see shortly. 
 
Secondly, it became clear during the writing of this chapter that 
surprisingly few analysts provided a balanced discussion of the strengths 
and weaknesses of republicanism as a basis for anti-racist discourse and 
strategy: most appear to discuss it solely as a positive or a negative 
influence.  It is to be hoped that the comparative structure of the thesis, 
looking at the same questions from the perspectives of two contrasting 
movements, one broadly republican and one broadly anti-republican, can 
provide some insight into both sides of the debate.  This is a complex and 
quite nuanced question: whilst SOS and MIR are theoretically favourable 
and critical towards the Republic respectively, MIR occasionally uses 
republican rhetoric and is unlikely to be fundamentally opposed to ideals 
of liberté, égalité and fraternité, even if (like Balibar) it is critical of the way 
in which Enlightenment-influenced universalism has at times been used 
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to justify racism and exclusion.  Conversely, SOS, although consistently 
favourable towards republicanism, has over my chosen period been 
repeatedly critical of politicians who have misused the concept for 
discriminatory ends, and has frequently warned of the dangers of seeing 
‘republican values’ as something to be simply recited unthinkingly: for 
SOS, the question is how to make the Republic live up to its proclaimed 
principles in reality, again a position which MIR in unlikely to disagree 
with entirely, even if the two organisations have markedly different 
opinions on whether this can genuinely happen. 
 
The central point to be taken into account when considering potential 
issues concerning the relevance of existing works is, however, that 
relating to the difference between the political context previous works 
were written in (or about) and the political context behind the present 
work.  All of the authors considered in this chapter – Balibar, Taguieff, 
Lentin, Fysh and Wolfreys, Silverman, Bouamama, Abdallah and Désir, to 
take the most notable examples – focus either partially or wholly on 
French anti-racism in the context of the early-mid 1980s under the 
presidency of François Mitterrand.  As a political climate for anti-racism, 
however, it was more the exception than the rule.  Whilst Mitterrand’s 
economic radicalism was short lived post-1981, a liberal discourse on 
human rights and identity politics was a hallmark of the administration’s 
early years: to take a few examples, the death penalty was abolished; 
homosexuality officially decriminalised; and a new Ministry of Women’s 
Rights created.  This social liberalism was also visible in regard 
 85 
specifically to immigration: immigrants were permitted to join trade unions 
and political parties, and those in the country illegally were offered the 
chance to declare themselves and become registered residents.  In this 
climate of optimism following the Socialist victory, ‘A new visibility and 
confidence of immigrants were evident’ (Kedward, 2005: 488), with 
‘Hundreds, and soon thousands, of local associations [being] launched to 
pursue the welfare, leisure and cultural interests of people of immigrant 
origin’ (ibid).  It was in this specific climate that the Marche des Beurs 
took place, and significantly, was welcomed by Mitterrand himself on its 
arrival in Paris.  It was in this climate that there was a significant public 
enthusiasm for ‘an expansive and inclusive cultural identity for modern 
France (Kedward 2005: 503), rejecting defensive nationalism and a 
uniform, conservative conception of society.  And it was in the wake of 
this climate that SOS Racisme gained unprecedented visibility and media 
profile for the anti-racist movement, benefiting from equally 
unprecedented official support from the government, which had 
everything to gain from backing a mass youth movement like SOS.  This 
liberal political context lasted only until approximately the middle of the 
1980s – overlapping with the rise of SOS, which focused to a substantial 
extent on fighting the Front National – when an FN-inspired discourse on 
national identity, crime, immigration and insecurity began to impose itself 
on the public debate.  During this period however, the French political 
climate was marked for the anti-racist movement by openness to new 
thinking, the presence of allies in political power, a certain tolerance of 
protest, and a willingness to make policy which coincided with at least 
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some of the movement’s interests.  Of course, the extent to which this 
constitutes a favourable context depends on the perspective the question 
is examined from: should social movements work within or against the 
mainstream political system?  Nevertheless, it is arguable that such 
conditions have not existed to the same extent either before or since. 
 
The contrasts between the early-mid 1980s and 2005-2009 as contexts 
for French anti-racism are striking.  As noted at the start of this chapter, 
very few works have examined anti-racism in the context of the ‘Sarkozy 
years’.  It is my argument, however, that these years form a unique and 
highly challenging period for the movement.  Let us consider a few of the 
reasons why. 
 
Firstly, although national identity as a theme in French politics is far from 
being unique to my chosen period, the extent to which it dominated 
political discussion over these years was without precedent.  Nicolas 
Sarkozy, to take one example, fought his 2007 presidential election 
campaign almost exclusively on the terrain of national identity.  He would 
go on, furthermore, to make it the basis of the controversial ‘Ministry of 
Immigration and National Identity’, and to attempt to resurrect the theme 
ahead of the 2010 regional elections with the ‘identity debate’ of late 2009.  
Whilst there is nothing inherently wrong with debating issues of national 
identity, it must be noted that Sarkozy’s approach was less about debate 
than it was about imposing a particular conception of the idea.  Sarkozy’s 
‘national identity’, as we will see shortly in chapter 2, aimed to look back 
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with unambiguous pride at a glorious French past, a story from which 
immigrants and their descendants are entirely shut out – immigrants 
being presented in this discourse almost entirely in terms of threat, as is 
arguably manifested in the name of the new Ministry placing ‘immigration’ 
and ‘national identity’ in opposition – and a story which deliberately 
avoids any awkward questions about France’s behaviour during the 
colonial period (Noiriel 2007a, Meyran 2009, Maillot 2008). 
 
Secondly, the predominance of this discourse on national identity was 
concomitant with a consensus on the language of republicanism on the 
part of political actors across the ideological spectrum.  Because of this, 
almost every argument made in the political mainstream over this period 
was made with reference to ‘republican values’, stretching the idea 
almost to breaking point.  Most notably in terms of my argument, it was 
frequently used by Sarkozy and his allies not in a positive sense, 
emphasising universal equality and brotherhood regardless of race or 
religion, but in a negative sense: that is, it was used as a rhetorical tool 
for attacking those held to be threatening these ideals, implicitly (it is 
never explicitly spelled out) France’s Muslim population (Noiriel 2007a, 
De Cock et al. 2008, Martigny 2009). 
 
Thirdly and finally, contained within Sarkozy’s national identity discourse 
during this political context were rhetorical features designed to shut 
down debate and shut out his critics.  Anyone aiming to raise the 
awkward questions on colonialism this discourse was attempting to forget, 
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or who deviated from the idea of a single, glorious, unifying history, would 
be accused of ‘repentance’, whilst anyone of immigrant origin who was 
unwilling or (far more likely, due to lack of jobs or opportunities for social 
advancement) unable to ‘integrate’ would be accused of 
communautarisme: both terms, in the ‘us versus them’ framework of 
Sarkozy’s discourse, implying ‘enemy of France’ or ‘enemy of the 
Republic’ (CVUH 2007, Boubeker 2010, Tissot and Tévanian 2010). 
 
In many ways, therefore, we have the opposite of the context in the early-
mid 1980s: a political élite closed to new thinking; no allies of the anti-
racist movement in government; little tolerance of protest or opposition; 
and little interest in making policy which coincided with the interests of the 
movement.  Indeed, despite their substantial differences in orientation, 
both SOS and MIR found the period examined in this thesis to be a highly 
challenging one: SOS finding its chosen republican ideology being used 
as rhetorical cover for the stigmatisation of a substantially-sized sector of 
the French population, and MIR’s emphasis on colonial memory and 
multiculturalism running up against the twin ideological roadblocks of anti-
repentance and anti-communautarisme.  In chapter 2 therefore, I would 
like to examine in detail the political context of the period under 
discussion in the thesis, via a closer look at the discourse which defines 
the period: that of Nicolas Sarkozy and his allies on national identity. 
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Chapter 2 
Sarkozy and national identity 2005-2009 
 
 
Having considered in chapter 1 the conceptual and analytical framework 
of the thesis, in this chapter I move on to examine the political and 
ideological context within which anti-racist movements had to operate 
over my chosen period.  As was noted in the previous chapter, much 
existing work on French anti-racism focuses on the early to mid 1980s, a 
period when the Left was in government and was apparently receptive to 
the anti-racist cause.  It is my argument however that 2005-2009 is itself 
a distinctive period for the study of anti-racism in France, one which 
differs substantially from the earlier context, and one which has been the 
subject of significantly less analysis.  My argument for the distinctiveness 
of this period is based on three factors: the pervasiveness of an 
exclusionary and backwards-looking conception of national identity; the 
prevalence of terms such as ‘repentance’ and communautarisme 
(implying a rejection, as we will see, of post-colonialism, critical history, 
immigration, Islam, and the possibility of multiculturalism) in political 
debate; and the existence of an apparently universal consensus on 
republicanism, a consensus which, for differing reasons, caused 
difficulties for both movements like MIR which question the Republic, and 
movements like SOS which support its proclaimed principles. 
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The first and most central reason for positing 2005-2009 as a distinctive 
period for the study of French anti-racism, then, relates to national identity, 
and the predominance of this theme in political discussion over these 
years. I would argue that this period represented the height of the power 
and visibility of this discourse in the early 21st century, encompassing a 
number of key events which were used by Sarkozy and his allies to place 
the issues of national identity, immigration and security at the forefront of 
public debate.  These events included the widespread urban riots of 2005, 
during which ‘Nicolas Sarkozy a délibérément choisi de jouer le jeu de la 
provocation des jeunes des quartiers populaires et d’y faire monter la 
tension’ (Demiati, in Mucchielli and Le Goaziou (eds) (2007: 59); the 
Presidential election campaign of 2007, in which Sarkozy emphasised 
national identity to an unprecedented extent and played upon fears of 
immigration and Islam; the creation on 2007 of a new ‘Ministry of 
Immigration and National Identity’, which gave a legal basis to the 
supposition that immigration was not part of national identity but in 
opposition to it; and the ‘identity debate’ of late 2009, which aimed 
(unsuccessfully) to recapture the winning formula of 2007 ahead of the 
2010 regional elections. 
 
Predominant in political debate over these years, however, was not 
simply national identity, but a very specific conception of national identity.  
It was defined in a way which was consistently conservative, unchanging 
and backwards-looking, giving post-colonial immigrants and their 
descendants no part in the ‘national story’ (other than as something to be 
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feared and distrusted), and rejecting any critical examination of France’s 
colonial past.  Despite their significantly different ideological orientations, 
and their widely diverging visions of an ideal society (see chapter 4), both 
SOS and MIR are strongly critical of Sarkozy’s conception of national 
identity.  SOS sees it as leading to ‘[une] muséification mortière pour la 
vitalité d’une société’ (SOS Racisme, ‘Identité nationale: “un débat à 
rebours”’, 2009), while MIR criticises what it sees as ‘une identité 
nationale fermée, figée et chauvine’ (Mouvement des Indigènes de la 
République, ‘Communiqué de presse du MIR: “Ministère de l’Immigration 
et de l’Identité nationale” ou “Ministère des Affaires Indigènes”?’, 
9.3.2007).      
 
Two further reasons for the distinctiveness of 2005-2009 as a context for 
the study of French anti-racism can also be noted, each of which has 
particular repercussions for one of the movements examined in this thesis.  
The first of these relates to the currency of terms such as ‘repentance’ 
and communautarisme in political discourse.  ‘Repentance’ is a term used 
frequently by Sarkozy over these years, always in a pejorative sense.  It 
signifies rejection of critical examination of France’s past in favour of a 
patriotic and simplistic national narrative, perhaps in reaction to the brief 
ascendance of left-wing ideas circa 1997-2002 under Lionel Jospin, and 
to the willingness of Sarkozy’s predecessor Jacques Chirac to make 
official apologies for practices and events such as slavery, the mass 
round-up of Jews at the Vélodrome d’Hiver in 1942, and (via the French 
ambassador to Algeria) the Sétif massacre of 1945.  Communautarisme, 
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meanwhile, refers literally to the idea of communities feeling their primary 
loyalty to be to a religious or ethnic community rather than to the 
‘universalist’ Republic, but came over this period to signify an implicitly 
Muslim ‘enemy within’ (Dhume 2010), the discourse drawing upon years 
of alarmist media reporting of issues such as the veil, halal meat or forced 
marriages.  The prevalence of these terms meant that radical movements 
like MIR, which emphasise colonial memory (seen as ‘repentance’) and a 
multicultural model of society (seen as communautarisme) were unlikely 
to get a fair hearing for their arguments within mainstream political debate. 
 
Finally, over the period examined in the thesis there existed a ‘republican 
consensus’, with the language of republicanism being used by political 
actors from across the ideological spectrum.  As Sarah Waters notes: 
 “In France today, republican identity has found a broad consensus 
across the Left and Right, overcoming previous ideological divisions and 
political differences.  Indeed, the appeal of the republican model seemed 
to stem from its porous and malleable nature and its capacity to be 
harnessed towards entirely different political ends.” (2012: 42) 
Whilst there is a consensus on republican language therefore, and a 
consensus that republicanism is the central component of French identity, 
there is no consensus on the exact meaning of republicanism.  The 
concept can therefore be used by Sarkozy in an arguably discriminatory 
way, as a rhetorical contrast to Islam, immigration and communautarisme, 
just as much as it can be used by movements like SOS as an ideological 
basis for action against discrimination and in favour of equality of 
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opportunity.  Because of this consensus, SOS has frequently found it 
difficult to articulate a distinctive campaigning discourse over this period.  
At the same time, by articulating a highly critical stance towards 
republicanism MIR effectively shuts itself out from participation in the 
mainstream political debate.  The difficulties faced by SOS and (for 
completely different reasons) MIR serve therefore to illustrate the impact 
on anti-racism of Sarkozy’s dominant positions. 
 
In terms of structure, in this chapter I would like to examine the way in 
which these defining issues for the anti-racist movement over the 
timeframe of the thesis – a conservative and exclusionary conception of 
national identity, ‘repentance’, communautarisme and the Republic – are 
used by Sarkozy.  I will begin by looking at the way in which he uses 
history to shape his conception of national identity: a conception (as 
noted above) which aims to create a singular, patriotic roman national 
whilst ignoring immigration and colonial memory, contrary to the more 
fluid and flexible vision favoured by much of the anti-racist movement.  I 
will then move on to consider the related issues of ‘repentance’ and 
colonial memory, and the way in which they are used by Sarkozy to 
scapegoat as ‘anti-French’ critics of his discourse on history; rhetoric 
which undoubtedly affects a movement like MIR, even if it is not targeted 
by name.  I will subsequently look at Sarkozy’s usage of the idea of 
republicanism, seen not as an egalitarian political project but as a 
rhetorical tool and signifier of ‘national identity’, and used chiefly as a 
means of attacking practices held to threaten it, such as immigration and 
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communautarisme.  As again was noted above, this usage of the 
Republic causes serious difficulties to SOS, which uses republicanism as 
an ideological basis for fighting discrimination and inequality.  Finally, I 
will end the chapter by considering the arguments of a number of key 
analysts (Noiriel 2007a, Martigny 2009, Maillot 2008, Tissot and Tévanian 
2010, Badiou 2007) on the significance and novelty of Sarkozy’s 
discourse, and possible reasons for its success. 
 
Although national identity has been the subject of a great deal of debate 
over the years examined in the thesis, there is little consensus on the 
exact meaning of the term.  As Sarah Waters notes: 
 “On the one hand, there are those who see French identity as an 
essence, something primordial, hereditary and natural that is transmitted 
unchanged from one generation to the next. [...] On the other hand, there 
are those who see French identity as a mere construct, something that is 
constantly reinvented in response to changing contingencies and needs.” 
(2012:15) 
There is a long-running debate between these essentialist and 
constructivist ideas of the nation and national identity in French society.  
Indeed, the differing positions of Sarkozy and my chosen movements on 
this question can arguably be seen as an incarnation of this debate.  
Whereas Sarkozy takes the essentialist view, presenting French identity 
as something ancient, mystical and intangible which newcomers cannot 
truly be part of, anti-racist movements in France have traditionally 
attempted to question any essentialisation of national identity, arguing 
 95 
instead for an identity which is open, flexible and open to evolution.  As 
former SOS President Dominique Sopo puts it in his reaction to the 
‘identity debate’ of 2009, for instance: 
 “Ce que nous jugeons comme une inestimable valeur dans les 
sociétés au sein desquelles nous évoluons, c’est tout au contraire leur 
complexité, leurs contradictions, leur perpétuel changement où chaque 
jour s’invente une part de la société à venir.” (SOS Racisme, ‘Identité 
nationale: “un débat à rebours”’, 2009) 
 
Certain analysts, furthermore, have argued that the idea of national 
identity is too inexact to be of practical use in understanding how 
societies work.  As Dominique Schnapper writes, for example, ‘Au terme 
“d’identité nationale”, je préfèrerais celui “d’identification à la nation”’, 
since ‘La notion d’identité comporte deux connotations, la similitude et 
l’unité, elle évoque l’éternité et l’immobilisme.  Or cela est faux: les 
collectivités historiques, les identifications à la nation changent avec le 
temps.’ (Regards sur l’actualité: l’identité nationale en débat (2010: 18)).  
Regardless of terminology however, what is at issue in this chapter is the 
way in which Sarkozy used the concept of national identity over the years 
2005-2009, as well as its impact on my chosen anti-racist movements.  
Why did Sarkozy place such emphasis on ‘national identity’?  There are 
several possible reasons.  Firstly, the discourse played upon the fear and 
insecurity felt by substantial parts of the French population when faced on 
the one hand by growing unemployment and précarité, and on the other 
hand by years of alarmist media coverage of radical Islam, terrorism and 
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communautarisme.  Secondly, it functions as a ‘smokescreen’, covering 
up the often economically-related causes of the anxiety mentioned above 
and the inability or unwillingness of the government to do anything about 
them, and diverting attention instead towards its identity-related 
symptoms.  And thirdly, it consistently creates a binary of ‘us’ against 
‘them’; the ‘them’ in this discourse taking in numerous different groups: 
immigrants, Islamists and communautaristes, certainly, but also left-wing 
intellectuals and historians, and even the political élite as a whole, in spite 
of the fact that Sarkozy is thoroughly embedded within the political élite.  
This rhetorical technique, common to populist political organisations in 
Europe and elsewhere, and used by Sarkozy as a means of presenting 
himself as a man of the people and candidate of rupture, recurs 
frequently throughout all the key themes of Sarkozy’s discourse identified 
in this chapter.  I will begin by looking at Sarkozy’s use of history, what 
this says about his conception of national identity, and how this serves to 
frame anti-racist discourse and action. 
 
 
Sarkozy and history 
 
As we have now seen, the period examined in this thesis is arguably 
defined by a conservative and ‘essentialist’ discourse on national identity 
on the part of Sarkozy and his allies and supporters.  This discourse can 
be contrasted with the more constructivist approach to the question taken 
by the majority of the French anti-racist movement.  Sarkozy’s discourse 
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also serves to present immigration as a threat to identity in a way 
considered unacceptable to both SOS and MIR, and implicitly stigmatises 
or marginalises those of certain foreign origins, even when they are 
French citizens, again offending the principles of both SOS and MIR, 
despite their widely differing ideologies: in the former case, the principle 
of republican ‘colour-blindness’ and indifference to origins, and in the 
latter, the principle that stereotypes, discrimination and racial hierarchies 
which work against populations of post-colonial immigrant origin must end 
if France is to adapt to the reality of a multicultural society.  As can be 
seen by an examination of Sarkozy’s speeches over 2005-2009 
(particularly those made in the 2007 Presidential election campaign and 
during the ‘identity debate’ of late 2009), this exclusive and exclusionary 
conception of national identity is put together with extensive reference to 
history. 
 
A representative quotation from Sarkozy on the subject of history is the 
following, taken from a 2007 campaign speech in Caen devoted almost 
entirely to the issue of national identity: 
 "La France ce n'est pas une page blanche.  C'est un pays qui a 
une longue histoire.  C'est un pays qui s'est forgé au cours des siècles 
une identité, une personnalité qu'il faut respecter, qu'on ne peut pas 
effacer, qu'on ne peut pas ignorer, qui est une part de l'identité de chacun, 
qui est faite de mille apports, de commémorations, de leçons 
d'instituteurs, de réminiscences qui se transmettent de génération en 
génération, de souvenirs d'enfance, de vieilles histoires de grands-pères 
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qui ont fait la guerre et qui racontent à leur tour à leurs petits-enfants ce 
que leurs grands-pères leur ont raconté jadis.”  (Caen, 2007) 
 
What is immediately obvious in this quotation are the references to 'une 
longue histoire'; 'une identité'; 'une personnalité'.  Sarkozy's conception of 
history is of a unitary phenomenon and force for social cohesion.  He 
rejects, therefore, the idea of history as a multiplicity of competing 
interpretations of the past, operating on an opposite set of assumptions 
from a movement like MIR which emphasises the importance of memory 
in the formation of the identities of post-colonial populations, but equally 
operating in a manner consistent with his rejection of ‘repentance’.  The 
reference to the need to 'respect' France's history and identity implies the 
need to assimilate, but looking at his thoughts on the factors said to form 
'l'identité de chacun' it is difficult to see how any newcomer could 
realistically do this.  The allusions to 'leçons d'instituteurs', 'réminiscences 
qui se transmettent de génération en génération' and 'vieilles histoires de 
grands-pères' paint 'Frenchness' as something mystical and mysterious 
passed down over the centuries, something more than just a nationality.  
It is arguable that Sarkozy's discourse on history is largely based on myth, 
a link discussed by Régis Meyran in Le mythe de l'identité nationale 
(2009).  As Meyran writes in his discussion of national myth, 'ces récits 
mythiques définissent en négatif ceux qui ne sont pas des Français: les 
immigrés, mais aussi les nationaux de fraîche date, ou bien ceux dont la 
race ou les traditions ne sont pas "compatibles"' (2009: 11).  ’History’ 
therefore becomes a single, officially sanctioned set of myths, which has 
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the effect of raising the bar of ’true Frenchness’ for any new incoming 
group.  It could perhaps be argued that this conception of history forms 
one of the unspoken ideological bases for Sarkozy’s 2006 comments that 
's'il y en a que cela gêne d'être en France, qu'ils ne se gênent pas pour 
quitter un pays qu'ils n'aiment pas' (commonly remembered as 'aimez-la 
ou quittez-la' - see Le Monde 24.5.2006).  It is seemingly necessary to 
assimilate not only to the ’values’ of the present day, but to a certain idea 
of the past.  As we shall see in the remainder of this chapter, much of 
Sarkozy's discourse aims to establish a 'them' and an 'us’, an idea at 
odds with the fundamental demand of the French anti-racist movement 
for equality and fraternity.  The creation and reflection of national myth is 
a subtle but unmistakable way of achieving this aim. 
 
In addition to presenting French history in an exclusionary and 
‘essentialist’ way – contrary to both SOS’s celebration of the universalist 
ideology of the Enlightenment and the Revolution, and the emphasis 
placed by MIR on the legacies of colonialism – Sarkozy’s historical 
discourse rejects nuance and analysis in a way regarded as intellectually 
reductive by critical historians.  This approach to history can be seen, to 
take one example, in his usage of the memories of prominent historical 
figures.  As he states in the Caen speech cited earlier:  
 “Oui je me reconnais dans Jaurès et dans Blum, dans Jules Ferry, 
dans Clemenceau, comme je me reconnais dans Péguy, dans Lyautey et 
dans le Général De Gaulle, Chaban, dans Jean Monnet, dans Georges 
Pompidou.” (Caen, 2007) 
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Again, what can be seen is Sarkozy's idea of a single, consensual 
national history, made up of great events and heroic individuals, wherever 
they may have stood on the political spectrum.  His constant references 
to these 'Great Men', devoid of any historical context, would seem to have 
the aim of intentionally blurring historical meaning and disarming all 
possible criticisms from his adversaries.  This has two major effects.  The 
first is to reinforce the 'national myth' discussed above, and the second is 
to present himself as 'père de la nation': the heir to these great historical 
figures and the only patriotic choice to lead the nation.  The names he 
lists were undoubtedly carefully chosen.  To take just a few examples, 
they illustrate his attempt to take 'ownership' of the Left's iconic figures 
(Blum, Jaurès); his appeal to a classical model of the Republic and its 
education system (Ferry); and perhaps most interestingly, his 
rehabilitation of the colonial enterprise (Lyautey).  De Gaulle, finally, 
would seem to be a model for Sarkozy's desire to paint himself as a 
unifying figure, above party politics. 
 
De Cock, Madeline, Offenstadt and Wahnich (2008) argue that this 
aspect of Sarkozy’s discourse reduces history to ‘name dropping’, with 
the aim of creating '[un] nouveau rêve national dépolitisé' (2008: 14).  
Sarkozy rejects, they write, 'l'histoire savante et critique' which can help 
us to understand our place in the present, and possible destinations in 
the future, in favour of a list of decontextualised 'heroes' designed to do 
nothing more than elicit an emotional response in his audience (2008: 21).  
It is not a question of understanding the past, but of validating his own 
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political project.  They go on to compare Sarkozy's version of history to 
those found in primary school textbooks of the Third Republic such as Le 
tour de la France par deux enfants, the hugely popular patriotic storybook 
with the stated aims of 'groupant [...] toutes les connaissances morales et 
civiques autour de l'idée de la France' and 'présenter aux enfants la patrie 
sous ses traits les plus nobles' (1884: préface).  It is, they write, 'une 
histoire lisse et fermée, sans questionnement latéral, une histoire où 
l'analyse cède le pas à l'exaltation de la patrie' (2008: 17); a simplified, 
moralistic reading of events 'destinée à des enfants de 6 à 12 ans'. (2008: 
21)  A similar point is made in a 2007 work by the Comité de vigilance 
face aux usages publics de l'histoire (CVUH), a group of historians and 
academics opposed to the misappropriation and distortion of history by 
politicians, whose highest-profile member is perhaps the historian of 
immigration Gérard Noiriel.  This work, however, adds the idea that 
Sarkozy’s use of history serves to 'détourner l'attention de son 
programme réel que l'on peut qualifier de national-libéral et dont les 
premières victimes seront les cibles directes de ses discours de 
récupération' (2007: 1).  As we will see later on in this chapter, the charge 
that national identity – of which this evocation of history is evidently a part 
– functions as a ‘smokescreen’ hiding more significant (particularly socio-
economic) issues is one made frequently by Sarkozy’s critics in academia 
and the media.   
 
As a final example of the reaction of many critical historians to Sarkozy’s 
use of history can be taken Gérard Noiriel, the historian of immigration 
 102 
touched upon above.  Noiriel has been a consistent critic of Sarkozy's 
national identity discourse, resigning from his role as an advisor for the 
Cité nationale de l'histoire de l'immigration in 2007, in protest at Sarkozy's 
foundation of the new Ministère de l'Immigration, de l'Intégration, de 
l'Identité nationale et du Développement solidaire.  As Max Silverman 
notes in his review of À quoi sert "l'identité nationale" (2007a) (Noiriel’s 
critical examination of Sarkozy’s use of national identity, and perhaps the 
key text on this theme), Noiriel perceives himself as a 'committed 
intellectual', with a 'responsibility to guarantee equality of treatment and 
guard against the creation of dangerous stereotypes' (in Modern and 
Contemporary France, 18:1, 115-118, 2010).  Accordingly, Noiriel 
highlights in this text what he sees as the empty, and historically 
nonsensical, rhetoric which makes up Sarkozy's discourse on history and 
national identity.  Noiriel describes the way in which Sarkozy evokes the 
essentialist, ‘spiritual’ model of nationhood discussed above – the France 
of 'the land' and of 2000 years of eternal values – then moves without a 
pause into the France founded on the principles of the revolutionary 
Republic: the beacon of liberty, equality and fraternity and champion of 
the Rights of Man.  So is there one France, eternal and unchanging, or a 
new France representing new human and political values?  As Noiriel 
points out, in his electoral discourse Sarkozy wraps up Frenchness as 
both these traditions, with no apparent need for analysis or qualification.  
In Sarkozy's all-encompassing definition, France is local but central, 
unchanging yet revolutionary, Christian yet secular.  To Noiriel, Sarkozy's 
historical discourse is beset with contradictions.  As he writes: 
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 "L'identité de la France, c'est Barrès et Jaurès enfin devenus amis, 
le chantre de l'antisémitisme cheminant bras dessus, bras dessous, sur 
les routes de la France avec le militant des droits de l'homme" (2007a: 87) 
 
Noiriel argues elsewhere in the text that this aspect of Sarkozy’s 
discourse represents 'une vision de l'histoire de la France plus proche 
d'un film hollywoodien que des travaux universitaires' (2007a: 90).  It 
could perhaps be argued that this 'reconciliation of opposites' has the 
same subtext as much of Sarkozy's historically-based rhetoric: 'there is 
only one history of France, it contains what I say it does, everyone must 
respect it, and I am the only one who embodies it today'.  Such rhetoric 
arguably finds its physical manifestation in Sarkozy's plans to create a 
new 'Maison de l'histoire de la France' which, according to Hervé 
Lemoine's official report of April 2008, aimed to remedy 'le renoncement 
aux principes de l'histoire' and 'la remise en cause du "roman national"'.  
As was frequently the case with Sarkozy’s national identity-centred 
projects, these plans provoked substantial criticism and intense debate, a 
group of critical historians including Noiriel and Offenstadt publishing a 
joint opinion piece in Le Monde in which they write that 'une telle maison 
serait en quelque sorte la vitrine historique de la supposée "identité 
nationale" dont l'incantation ne cesse de mobiliser les esprits depuis 2007 
avec des implications terribles pour les plus vulnérables et 
déshonorantes pour ceux qui leur donnent réalité'.  (21.10.2010)  While 
national identity is not unique to the years examined in the thesis, it is the 
potential for ‘implications terribles pour les plus vulnérables’ contained 
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within Sarkozy’s conception of the theme that makes the reaction of the 
anti-racist movement a key issue over this period.    
 
The aim of this chapter is to examine the aspects which make up 
Sarkozy's discourse on national identity in the years 2005-2009, in order 
to give an idea of the political and discursive climate in which anti-racist 
groups had to operate during this period, as well as the constraining 
factors for the movement caused by this climate.  The first of these 
aspects to be identified is history.  From a reading of both primary and 
secondary sources, a consistent picture can be determined.  For Sarkozy, 
there is a single national history, embodied by 'Great Men' to whom 
Sarkozy implicitly presents himself as the rightful heir.  Perhaps most 
relevant to this thesis, however, is his willingness both to create and 
reflect national myth.  This can be detected within the very idea of a 
'single national history', which almost by definition is made up of an 
officially sanctioned set of myths.  Most importantly, it can also be seen in 
his evocation of French national identity as something spiritual and 
intangible built up over the centuries.  This myth-making has the effect of 
creating an exclusive, 'frozen' version of national identity, one which is 
difficult for newcomers to accede to, particularly if their cultural traditions 
are held to be incompatible, as we will see in the discussion of the 
Republic and its 'opposites' later on in the chapter.  Sarkozy’s conception 
of national identity is rejected by both SOS and MIR, the former preferring 
to promote a ‘République métissée’ accepting of immigration and open to 
cultural influence from immigrants and their descendants (Qu’est-ce que 
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SOS Racisme (2006: 90)); and the latter promoting equality not only 
between individuals but between cultures within France (Mouvement des 
Indigènes de la République, ‘Il faut une véritable alternative à la politique 
raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 6.11.2009).  Nevertheless, the 
predominance of this conception meant firstly that the movements could 
not avoid engaging with it, and secondly that their alternative visions had 
little visibility outside activist circles. 
 
 
Sarkozy, repentance and populism 
 
Linked to the theme of history is that of 'anti-repentance'.  As will now be 
clear, Sarkozy favours a conception of history in which there is one 
history of France, to be learned and respected by all citizens, and rejects 
entirely the idea that history is made up of numerous competing 
interpretations.  As such, those who deviate from his version and look 
back critically at the more controversial episodes in France's past are 
frequently accused of 'repentance', a major offence in the scheme of 
Sarkozy’s discourse.  Although not named specifically by Sarkozy, MIR – 
as a visible and controversial movement which places great importance 
on colonial memory – is undoubtedly implicated in this climate, as can be 
seen in the influential conservative academic Daniel Lefeuvre’s 
denunciation of a new generation of anti-colonialists who ‘mène combat 
sur les plateaux de télévision et dans la presse politiquement correcte [...] 
multipliant les appels ou les pétitions en faveur des “indigènes de la 
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République”’ (2006: 7).  There is no shortage of references to 
‘repentance’ to be found in Sarkozy’s speeches over 2005-2009.  To take 
an illustrative example: 
 “[...] la mode de la repentance est une mode exécrable. 
Je n'accepte pas que l'on demande aux fils d'expier les fautes des pères. 
Je n'accepte pas que l'on juge toujours le passé avec les préjugés du 
présent. 
Je n'accepte pas cette bonne conscience moralisatrice qui réécrit 
l'histoire dans le seul but de mettre la nation en accusation. 
Je n'accepte pas ce dénigrement systématique de la nation qui est la 
forme ultime de la détestation de soi. 
Car pour un français, haïr la France c'est se haïr lui-même. 
 Je n'accepte pas que l'on veuille vivre en France en professant la haine 
de la France”  (Metz, 2007) 
 
This quotation is a typical representation of Sarkozy’s discourse on the 
theme.  'Repentance', for him, is linked to 'self-hate' and 'denigration of 
the nation', which in turn is often cited as a major cause of the 'crisis of 
identity' that Sarkozy presents himself as the man to solve.  This 
discourse is routinely linked to an attempted rehabilitation of France's 
colonial enterprise: 
 “La vérité c'est qu'il n'y a pas eu beaucoup de puissances 
coloniales dans le monde qui aient tant oeuvré pour la civilisation et si 
peu pour l'exploitation” (Caen, 2007) 
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Sarkozy presents colonialism as being linked with ‘civilisation’ and as 
being largely beneficial for the countries and people being colonised, 
whilst using language which avoids any negative judgement on the 
enterprise.  His arguments on the theme are thus diametrically opposed 
to a movement like MIR, which presents colonialism as synonymous with 
racism, discrimination and exploitation, and sees such practices as 
continuing to apply to the descendants of colonial populations in France’s 
poor suburbs.  As Sarkozy states in a campaign speech in Toulon:     
  “On peut désapprouver la colonisation avec les valeurs qui sont 
les nôtres aujourd'hui. Mais on doit respecter les hommes et les femmes 
de bonne volonté qui ont pensé de bonne foi oeuvrer utilement pour un 
idéal de civilisation auquel ils croyaient.” (Toulon, 2007) 
As noted above, it is worth noting the lexical choice here.  In the French 
context, 'colonisation' and 'colonialisme' have quite different meanings.  
'Colonisation', the term chosen by Sarkozy here, has more neutral 
connotations, describing a process more than an ideology.  'Colonialisme', 
meanwhile, is a term most likely to be used in left-wing, anti-colonial 
circles, and implies that the colonial idea does in fact form an ideology 
and an exploitative system.  As Dulucq and Klein write in 'Les mots de la 
Colonisation' (2008): 
 "Le mot colonialisme prend en français un sens clairement 
péjoratif [...] ceux qui l'utilisent [...] insistent sur l'exploitation des 
territoires et des peuples conquis; ils dénoncent une colonisation qui 
profite aux seules métropoles" (2008: 30) 
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De Cock et al link Sarkozy’s rehabilitation of colonisation to his portrayal 
of France as 'globalement bonne' (2008: 148).  According to Sarkozy, 
France has never committed a genocide or crime against humanity, 
always fought for liberté, égalité and fraternité, and was the colonial 
power most devoted to civilisation and development: what, than, is there 
to ‘repent’ for?  This argument, in the view of De Cock et al, bears little 
relationship with reality.  They argue that far from spreading civilisation, 
development and ‘universalist’ values, colonialism is ’contradictoire avec 
les principes d’égalité et de droits des peuples à la liberté’ (2008: 149), a 
contradiction between principle and practice frequently emphasised by 
MIR, as we will see particularly in chapter 5.  Sarkozy’s calculations, 
however, are fundamentally political.  In praising colonialism and rejecting 
‘repentance’ he aimed to ensure the support and votes of several groups: 
those directly involved in colonisation and its aftermath (rapatriés from 
North Africa, harkis and their descendants, anciens combattants), Front 
National sympathisers and anyone nostalgic for France's lost status as a 
great colonial power. 
 
Implicit in Sarkozy's rehabilitation of colonisation and refusal of 
'repentance' is a rejection of 'post-colonial' ideas, ideas which (as in 
French academia and wider society) are the subject of some controversy 
in the anti-racist movement, with MIR placing them at the heart of its 
discourse and worldview and SOS substantially more wary, seeing too 
much emphasis on the past as potentially trapping post-colonial 
populations both in their ‘communities’ and in the role of permanent 
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victims (Sopo 2005).  Vincent Martigny (2009), in a piece seemingly 
written with the aim of challenging both analysts who see Sarkozy's 
discourse as something new and Sarkozy's own claims to 'rupture', 
argues that 'une réfutation de la mémoire post-coloniale et la relecture de 
l'histoire de la France' (2009: 33) is one of the major planks of Sarkozy's 
discourse.  It is Martigny’s claim that the theme of 'le refus de la 
repentance' is not fundamentally a new idea in conservative Republican 
discourse, despite 'une rénovation sémantique et une insistance notable 
sur ce type de rhétorique' (2009: 34).  He links the return of the theme to 
'la difficile gestion française de la question post-coloniale qui touche le 
pays depuis le milieu des années 90, notamment au travers des 
revendications autour de la mémoire' (2009: 28), with the implication that 
Sarkozy's discourse is reacting to the - albeit limited - opening up of 
France's politics of memory in this period.  Notable examples of this trend 
include Jacques Chirac's recognition of the French state's culpability for 
the 'Rafle du Vel d'Hiv' of 1942 in a speech in July 1995, the 2001 
adoption of a law recognising slavery as a crime against humanity, and 
the apology for the Sétif massacre of 1945 made by Hubert Colin de 
Verdière, the French ambassador to Algeria, in 2005.  These concessions, 
Martigny writes, 'ont heurté une partie de l'opinion publique (souvent sa 
partie la plus âgée), qui y a vu une raison de plus de constater les signes 
d'un déclin français' (ibid).  Noiriel, meanwhile, posits the idea that 
the ’anti-repentance’ discourse could have been a way for Sarkozy to 
distance himself from his predecessor and rival Jacques Chirac, whose 
period in office, as noted above, was marked by an admission of 
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culpability for the state’s role in the persecution of France’s Jewish 
population – an admission ’ouvrant du même coup la porte à d’autres 
revendications mémorielles, concernant principalement la colonisation et 
l’esclavage’ (2007a: 102).  If this is the case therefore, Sarkozy’s 
discourse is informed by a desire to appear a candidate of ’rupture’, both 
in the political scene as a whole and, seemingly, within his own party. 
 
Earlier in this chapter I touched upon the idea of 'us against them' being 
an important one in Sarkozy's discourse, and the way in which such 
deliberate divisiveness contradicted with the emphasis traditionally placed 
on equality and fraternity by the French anti-racist movement.  Like his 
use of history, which implicitly presented post-colonial immigrants and 
their descendants as incompatible with and unassimilable into French 
society, the discourse on anti-repentance has the effect of stigmatising 
certain 'undesirable elements' in French society.  In this case, two groups 
are targeted.  The first of these groups is made up, again, of immigrants 
and those of 'immigrant origin', who are unlikely to agree with his 
discourse on colonisation.  As Sarkozy states in the Metz speech quoted 
earlier, 'je n'accepte pas que l'on veuille vivre en France en professant la 
haine de la France'.  De Cock et al (2008: 159) link Sarkozy's refusal to 
'repent' about France's colonial past with his refusal to accept that 
prejudices formed in colonial times could influence the situation of 
immigrants and 'ethnic minorities' in contemporary French society, again 
implicitly rejecting the post-colonial ideas favoured by MIR.  Immigrants, 
he argues, are responsible for their own failure to assimilate; some, it is 
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implied, cannot be assimilated at all.  As De Cock et al point out, ’le souci 
pour les violences passées est systématiquement associé au “refus de 
s’intégrer” de certains immigrés’ (2008: 157).  That is to say, concern 
about the more controversial or shameful episodes in France’s past, 
particularly those related to colonialism, is linked to the rejection of ’une 
intégration réduite à la seule assimilation’ (ibid).  This argument enables 
Sarkozy to scapegoat both communautarisme (a term which will be 
discussed in detail later on in this chapter), and left-wing intellectuals who 
reject his discourse on immigration, national identity and colonialism. 
 
Left-wing historians and intellectuals, those most likely to publish works 
looking critically at France's past, are therefore the second group targeted, 
implicitly or explicitly, by Sarkozy's discourse on anti-repentance.  When 
Sarkozy states in the 2007 Metz speech that 'je n'accepte pas cette 
bonne conscience moralisatrice qui réécrit l'histoire dans le seul but de 
mettre la nation en accusation', for example, it is likely that this is the 
group being referred to.  De Cock et al note that Sarkozy routinely 
criticises historians, accusing them of ’falsification de l’histoire’, 
‘révisionnisme historique’ and being part of ’la “gauche bien-pensante” 
qui “juge le passé avec les préjugés du présent”’ (2008: 158).  Whilst the 
vast majority of French historians would be somewhat surprised to hear 
that they were 'rewriting history' with 'le seul but de mettre la nation en 
accusation', as is almost invariably the case with Sarkozy there are 
political calculations behind the claim.  As Noiriel notes, in relation to the 
reasons for Sarkozy's discourse on history and memory: 
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 “La raison majeure tient au fait qu’en se saisissant de ces enjeux 
mémoriels il a pu satisfaire à une règle essentielle du discours national-
sécuritaire: établir un lien entre les ennemis extérieurs et les ennemis 
intérieurs de la France” (2007a: 102) 
Sarkozy’s language here, he argues, rejects reason and operates entirely 
on emotion.  As Noiriel puts it, ‘il opère ainsi une confusion complète 
entre le registre rationnel de la critique et le registre affectif de la haine’ 
(ibid).  Thus, Noiriel claims, Sarkozy can label his critics in matters of 
immigration and national identity - historians, intellectuals, immigrants 
themselves - as ‘enemies of France’.  It could perhaps also be argued 
that Sarkozy's position here is linked to his professed antipathy to May 
'68 and its legacy, as the student movement was strongly associated with 
anti-imperialist values.    
 
De Cock et al argue that Sarkozy's aim in targeting historians and 
intellectuals is to ’séduire un électorat populaire présumé anti-
intellectualiste, du moins certifier un ancrage populaire’ (2008: 158).  It 
could perhaps be argued that this 'anti-intellectualism' shades into anti-
élitism and populism, despite the notable contradiction that Sarkozy is, by 
any definition, a member of the élite.  Those presented as the 'élite' who 
have lost touch with the 'people' tend most often in Sarkozy's discourse to 
be, again, left-wing intellectuals, despite their lack of any real power.  
There are numerous examples of appeals to 'the people' in Sarkozy's 
discourse.  To take one: 
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 “Je veux pouvoir parler au peuple de France, je veux pouvoir être 
le porte-parole du peuple français.  Je veux parler au nom de 
ce peuple que l'on veut tenir à l'écart de tout, de ce peuple que l'on ne 
veut plus écouter, que l'on ne veut plus entendre. [^]  Je veux être le 
candidat de cette France qui souffre et non celui des appareils, celui des 
notables, celui des élites qui prétendent penser et décider à la place 
du peuple.”  (Montpellier, 2007) 
 
This idea of promoting the cause of 'the people', defined in opposition to 
'élites', is an important one in most definitions of populism as a political 
style.  A full discussion of the nature of populism is beyond the scope of 
this chapter, but it is worth considering the question of how Sarkozy 
employs aspects of this style.  In L'illusion populiste (2007), Pierre-André 
Taguieff notes that populism is a style that can be employed by right- and 
left-wing movements, to democratic or anti-democratic ends, but 
emphasises that it is not an ideology or type of regime.  Possibly the 
closest he gets to a definition is the following: 
 “un style politique, fondé sur le recours systématique à la 
rhétorique de l'appel au peuple et la mise en oeuvre d'un mode de 
légitimation de type charismatique, le plus propre à valoriser le 
“changement”” (2007: 9) 
It is important to note that Taguieff does not refer to Sarkozy by name, or 
seemingly intend the analysis to apply to him.  I would argue, however, 
that elements of Taguieff’s definition could be applied to Sarkozy's 
rhetoric and to the political 'character' he plays. 
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First of all in Taguieff's schema, we have the figure of 'the leader' himself, 
'personnage qui est à la fois expression, guide et “sauveur” du “peuple”' 
(2007: 10).  This leader is likely to be charismatic and media-savvy 
('télégenique' as Taguieff puts it), sending out the message of “Suivez-
moi” or “Faites-moi confiance” (2007: 33).  Aspects of this figure can 
arguably be seen in Sarkozy, or at least in the political character he plays.  
As Noiriel writes, Sarkozy presents himself as 'L'homme qui dit toujours la 
vérité aux Français' (2007: 85); the man who sets out the idea that there 
is a 'crisis' in French identity, then presents himself as the only one who 
can solve it.  As Sarkozy himself puts it in the Caen speech, 'Je suis le 
candidat qui exprime les idées que pensent et que portent les Français'.  
It is interesting to note, what is more, that Noiriel attributes the 
announcement of the new 'Ministry of Immigration and National Identity' 
to the media management of Sarkozy and his advisors (2007: 84), giving 
an idea of the importance of controlling the media agenda in Sarkozy's 
campaign.  There is in fact a school of thought that his media support was 
a more important factor in Sarkozy's 2007 success than the 'quality' of his 
discourse, as we shall see later in the chapter.   
 
An additional key component in Taguieff's discussion of populism is the 
idea of 'L'appel personnel au peuple lancé par le leader' (2007: 34).  
Taguieff writes: 
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 “Le populisme politique implique la valorisation du peuple, opposé 
soit aux élites, soit aux étrangers, soit encore aux élites et aux étrangers” 
(2007: 19) 
'The people' in this conception are held to incarnate 'des vertus 
d'authenticité et d'honnêteté qui le distinguent face aux élites supposées 
illégitimes et corrompues' (ibid). This can be seen quite clearly in the 
example from the Montpellier speech above. Sarkozy claims that he 
wants to 'parler au nom de ce peuple que l'on veut tenir à l'écart de tout, 
de ce peuple que l'on ne veut plus écouter, que l'on ne veut plus 
entendre', thus implicitly presenting the dominant ethnic group as victims.  
And he does not want to be the candidate of '[la France] des élites qui 
prétendent penser et décider à la place du peuple'.  From my reading of 
Sarkozy's speeches, he does not generally oppose 'peuple' and 
'étrangers' in an explicit sense.  As we will see however, the figure of 'the 
foreigner' is frequently presented as a threat to 'the Republic' and its 
'values', arguably to similar effects.  Continuing on the theme of 'the 
people' in populism, Taguieff talks of 'la dimension mythologique de tout 
populisme, qui réside dans la thèse, toujours présupposée, que “le 
peuple” existe et qu'il est doté d'une unité, laquelle lui donne son identité' 
(2007: 31).  As we have seen at the start of this chapter, in the discussion 
of history, this is very much part of Sarkozy's discourse, and can have the 
indirect effect of excluding or stigmatising those of certain foreign origins, 
even if they are French citizens. 
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Taguieff goes on to consider (2007: 14) common positions of 
contemporary 'national populist' movements in Western Europe.  In 
common with Sarkozy are 'le rejet de l'immigration (stigmatisée comme 
facteur de perte d'identité nationale / régionale)' and 'un fort sentiment 
d'insécurité et la demande d'un rétablissement autoritaire de l'ordre' – as 
can be seen most clearly in my chosen period during the 2005 riots and 
their aftermath.  Generally less emphasised by Sarkozy are 'l'hostilité à 
l'Europe et à la globalisation': as a supporter of neo-liberal economics, 
and of voting 'yes' in 2005's referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, it would 
seem illogical for him to do so.  The idea of Sarkozy being linked 
ideologically to the wave of European 'national populist' movements 
which came to prominence in the early 2000s is an interesting one, and 
one which can be taken into account in the discussion of the novelty of 
Sarkozy's discourse, and the possible reasons for its success, at the end 
of this chapter.  There is one further point worth mentioning in Taguieff's 
argument before moving on, coming in a digression during his discussion 
of the Front National.  As we have now seen, the 'classical' model of 
populism opposes 'petits' and 'gros'.  Whilst there are obviously elements 
of this model in the FN's discourse – and Sarkozy's – Taguieff argues that 
theirs could just as easily be classified as 'un populisme des “moyens” 
contre les “petits”', setting 'les “moyens inférieurs”, bénéficiant 
d'avantages sociaux, contre les “exclus” (les “immigrés” avant tout), 
censés “vivre aux crochets” des Français' (2007: 22).  Whilst anti-racism 
is not an explicit target of Sarkozy’s populism, a political discourse which 
places ‘the people’ in opposition to ‘élites’ and ‘foreigners’ is always likely 
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to have implications for the movement, as by definition anti-racism aims 
to act in the interest of these same ‘foreigners’ and ‘immigrants’ 
(categories which in fact encompass numerous French citizens of ‘ethnic 
minority’ origin) presented as delinquents, scroungers, thieves and 
religious fundamentalists.  Anti-racism can therefore potentially be 
presented in this discourse as against the interests of ‘the people’, a term 
which implicitly gains a racial dimension entirely contrary to the ‘colour-
blind’ universalism associated with the French Republic. 
 
As has already been touched upon, Sarkozy's appeal to 'the people' and 
opposition to 'élites' can perhaps be seen in his consistent efforts to 
present himself as an outsider, daring to speak the truth and contradict 'la 
dictature du politiquement correct et de la pensée unique' (Caen, 2007).  
Taguieff talks of citizens' disaffection towards the political system as 
something potentially played upon by populist movements.  It could 
perhaps be argued that Sarkozy himself attempts to play on these 
feelings, despite him being a career politician in a major mainstream party.  
The way in which Sarkozy uses rhetorical techniques common to 
'insurgent', 'anti-system' movements, despite his status very much within 
the 'system', is a major contradiction, and arguably part of what makes 
him an interesting political figure to examine. 
 
Summing up, after my discussion of Sarkozy's use of history, I moved on 
to examine the connected theme of 'anti-repentance'.  To recap, Sarkozy 
favours a conception of history in which there is one history of France, to 
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be learned and respected by all citizens.  As such, those who deviate 
from his version and look back critically at the more shameful episodes in 
France's past are accused of 'repentance', associated with 'self-hate' and 
'denigration of the nation'.  This has the effect of stigmatising both those 
of 'immigrant origin' and left-wing intellectuals and historians, a situation 
which, in terms of anti-racism, has a particular effect on the ability of MIR 
to receive a fair hearing for its arguments – arguably an example of 
Sarkozy’s success in marginalising critical political voices.  To end the 
section, I then used the idea of 'anti-intellectualism' and 'anti-élitism' in 
Sarkozy's discourse as a starting point to consider the idea of populism, 
an idea which has to be taken into account in an analysis of the meaning 
and success of this discourse.  In the next section, I will consider the use 
made by Sarkozy of the Republic, an aspect of his campaigning language 
with substantial implications for the capacity of SOS to articulate a 
distinctive alternative discourse. 
 
 
 
Sarkozy, the Republic and communautarisme 
 
As can be seen throughout the thesis, SOS, like the majority of 
mainstream anti-racist movements in France, bases its action on 
republicanism.  More specifically, it promotes a liberal conception of the 
idea, emphasising equality, tolerance and ‘colour-blindness’.  For SOS, to 
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quote the organisation’s 2007 mission statement, anti-racism is ‘[un] 
projet de fraternité et d’égalité’: 
 “L’antiracisme n’a jamais été pour nous la volonté de défendre 
telle population contre telle autre [...] L’antiracisme, pour nous, a toujours 
été la volonté de voir chacun vivre à égale dignité dans la société, quelles 
que soient ses origines, sa confession ou ses pratiques culturelles.” (SOS 
Racisme, ‘Nos Missions’, 2007) 
 
Republicanism, however, is a highly flexible concept.  At the same time 
as it was used by SOS as a basis for promoting equality and fighting 
discrimination, it was used by Sarkozy as a rhetorical tool which served to 
stigmatise both immigrants and French citizens of foreign origin, in 
particular the country’s Muslim population.  Let us consider the way in 
which this happens. 
 
There would appear to be a recurrent trope in Sarkozy’s discourse in 
which he praises the Republic and what he sees as its ‘values’, then goes 
on to argue that these values are ’in crisis’ or ’under threat’.  I will 
consider this idea in full shortly, but firstly it is worth considering the 
question of what Sarkozy means by 'the Republic' and 'republican values'.  
On this question, the answer is not entirely clear.  It is perhaps arguable 
that the term is repeated so often it loses any meaning it once had.  
Consider, for example, Sarkozy's 2006 speech in Périgueux, in which, 
according to the lexical analysis of Jean Véronis of the University of 
Provence (http://sites.univ-provence.fr/veronis/Discours2007/), he used 
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the term 'République' no less than 76 times.  I have chosen to take 
examples, however, from Sarkozy’s 2009 speech in La Chapelle-en-
Vercors, as this speech was given to mark the launch of the ‘identity 
debate’ of late that year, and thus illustrates the ‘official’ viewpoints on 
key concepts to be used in the debate.  In this speech, Sarkozy has the 
following to say about the Republic:     
 “La République, c'est la souveraineté de la Nation.  La République, 
c'est l'autorité et d'abord l'autorité de l'État.  La République, c'est l'égalité 
des chances.  La République, c'est le mérite, c'est le travail.  La 
République, c'est la laïcité.  La République, c'est la compréhension, le 
respect et la solidarité”  (La Chapelle-en-Vercors, 2009) 
This is fairly uncontroversial territory for a mainstream French politician, 
although it is noticeable that Sarkozy promotes aspects of his 
conservative worldview in the references to 'autorité', 'travail' and 'respect'.  
This technique of using 'the Republic' as a means of providing ideological 
backing for his policies and positions can also be seen in this extract from 
the same speech: 
  “Que reste-t-il de la République si l'on se met à considérer de la 
même manière le délinquant et la victime, celui qui fait son devoir et celui 
qui ne le fait pas, celui qui fait son travail et celui qui ne fait rien?  Que 
reste-t-il de la République quand on place sur le même plan l'intérêt 
particulier et l'intérêt général, le principe d'égalité et le droit à la 
différence?” 
Again, Sarkozy associates republican values with work, in keeping with 
his rhetoric of 'travailler plus pour gagner plus' (Réunion des nouveaux 
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adhérants à l'UMP, 2006, and elsewhere), and with his proclaimed 
'rupture' – one of many – with the 35 hour week.  To this he adds his 
campaign against 'delinquency', one which continues throughout my 
timeframe and almost exclusively targets young men of 'immigrant origin' 
in the banlieues.  The implication that the idea of le droit à la différence is 
'anti-republican' is also noteworthy: SOS Racisme, the movement with 
which the idea is widely associated, had also seemingly come to this 
conclusion well before the timeframe examined in the thesis4. 
 
De Cock et al, noting Sarkozy’s self-identification as a spokesman 
for ’une droite “républicaine”, themselves consider the question of what 
he means by 'the Republic'.  They argue that Sarkozy deliberately strips 
away much of the concept’s political significance: 
  “Davantage perçue comme une notion juridique (un type de 
régime constitutionnel) que politique (un projet démocratique de politique 
égalitaire), la République peut alors servir d’habits confortables pour 
prétendre incarner une tradition progressiste quand on prolonge plutôt la 
révolution réactionnaire” (2008: 19)  
According to this argument therefore, Sarkozy is simply paying lip service 
to the radical political agenda originally embodied by the Republic, 
defining it in a way which fits his own interests and using it as a cover for 
his reactionary policies: a problem for a movement like SOS which places 
the Republic’s Enlightenment- and Revolution-inspired egalitarianism at 
the heart of its understanding of the idea.  Of course, every mainstream 
                                                 
4 As I note elsewhere in the thesis, as long ago as 1990 founding SOS President Harlem 
Désir claimed of the organisation that ‘nous n’avons jamais fait du droit à la différence le 
principe de notre action’ (‘Harlem Désir: Vive la nation!’, Nouvel Observateur 13.6.1990) 
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politician in France claims to respect the Republic, so the battle to define 
what it stands for and which values it represents is still of vital importance.  
According to Martigny this battle was an undercurrent in the 2007 election 
campaign, and could be detected in the national identity discourse of the 
two main candidates.  While Ségolène Royal’s ’républicaine-pluraliste’ 
conception accepted the multiple reality of French history and saw 
national identity as something continually under construction, albeit on a 
basis of fundamental shared values (2009: 31), Sarkozy’s ‘républicaine-
conservatrice’ conception, as we have seen, rejected critical alternative 
views of history and based itself (amongst other things) on 
assimilationist ’Jacobin’ republicanism – which, as Martigny notes, 
passed as a theme from Left to Right during the 1980s (2009: 34).  
Accordingly, immigrants are required to adopt ’une identité nationale pré-
établie’, as opposed to the more open, ‘constructivist’ conception 
associated with the French anti-racist movement.  As Martigny sums up: 
 “Cette conception de l’identité nationale comme un facteur figé 
s’opposant à la perception de l’identité comme un compromis historique 
en perpétuelle évolution est la marque de fabrique du candidat Sarkozy” 
(ibid) 
This battle over the meaning of ‘the Republic’ - and thus of national 
identity itself - would seem unlikely to end in the near future, as this would 
involve a move away from republican ideology on the part of one of the 
major parties.  Certainly, during the period under discussion in my thesis, 
it appeared as entrenched as ever, the discourse of the ’droit à la 
différence’ having moved away from the mainstream since the mid-1980s, 
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even being appropriated by the far-Right for its own purposes (see 
Lebovics (2004: 132) for a discussion of this ideological shift). 
 
Noiriel too considers the question of what Sarkozy means when he talks 
about 'the Republic', arguing that in keeping with his all-encompassing 
(and often contradictory) conception of history, Sarkozy simply links the 
idea of the Republic with every aspect of French society he approves of.  
As Noiriel sees it, Sarkozy's 'Republic' is 'une République à la fois libérale, 
sociale, radicale, laïque, chrétienne, qui revendique en même temps la 
baisse de l’impôt sur les grandes fortunes, la sécurité sociale et le droit 
au travail’ (2007a: 87).  Furthermore, Sarkozy argues that ‘republican 
values’ exist ‘dans l’éternité de l’histoire, en affirmant que, “depuis 
toujours”, les Français les avaient défendues’ (2007a: 88), neatly 
resolving the contradictions between the ‘eternal’ and ‘post-Revolutionary’ 
conceptions of France discussed earlier, but at the same time moving the 
concept even further away from a specific definition.   
 
In many ways, it would seem that Sarkozy's use of the Republic is merely 
a symbolic tool divested of ideological or historical significance; a mere 
signifier of national identity (although of course, depoliticising a régime 
theoretically based around universal liberty, equality and fraternity is itself 
a highly political act).  Noiriel makes the point that Sarkozy plays down 
the role of the French Revolution and places the origins of 'republican 
values' far back in history (in the case of his 2007 speech at Caen, to the 
time of the Vikings).  In addition, Sarkozy - like de Gaulle before him - 
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frequently attempts to present himself as transcending the traditional 
Left/Right divide; as 'l'homme du peuple' who incarnates a national 
identity portrayed as something above party politics.  Like his conception 
of history as a single 'national story' to be learned and respected by every 
citizen, his evocation of the Republic is representative of this self-
portrayal.  Perhaps in this conception ’the Republic’ is representative 
of ’une hérédité des valeurs’ (Noiriel 2007a: 91), or as Meyran put it, an 
example of the ’récits mythiques [qui] définissent en négatif ceux qui ne 
sont pas des Français‘ (2009: 11).  Looking at Sarkozy’s discourse on the 
threats to the Republic and its values, this point is worth keeping in mind. 
 
Most relevant to this chapter, however, is Sarkozy’s conception of the 
‘opposite’ of the Republic and its values, an idea which links clearly which 
the recurring theme of ‘us against them’ in his campaigning discourse.  
As he puts it, 'On ne peut pas vouloir tous les avantages de la 
République si l'on ne respecte aucune de ses lois, aucune de ses valeurs, 
aucun de ses principes' (La Chapelle-en-Vercors, 2009).  But who is he 
referring to when he makes this argument?  As usual in Sarkozy's 
discourse he does not name names, but it could perhaps be argued that 
the 'opposite' of Republican values is 'the foreigner', a figure represented 
by two terms: 'le clandestin' and communautarisme.  As Sarkozy says on 
the subject of the 'clandestin', firstly: 
 “Être français, c'est parler et écrire le français.  Être français, c'est 
respecter la loi.  Celui qui entre clandestinement en France, celui qui ne 
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fait aucun effort pour s'intégrer, celui-là ne doit pas attendre à se voir 
reconnaître les mêmes droits qu'un français” (Caen, 2007) 
This aspect of Sarkozy's discourse is noted by Noiriel, who argues that ’le 
procédé rhétorique utilisé pour accentuer la présentation péjorative de 
ces personnes consiste toujours à les opposer aux véritables nationaux’ 
(2007a: 93).  The picture of the 'clandestin' is painted by 'une chaîne 
d'équivalences négatives permettant de dresser le portrait robot de 
l'antithèse du Français' (ibid): someone who does not speak French, does 
not respect the law and makes no effort to integrate.  As may be 
expected, there is no acknowledgement of the discrimination faced by 
immigrants, or that for an illegal immigrant it might be difficult to 'integrate' 
without being deported, or that, given time, immigrants and their 
descendants could in fact integrate into society.  And this argument, 
which as Noiriel points out, attributes to all 'clandestins' behaviour which 
applies in reality to 'une infime partie d'entre eux' (2007a: 94), is 'légitimé 
par des références constantes aux “valeurs” éternelles de la République' 
(ibid). 
 
The most important idea in a discussion of this theme, however, is that of 
communautarisme.  Sarkozy’s usage of this term causes substantial 
difficulties for SOS, which similarly opposes the practice, on the grounds 
that choosing to live solely in ethnically- or religiously-based communities 
is contrary to republican universalism and colour-blindness.  However, 
whereas SOS sees communautarisme as undesirable but 
understandable – as a support system for immigrant and immigrant-origin 
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populations, which can be fought by bringing them into wider society via 
action against discrimination and poverty – for Sarkozy the term is used 
as an emotive trigger-word, designed to bring to his audience’s mind fear 
of ‘threats to society’ from illegal immigration, social disorder and radical 
Islam. 
 
As with 'repentance', discussed earlier, Sarkozy’s discourse portrays 
communautarisme as a serious crime, and frequently blames the 
phenomenon for much of what has supposedly gone wrong with French 
society.  Let us take a typical example of the way Sarkozy presents the 
term: 
 “Affaiblir le sentiment national c'est laisser le champ libre 
au communautarisme. Je ne veux pas du communautarisme. Je veux 
l'intégration qui permet de tisser du lien social, de la solidarité, de la 
compréhension et du respect. 
Le communautarisme c'est enfermer chacun dans ses origines et ses 
croyances. 
Le communautarisme c'est prendre le risque que ce qui nous sépare 
devienne plus important que ce qui nous unit. 
Le communautarisme c'est la porte ouverte à l'exclusion, à l'intolérance, à 
la violence et aux tribus. 
Le communautarisme c'est la condamnation de l'universalisme des 
Lumières. C'est la fin de notre conception universaliste de l'Homme. 
Le communautarisme c'est la fin de l'idée que nous nous faisons de la 
République.”  (Metz, 2007) 
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So what is communautarisme?  In literal terms this refers to the possible 
consequences of 'multiculturalism' as perceived within French society, but 
in the discourse of Sarkozy it represents nothing less than 'la fin de notre 
conception universaliste de l'Homme'.  Again, Sarkozy does not define 
exactly what he means by communautarisme, although the use of the 
term allows Sarkozy to represent multiculturalism to a French audience in 
the way that he wants – one key understanding would be that a person's 
primary loyalty is to an ethnic or religious group, rather than to the nation-
state.  He goes on to work by insinuation, using what Noiriel calls 
a ’chaîne des équivalences’ which illustrates what he sees as ‘le contraire 
de la République’ (2007a: 95).  This extract from the 2007 Caen speech 
is representative of this technique 
 “Celui qui ne veut pas respecter nos valeurs de liberté n'est pas 
obligé de rester. 
Celui qui ne veut pas respecter notre conception de l'homme, celui 
qui récuse l'humanisme et l'universalisme, celui qui récuse l'usage de la 
raison, celui qui veut abolir l'héritage des Lumières et celui de la 
Révolution, celui qui ne veut pas reconnaître que la femme est l'égal de 
l'homme, celui qui veut cloîtrer sa femme, obliger sa fille à porter le voile, 
à se faire exciser ou à se marier de force, celui-là n'a rien à faire en 
France et il doit savoir que s'il reste, les lois et les principes de la 
République s'appliqueront à lui comme à tous les autres citoyens”   (Caen, 
2007) 
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As Noiriel points out, ‘chacun des exemples cités pour designer l’anti-
France renvoie à un sujet qui a été mis au devant de l’actualité par les 
médias dans les années précédentes, et qui tous évoquent l’immigration 
en provenance du Maghreb et d’Afrique noire’ (2007a: 95).  So to take 
this idea to its logical conclusion, the opposite of ’republican values’ in 
Sarkozy’s discourse is in fact Islam, although this is never made explicit.  
As Noiriel puts it, ’Sarkozy ne désigne jamais nommément le groupe qu’il 
montre du doigt.  Néanmoins, il utilise la même technique de 
communication de Jean-Marie Le Pen’ (2007a: 96).  Again, as with the 
discussions of history and repentance earlier in the chapter, the logic is 
that of 'us against them'.  In Sarkozy's speeches, Islam is evoked only by 
implied negativity, playing upon negative stereotypes that had built up in 
political and media discourse over the preceding years.  Due to the vague 
way it is formulated accusations of racism can be denied, but it is evident 
that the audience can be trusted to fill in the gaps for themselves.  To 
sum up, Sarkozy would seem to use the idea of the Republic to embody 
all that is ’good’ in his conception of French society, while simultaneously 
setting up communautarisme as representative of everything the Republic 
should reject.  This rhetorical technique is then used as a cover for the 
targeting of certain specific groups within French society, whether 
members of these groups are French or not.  The effect, thus, is to elide 
sans-papiers, legitimate immigrants and French citizens of visible ethnic 
minority origin into a single category; the latter becoming what Ahmed 
Boubeker (2010: 265) calls 'étrangers de l'intérieur'; de facto second-
class citizens.  If this critique is to be accepted there is a major 
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contradiction at the heart of Sarkozy's discourse - he promotes 
republicanism, but ignores one of its central tenets: that every French 
citizen should be equal.  As we will see in chapter 3, this use of 
republicanism for purposes which serve to stigmatise a significant 
minority of the French population causes substantial problems for SOS, 
which itself basis its appeals for tolerance and equality on the ever 
flexible idea of ‘republican values’.  What is more, a discourse which 
implicitly presents Islam as contrary to the Republic inevitably has 
implications for MIR, a movement which contains numerous Muslim 
members and places substantial emphasis on the fight against 
Islamophobia.  
 
It could perhaps be argued, finally, that this discourse on the Republic 
and its 'opposites' forms the basis of Sarkozy's discourse on security, 
which reappears throughout my timeframe, but is most in evidence in the 
aftermath of the riots of 2005.  As Boubeker writes on the representation 
of the banlieues in contemporary political discourse: 
  “C'est le thème de la dérive mafieuse, ethnique, islamique, 
communautariste... des quartiers.  Une nouvelle version des “classes 
dangereuses” qui seraient liguées contre la République et la sacro-sainte 
communauté des citoyens.” (2010: 271) 
Such a representation can be seen in Sarkozy's speech of November 
2005, in which, as Minister for the Interior, he announced the imposition 
of a state of emergency.  As he said at this time: 
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  “Au-delà donc des facteurs économiques et sociaux, il y a un autre 
facteur, un facteur central: c'est la volonté de ceux qui ont fait de la 
délinquance leur activité principale de résister à l'ambition de la 
République de réinstaller son ordre, celui de ses lois, dans leur territoire”  
(Assemblée nationale, 2005) 
And he goes on to make his position clear: 
  “Si ce n'est pas l'ordre de la République qui règne dans ces 
quartiers, ce sera celui des bandes ou des extrémistes” 
 
There are numerous other examples that could have been chosen, but 
the tone of Sarkozy's discourse is quite apparent in these quotations.  
The picture he paints of the banlieues is one of 'delinquents', 'gangs' and 
'extremists'.  By 'extremists' he almost certainly intends his audience to 
understand 'Islamic extremists', although as usual he does not say so in 
as many words.  As for the Republic in this scenario, it is explicitly 
contrasted with these 'gangs' and 'extremists'.  And there is no middle 
ground: you have either one or the other.  There is quite a militaristic tone 
to Sarkozy's comments at this time: the Republic has to 'reconquer' the 
'territory' of the banlieues and re-establish order, a discourse seen by 
MIR as evidence of the continuity between colonial and post-colonial 
France5.  The rioters, it is implied furthermore, should be condemned 
without the need for understanding.  As Demiati (in Mucchielli and Le 
Goaziou (eds.), 2007) writes, 'c'est le sens du langage de M. Sarkozy qui, 
                                                 
5 In the sense that post-colonial immigrants are largely confined to France’s poor 
suburbs and are subject to repressive treatment from the authorities – so MIR’s 
argument goes – in the same way as their ‘native’ ancestors in the French colonies 
(hence the name of the movement). 
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en cherchant surtout à criminaliser les émeutiers, vise à ôter à leurs actes 
toute signification ou justification politique'.  Once again, the effect of 
Sarkozy's language is to create an amalgam; a composite figure 
incorporating all the negative stereotypes that had built up around 
immigration, the banlieues and radical Islam in the preceding years.  It is 
ignored or downplayed that the majority of the 2005 rioters were French 
citizens, many of whom will have wanted to 'integrate' into French society 
but found they were unable to, due to racial prejudice and lack of 
opportunities for social advancement. 
 
In this section, using a combination of primary and secondary sources, I 
have examined some of the key aspects of Sarkozy's discourse on 
national identity, as a means of firmly establishing the political and 
ideological context within which anti-racist movements had to act over my 
chosen period.  It is arguable that all of these aspects are connected, and 
that all can be explained, partially at least, with reference to the idea of 
'us against them'.  The first theme to be examined was that of history.  
Here Sarkozy sets up the idea of a single, consensual national history, 
made up of great events and heroic individuals, to which he presents 
himself as the heir.  Perhaps most importantly, he also plays upon the 
idea of national myth, painting 'Frenchness' as something more than just 
a nationality.  This has the effect of making it difficult for new immigrants 
ever to be seen as truly assimilated, especially if their cultural practices 
are held to be incompatible with French tradition.  The second theme was 
that of 'anti-repentance', often linked with a defence of France's colonial 
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enterprise.  This allows critics of Sarkozy's patriotic, all-encompassing, 
singular version of history to be stigmatised as 'enemies of France'.  
Those targeted are France's population of 'immigrant origin', and left-wing 
historians and intellectuals.  Targeting the latter group enables Sarkozy to 
pose as a populist anti-élitist, defending the rights of 'the People' and the 
'true France'.  This theme also allows Sarkozy to break away from the 
Chirac regime, under which there was a limited opening up of the French 
state's politics of memory.  The final theme is that of the Republic, held to 
embody everything worthwhile about French society, and its 'opposites', 
embodied by communautarisme and the theoretical figure, based on the 
stereotypes built up over several years of news stories, of the 
fundamentalist (male) Muslim, possibly a criminal, who refuses to 
integrate and forces his wife to wear the veil.  This context was a 
complicated one for both the movements examined in the thesis, for three 
central reasons.  Firstly, because a conservative, essentialist conception 
of national identity was predominant in political discourse over this period, 
meaning that more liberal or radical visions of the concept had little 
visibility, and implanting in the public mind the ideas that immigration is a 
threat to identity, and that certain elements within the French population 
can never truly assimilate.  Secondly (an issue particularly for MIR), 
because terms such as communautarisme and ‘repentance’ were 
widespread, and presented as something to be feared, meaning that 
movements which emphasised multiculturalism, colonial memory and the 
fight against Islamophobia were considered as inherently suspicious.  
And thirdly (an issue particularly for SOS), because there was a 
 133 
consensus on the language of republicanism across the political 
spectrum, meaning that it could be used simultaneously as a basis for 
fighting racism, discrimination and inequality, and as a basis for 
stigmatising minority populations, a situation which made it difficult for 
mainstream republican movements to articulate a distinctive campaigning 
discourse.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter I intend, based on a number of critical 
texts which focus on my chosen period, to examine the novelty (or 
otherwise), significance and reason for the success of Sarkozy's 
discourse.  I will end the chapter, finally, with my thoughts on the question 
posed right at the start of it: what is 'Sarkozysme'? 
 
 
Sarkozy’s national identity discourse: anything new? 
 
On then to the first of these questions: is Sarkozy's discourse new?  
Based on extensive reading of contemporary secondary sources, the 
consensus would seem to be that it is not – which evidently would give 
the lie to his claim of being a candidate of 'rupture'.  The question, 
however, is evidently more complicated than that.  While none of the 
authors examined found Sarkozy's discourse to be entirely new, all of 
them found something new in the relationship between this discourse and 
the political context in which it was being pronounced. 
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For example, Martigny argues that there is nothing new in Sarkozy's 
discourse: ’le contenu de son discours a été extrêmement typique d’un 
républicanisme civique autoritaire inscrit dans la tradition française’ (2009: 
24).  However there are two things that, for Martigny, are new about 
Sarkozy's discourse.  The first is ‘la position centrale de ce thème [ie. 
national identity] dans la campagne présidentielle’ (2009: 23).  The 
second, perhaps the most important, is the willingness of Sarkozy's 
audience to receive his message.  This willingness is linked to the 
political and social climate of the years leading up to the 2007 election, or 
more specifically ’une série d’événements générateurs d’angoisses 
relatives à l’identité de la France dans l’opinion publique depuis 2001’ 
(2009: 26).  He divides these ‘générateurs d’angoisses’ into three 
categories: 
 “(1) les craintes d’une dilution de l’identité française dans l’Europe 
et la mondialisation face à une situation économique déprimée, (2) les 
angoisses liées à la question migratoire, à la crise du melting-pot 
républicain et au défi multiculurel, dont découle (3) la difficile gestion de 
la question post-coloniale, illustrée par un débat vif sur la mémoire 
nationale et “la repentance”’ (ibid) 
If Martigny’s critique is to be accepted, the implication is that Sarkozy was 
following rather than leading events, adapting his discourse to take 
advantage of anxieties that were already ‘in the air’.  Certainly, there are 
a number of similarities between Martigny’s ‘générateurs d’angoisses’ 
and my own list of recurring themes in Sarkozy’s discourse.  It is 
noticeable however that none of the authors I have examined identified 
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the threat to French identity from globalisation and the European Union 
as a key theme in Sarkozy’s discourse; where there were ’threats’ 
mentioned they came from immigrants, ’repentance’ and 
communautarisme.  This could perhaps be seen as evidence of a certain 
disconnect between Sarkozy’s neo-liberal economic policy - which is in 
favour of globalisation and European free trade - and his ‘national identity’ 
agenda, which seemingly ignores this as a source of anxiety.  In a text 
explicitly written in response to the creation of the new Ministry mentioned 
earlier, Agnès Maillot (2008), whose ideas I will return to shortly, argues 
that before 2007 no ‘mainstream’ presidential candidate had made 
national identity a priority.  On similar lines to Martigny, however, she 
writes that ’en effet, à l’heure de l’élargissement de l’UE et de la 
mondialisation, ce thème ne manque pas de pertinence’ (2008: 7) 
 
Noiriel’s answer to the question about the novelty of Sarkozy’s discourse 
is in many ways comparable to that of Martigny.  Having looked at the 
deep roots of conservative discourse on ‘the nation’, he too identifies a 
number of ‘événements d’actualité qui mettent en scène des jeunes issus 
de l’immigration’ (2007a: 79) in the early 2000s such as the ‘affaire du 
voile islamique’ of 2004 and the riots of 2005.  Such events, he writes, 
served to establish a ‘grille de lecture’ (2007a: 80) in which Islam was 
represented as a threat to France by politicians, the media, and 
conservative intellectuals such as Alain Finkielkraut (the latter praised by 
Sarkozy in 2005 as 'un intellectuel qui fait honneur à l'intelligence 
française', see Le Monde 4.12.2005).  Much of Sarkozy’s pitch to the 
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electorate, as we have seen, came in the form of presenting himself as a 
candidate of ’rupture’; an outsider daring to speak the truth.  It is Noiriel’s 
argument that, intellectually, he had no right to do so.  Again however, 
what was new was the prominent role played by the idea of national 
identity - ’Le thème de “l’identité nationale”’, Noiriel writes, ‘a été 
brutalement replacé au centre du débat public par Nicolas Sarkozy’ 
(2007a: 81) - and his decision to give it a legal manifestation in the shape 
of the new Ministry.  As he writes on this subject: 
 “Pour éternaliser le “problème”, le plus sûr était en effet de 
l’étatiser.  Mais lorsque des mots entrent dans le langage de l’État, leurs 
effets sont infiniment plus redoutables que des propos de campagne.  
L’association “immigration et identité nationale”, dorénavant inscrite dans 
la loi, est devenue une catégorie de pensée et d’action qui s’impose à 
tous, quelle que soit l’actualité du jour” (2007a: 146) 
 
The final authors to be examined on this question are Sylvie Tissot and 
Pierre Tévanian.  In a compendium of their work under the umbrella of 
the collective ‘Les mots sont importants’ (2010), an essay entitled ‘Qu’est-
ce que le Sarkozysme?’ sums up their attitude.  The publication date of 
this collection is likely to be incidental, marking as it does ten years of the 
collective, although some of the later pieces touch upon the 'identity 
debate' of late 2009, as we shall see.  Tévanian, it seems, has always 
seen his role as challenging power and official thinking, in words (eg. La 
République du mépris, 2007) and in deeds (signing the Appel des 
Indigènes de la République), and his writing style, generally more 
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polemical than the texts cited so far, is much in evidence in this collection.  
In the essay mentioned above, the authors argue that Sarkozy’s 
programme is the most unambiguously right-wing since World War 2: 
 “Jamais entre 1945 et 2007 un candidat de droite n’avait construit 
sa campagne sur l’ensemble des fondamentaux de la droite la plus 
droitière” (2010: 205) 
At the same time, they find nothing new in it: 
 “Comme dans toute révolution conservatrice, il n’y rien 
d’absolument nouveau si l’on analyse séparément chaque segment 
idéologique ou imaginaire du programme, de la campagne et du 
personnage Sarkozy” (ibid) 
They go on to place ‘la synthèse Sarkozyste’ (2010: 202) in the 
‘shameful’ tradition of Pétain and Maurras, arguing that his electoral 
success is based on mobilising the most right-wing elements in French 
society.  Much of the rest of the essay is devoted to asking why this 
‘mobilisation’ was successful, and on this subject their analysis diverges 
from the works studied so far.  They have two main arguments here.  The 
first is that his massive media support - due to his close links with the 
business world - was a more important factor in his success than 
the ’quality’ of his discourse.  And the second, finally, is that he was 
helped by the weakness of the Left’s ’counter-discourse’: as they write, ’et 
si Sarkozy n’avait été fort que de la faiblesse de ses adversaires?’ (2010: 
209)  The Left, they argue, had over the last 20 years accepted the 
Right’s arguments on issues such as the security, the ’problem of 
immigration’ and the need to ban the Muslim headscarf; ’vingt ans de 
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consensus libéral, sécuritaire et xénophobe’ (2010: 211) allowed Sarkozy 
to run a ’hard-right’ campaign without the need for compromise, while the 
Left was unable to provide effective opposition.  As they sum up, ’la droite 
n’est donc pas devenue intelligente: elle est devenue hégémonique’ (ibid). 
 
Summing up, the predominant impression gained from a reading of the 
sources above is that Sarkozy's discourse is not in itself new, but that due 
to the political and social context of the period under discussion, it was 
able to find a receptive audience.  This was a period in which anxieties 
around France's place in Europe and the world were ever-present, in 
which there were numerous media controversies surrounding France's 
Muslim population, and in which political parties of all persuasions 
seemingly accepted the Right's arguments on 'security'.  Perhaps in such 
a climate, it was a question of turning events to his advantage, rather 
than necessarily creating anything 'new'.  That is to say, Sarkozy 
managed to seize the political initiative, with the help of a discourse which 
took advantage of the inherently polysemic nature of republicanism in the 
French context. 
 
 
Significance and meaning? 
 
Before ending this section, I intend to examine the question of what 
contemporary authors see as the underlying significance of Sarkozy's 
discourse.  As we have seen, in the discussion above of whether 
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Sarkozy's discourse was new there was one predominant interpretation 
which appeared, in various forms, in all the texts examined.  This, to 
reiterate, was that this discourse was not inherently new, but that it fitted 
with the political and social context of the time.  Similarly, a number of 
analysts also agree that issues of immigration and national identity have 
been used as a form of 'smokescreen', obscuring the genuinely important 
questions in French society. 
 
For example, written following the announcement of the new 'Ministry of 
Immigration and National Identity', Agnès Maillot's 'Identité nationale et 
immigration: la liaison dangereuse' concludes that focusing relentlessly 
on immigration, and linking it to national identity, represents 'un écran de 
fumée pratique pour ceux qui veulent éviter un débat plus profond, tel 
celui qui pose la question des inégalités sociales, qu'elles soient 
culturelles ou économiques' (2008: 141).  One of the underlying 
arguments behind Maillot's book is that 'la question identitaire n'est 
pertinente que si son objectif est d'atteindre une plus grande cohésion 
sociale' (2008: 8).  She warns against using it for political purposes, and 
against reducing the idea solely to opposition to immigration.  In the 
creation of the new Ministry she finds Sarkozy and Brice Hortefeux guilty 
on both of these counts.  As she writes: 
 "En liant les thèmes de l'identité et de l'immigration, le nouveau 
ministère suppose une corrélation entre les deux, et ne cherche donc pas 
plus loin les possibles raisons de la crise d'identité que traverse le pays" 
(2008: 19) 
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It is Maillot's argument, then, that in the creation of the new Ministry, 
Sarkozy and Hortefeux lay the entire blame for a supposed 'crisis of 
identity' on immigration.  This, she points out, is logically nonsensical.  
However, she does not deny the existence of a potential 'crisis of identity' 
in France, going on to list a number of possible - genuine - causes that 
Sarkozy and his allies ignore.  These causes include the decline of 
industrial society, the erosion of class solidarity and the loss of 
communism as an alternative vision of society.  As she concludes: 
 "On assiste donc à une érosion des liens sociaux traditionnels, de 
la solidarité de classe, ainsi qu'à une augmentation de la marginalisation 
et de l'exclusion" (2008: 20) 
The picture, therefore, is of Sarkozy's preoccupation with national identity 
obscuring the truly important debates in French society.  Maillot's critique 
shares some similarities with Pierre Nora's article in the 2008 Cahiers 
français special issue on national identity.  Also written following the 
announcement of the new Ministry, in this article Nora declares himself to 
be in favour of talking openly about immigration, and discussing national 
identity, but against linking the two.  He agrees with Sarkozy that there is 
'crisis' of national identity, but like Maillot argues that it is wrong to 
attribute this crisis to immigration.  Alternative factors he identifies include 
France's loss of power following the end of empire and 'l'altération des 
paramètres traditionnels de la souverainété' linked to incorporation into 
the EU (2008: 8). 
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Tissot and Tévanian, in their essay 'Les dessous de l'identité nationale', 
argue on similar lines, albeit using a more class-based, Marxist-
influenced analysis.  Writing about the 'identity debate' of late 2009, the 
authors set out their interpretation of this discourse as '[une] stratégie de 
diversion et de division' (2010: 235).  They sum up what they see as the 
political function of the focus on questions of national identity as follows: 
 "Il s'agit, en produisant des affects d'amour (de la patrie) et de 
haine (de "l'étranger"), d'"unir ceux qui pourraient s'opposer" (les petits 
blancs exploités et leurs exploiteurs blancs) tout en "divisant ceux qui 
pourraient s'unir" (les exploités blancs et non blancs, français et 
étrangers, musulmans et non musulmans)" (ibid) 
Their call is for unity amongst the working class, on the basis that 'le 
travailleur français' has far more in common with his foreign, African or 
Muslim workmate or neighbour than with the political or business class.  
For Tissot and Tévanian, the 2009 debate, in fact the entire debate on the 
'problem' of immigration and national identity, functions as a 
'smokescreen'.  As they write, 'il s'agit en somme d'occuper tout le terrain 
idéologique et médiatique afin d'écarter ou d'étouffer d'autres questions' 
(2010: 234).  More specifically, 'la recherche d'une identité a pour 
fonction première d'évacuer la demande d'égalité' (ibid). 
 
Related to the idea of national identity as a ’smokescreen’, finally, is Alain 
Badiou’s discussion of the ’politics of fear’.  This comes in 'De quoi 
Sarkozy est-il le nom?' (2007), the fourth in a series of five extended 
political essays written by the Marxist philosopher in the early years of the 
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21st century, and his biggest-selling text by some distance (Marianne, 
18.12.2007).  It is a highly critical work, and has numerous facets to its 
argument, of which this is only one.  According to his conception of the 
idea, the privileged, ’dominant’ classes feel that their privilege is under 
threat.  This is translated into a ’fear’ of 'des jeunes des banlieues, des 
musulmans, des noirs venus d'Afrique...' (2007: 9), which is in fact spread 
more widely throughout society.  This fear, for many of the voters 
targeted by Sarkozy, 'crée le désir d'avoir un maître qui vous protège, fût-
ce en vous opprimant et paupérisant plus encore' (ibid).  Thus, in 
Badiou’s view, fear goes hand in hand with the perpetuation of capitalist 
society: voters can be persuaded to act against their own economic 
interests for the sake of ’security’.  For Badiou, this constant resort to the 
'politics of fear' pushes aside far more important debates, such as those 
on the social effects of capitalism, and the necessity of creating an 
alliance with 'les habitants de "l'autre" monde' (2007: 11) - that is, the 
populations of the deprived global South, some of whom may emigrate to 
France and find themselves treated as criminals.  For him, resorting to 
these ’politics of fear’ and ignoring such important questions represents a 
failure amongst the political class as a whole. 
 
In this section I have considered the question of what various authors see 
as the meaning and significance behind Sarkozy's discourse.  It is 
noticeable that all these authors, although they approach the issue from 
different angles, conclude that this focus on questions of national identity 
and immigration is based on a wilful ignorance or a deliberate obfuscation 
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of the most important issues facing contemporary France.  Perhaps it 
would be apposite, therefore, to end this discussion on Meyran's warning: 
 "Le sentiment d'identité nationale, sentiment diffus d'appartenir à 
une communauté de destin, existe probablement chez tout individu au 
sein d'un État-nation.  Mais un tel sentiment est susceptible d'être 
manipulé au gré des idéologies dominantes." (2009: 10) 
 
 
‘Sarkozysme' and potential reasons for its success 
 
The main thesis behind the Badiou text mentioned above is that Sarkozy 
is representative of a latent 'pétainisme' (2007: 18) in French society.  
This presents itself as a 'rupture' or 'revolution', but, in Badiou's view, is 
actually a capitulation.  In Pétain's case the 'capitulation' was to Nazi 
Germany; in Sarkozy's, he argues, it is to international capitalism (2007: 
106).  This 'pétainisme', furthermore, claims to be reacting to a 'crise 
morale' (ibid), each version defining itself against a recent event that it 
was deemed necessary to repudiate: for the original the Front Populaire; 
for Sarkozy's version May '68 (2007: 108).  Badiou’s view of Sarkozy as a 
potential danger to French democracy and the Republic has been 
challenged by Thomas Legrand, author of Ce n’est rien qu’un Président 
qui nous fait perdre du temps (2010), who in an interview at rue89.com 
argues that ’contrairement à ce qu’il dit, il n’a rien révolutionné, il n’a 
même modernisé la gouvernance’ (20.1.2010).  Nevertheless, this part of 
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Badiou's argument brings to the surface an interesting question: is 
Sarkozy directly comparable with any one personality from French history? 
 
There are a number of potential antecedents to Sarkozy, from Le Pen, to 
Poujade, to de Gaulle.  It could be argued that he has taken aspects from 
all of these figures: from Le Pen, insistent focus on issues of immigration 
and national identity; from Poujade, anti-intellectualism and appeal to the 
lower-middle class; from de Gaulle, strong defence of 'the Republic' and 
self-presentation as a unifying figure above party politics, and so on.  
There are also those who place Sarkozy within a certain French 
intellectual current, such as Charles Tshimanga (in Tshimanga, Gondola 
and Bloom (eds), 2009) who places Sarkozy in the lineage of ’New Right’ 
political thinking.  As he writes, ’the central thesis that the New Right sells 
to the public as “common sense” is that an immutable French identity has 
existed since the dawn of time’ (2009: 266).  It is his argument that 
the ’New Right’ notion of national identity has become dominant over the 
last 30 years, marginalising ethnic minorities as ’dangerous foreigners’ 
and enabling a succession of conservative politicians to mask their 
failures on issues such as unemployment.  I would argue that Sarkozy 
could not be considered as the successor to any single personality in 
French political history, or even be considered as belonging, at least not 
entirely, to any one school of political thought.  What could be argued, 
however, is that Sarkozy's discourse is made up of a synthesis of existing 
right-wing ideas, seemingly chosen because of their pertinence to the 
period in which he is operating.  Philippe Marlière argues on similar lines 
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in the November 2007 issue of Modern and Contemporary France, 
claiming that Sarkozy ‘pragmatically rotates’ (2007: 9) between the long-
standing currents of right-wing French thought (Bonapartist, Orleanist, 
legitimist) for reasons of political expediency.  In the same issue, Nick 
Hewlett places Sarkozy in the Bonapartist tradition: an ’authoritarian but 
charismatic leader’ taking advantage of ’disarray amongst other political 
forces’ and emphasising ’nationalism and national unity’, ’modernisation 
and progress’ (2007: 3). 
 
So, what else is 'Sarkozysme', other than the 'synthesis' mentioned above?  
As was touched upon earlier in this chapter, much of Sarkozy's discourse 
could be termed as 'populist'.  This can be quite an elusive term, but 
based on several discussions of the subject (Taguieff 2007, Berezin 2009, 
Birnbaum 1995) there would appear to be a number of recurrent 
elements.  These elements include anti-intellectualism, rejection of 
'ideology', opposition of the 'real people' against the corrupt or dishonest 
political élites, and definition of 'us' against perceived enemies who are 
'the other'.  On this basis, it could perhaps be argued that Sarkozy bears 
more resemblance to the 'national populist' movements that came to 
prominence in Western Europe in the early 2000s (in the Netherlands, 
Scandinavia, Austria and Switzerland amongst others) than to any one 
antecedent in France.  Throughout Europe in this period such movements 
have played upon worries about globalisation, immigration, demographics 
and radical Islam, as arguably has Sarkozy during his time in the political 
spotlight.  Of course, it must be pointed out that these movements were 
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explicitly anti-system whereas Sarkozy is coming from a well-established 
parliamentary Right, but there are numerous rhetorical similarities to be 
found. 
 
As Maillot pointed out earlier in the chapter, furthermore, there has at the 
same time been a move away from relatively stable class-based politics, 
in favour of individualistic 'values and identity' politics.  As Olivier 
Duhamel, Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po, wrote in the 
pages of Le Monde: 
 “C'est la droite populiste xénophobe qui offre aujourd'hui cette 
réponse simple aux souffrances, en disant “vous souffrez à cause de tous 
ces gens pas comme nous”.  Et c'est efficace.” (25.9.2010) 
And Mabel Berezin, Associate Professor of Sociology at Cornell 
University, argues along similar lines in her book 'Illiberal Politics in 
Neoliberal Times': 
  “The assortment of phenomena that populism embraces as its own 
is a cri de coeur over social assumptions that were hard won and 
developed in the nineteenth century, fully institutionalised in the twentieth 
century – but that appear to be approaching obsolescence in the twenty-
first century” (2009: 36) 
It is Sarkozy's skill – and, I would argue, a major reason for his success – 
that he was able to use this climate to his advantage.  He articulated a 
discourse with substantial populist and nationalist overtones, but did so 
from within a major mainstream party, benefiting from the respectability 
inherent to his position to gain the votes of those who may agree with 
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aspects of FN ideology, but who do not see themselves as ’extremists’.  
At the same time, he was able to avoid alienating more moderate voters, 
thus was able to build a substantial electoral coalition.  Certainly, it is 
possible to point out a number of contradictions within his discourse, as I 
have done throughout this chapter, but for the majority of voters it would 
seem to have been unimportant. 
 
In this chapter I have considered the question of what makes up 
Sarkozy’s discourse on national identity, as a means of understanding the 
context within which anti-racism was operating during the period 
examined in the thesis.  The main section of the chapter examined the 
key features of this discourse, all of which, as was noted earlier, arguably 
fit into a logic of ‘us against them’.  The choice of these features – history, 
anti-repentance and the Republic – allowed me to discuss a number of 
central debates with which the anti-racist movement was heavily involved: 
the construction of a conservative and essentialist conception of national 
identity, and the concomitant presentation of immigration as a threat and 
populations of post-colonial immigrant origin as inherently ‘incompatible’; 
controversies around colonial memory; the issues caused by the 
existence of a consensus on the language of republicanism but not its 
underlying meaning; and the use of communautarisme as a rhetorical tool 
serving to stoke fears around immigration, crime and Islamic 
fundamentalism.  I then looked at contemporary analysis of Sarkozy’s 
discourse, noting that the majority of authors under review considered 
that this discourse could be seen as a form of 'smokescreen', and that 
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although it is not entirely new, it is well tailored to the context in which it is 
being pronounced.  I ended, finally, with my own thoughts on what this 
discourse is, concluding that although it could be seen as a synthesis of 
several strands of French right-wing thought, it arguably has more in 
common with Western European 'national populist' movements of the 
early 2000s.  The reaction of anti-racist groups to this discourse and 
political context is a central theme in the following chapters, the first of 
which introduces the two movements examined in the thesis: SOS 
Racisme and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République. 
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Chapter 3  
SOS Racisme and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, 
2005-2009: an introduction 
 
 
In this thesis, I examine two central research questions.  The first of these 
asks how anti-racist movements in France have reacted to the political 
context of 2005-2009, a context defined by Nicolas Sarkozy’s hard-line 
conservative positions on national identity and immigration, as well as by 
the claims made by political actors from across the ideological spectrum 
to France’s self-proclaimed political culture of universalist republicanism.  
The second, meanwhile, considers the positions of SOS Racisme and the 
Mouvement des Indigènes de la République – chosen because of their 
substantial differences in this regard – in relation to this republican 
political culture: these differing relationships largely inform these two 
movements’ policies and viewpoints when faced with the political context 
of my chosen period.  These questions will inform the three ‘case-study’ 
chapters which follow.  Before moving on to these chapters, this final 
contextual chapter introduces SOS, MIR and their ideologies and 
strategies over the years examined in the thesis, keeping in mind three 
major questions: what were the key elements of the groups’ thought and 
principles during this period?  What, based on the evidence of initiatives 
taken over the years examined in the thesis, were their stances in relation 
to mainstream political culture?  And what approaches did they employ in 
order to communicate their message? 
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While SOS Racisme has been the subject of a number of academic 
examinations, these focus, almost without exception, on the movement’s 
peak of media visibility and mainstream political support in the 1980s6.  
This was, as noted in chapter 1, a very different political context to the 
one under discussion in my thesis.  It was a time when the Left was in 
power and was receptive to the anti-racist cause, even if this had 
ambiguous effects for the wider movement, in that the autonomous Beur 
associations which brought anti-racism to the forefront of political debate 
circa 1983-84 found themselves displaced from the limelight by the more 
‘consensual’, Socialist Party- backed SOS (Bouamama 1994, Abdallah 
2000).  As for MIR, in its short life so far it has provoked a number of 
controversies and polemics, due to its outspoken criticisms of France’s 
republican political structures and its insistance on the acknowledgement 
of race, Islamophobia and the history and legacy of colonialism, but less 
in the way of impartial analysis.  This chapter hopes to address these 
issues, and in doing so, to provide an overview of some of the key 
debates in French anti-racism over 2005-2009.  In terms of structure, the 
chapter is divided into two sub-sections, the first looking at SOS and the 
second looking at MIR.  In each of these sections, I will begin by 
considering the movement under discussion in relation to Alana Lentin’s 
useful idea of a continuum of proximity to and distance from mainstream 
political culture.  I will then, very briefly, consider the context of each 
                                                 
6 As can be seen in chapter 1, the movement over this period was examined by well-
known analysts of racism and anti-racism such as Pierre André Taguieff (1987, 1995); 
former Beur activists such as Saïd Bouamama (1994) and Mogniss H. Abdallah (2000); 
and its own key figures such as Harlem Désir (1987) and Julien Dray (1987), amongst 
many others.   
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movement’s foundation, and the influence this has had on its 
contemporary positioning.  The centre of each section will consist of an 
introduction to the key points of the movements’ ideology and strategy, 
illustrated with examples from relevant initiatives taken between 2005 and 
2009.  I will end my analysis of each movement with a concluding 
discussion, considering how the positions I have examined may have 
affected their reactions to Sarkozy’s discourse. 
 
Let us recap, firstly, the key defining characteristics of the context within 
which the anti-racist movement had to act between 2005 and 2009.  As 
we have seen in chapter 2, Nicolas Sarkozy’s discourse on race, 
immigration and national identity has been one of the defining themes of 
recent French politics. Less attention, however, has been afforded to 
groups which may consider it their role to present an alternative view of 
society.  This chapter, therefore, serves to introduce the worldviews and 
policy positions of the two contrasting anti-racist groups examined in this 
thesis in relation to the political climate of 2005-2009, during which as a 
highly visible Interior Minister, Presidential candidate and finally President, 
Sarkozy was apparently omnipresent in French politics, becoming 
associated with a conservative, backwards-looking and implicitly 
intolerant discourse on national identity.  This discourse was particularly 
visible during the 2007 presidential election campaign, and has three 
major linked components.  The first of these is a narrow and arguably 
exclusionary conception of history, according to which there is a single 
version of the French past, to be learned and respected by every French 
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inhabitant, with no consideration of alternative perspectives such as those 
of families with a background in the (former) colonies.  Linked to this is a 
denunciation of ‘repentance’ aimed at those who reject his conception of 
history: as Sarkozy puts it in his 2007 speech in Metz, ‘Je n'accepte pas 
ce dénigrement systématique de la nation qui est la forme ultime de la 
détestation de soi’ (Discours de Nicolas Sarkozy à Metz, 17.4.2007).  
Much of Sarkozy’s discourse had a deliberately socially divisive subtext, 
and in this case two groups are targeted: critical historians, presented as 
an out-of-touch élite who rewrite history in order to vilify the nation, the 
better to reinforce his self-presentation as a straight-talking man of the 
people; and populations of immigrant origin, whose continuing demand 
for recognition of the violence and oppression of the colonial period, and 
their contemporary consequences, is reduced to refusal to integrate and 
‘hatred of France’.  The third component is a repeated rhetorical use of 
the Republic, defined almost entirely by what it is not, the resulting list of 
threats to society drawing heavily on years of headlines relating to Muslim 
cultural practices of negligible (at best) importance to wider society: the 
Burqa, forced marriages, Halal meat and so on.  These threats were then 
subsumed in Sarkozy’s rhetoric into the overarching menace of 
communautarisme, a term which refers to the consequences of 
multiculturalism as perceived by a French audience, that is to say, of 
populations feeling their loyalty to be primarily towards an ethnic or 
religious group, rather than the Republic.  
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This political climate was a difficult one for both movements examined in 
this chapter, despite their substantial differences in orientation.  The 
radical post-colonial movement MIR, with its emphasis on the importance 
of colonial memory, belief that universalist republican ideology lies behind 
the subjugation of colonial populations and their descendants in 
contemporary France, and promotion of a form of multiculturalism as a 
model for society, was almost directly at odds with prevailing political 
thought in France.  For SOS, perhaps the best-known anti-racist group in 
France, the relationship with the dominant discourse associated with 
Sarkozy was more ambiguous.  This ambiguity, to a large extent, was 
caused by the existence of an apparent consensus on the language of 
republicanism, coupled with an apparent lack of consensus on its 
underlying meaning.  Like Sarkozy, SOS activists proclaim themselves to 
be in favour of the Republic, and against communautarisme and too 
much emphasis on colonial memory, and it is only with detailed 
knowledge of the intended subtexts that the differences between their 
positions become clear. 
 
Let us begin this introductory review of my two chosen movements, then, 
by looking at SOS Racisme. 
 
 
SOS Racisme 2005-2009: republicanism, pragmatism and consensus 
 
 154 
Alana Lentin argues that anti-racism can be characterised as ‘existing 
along a continuum of proximity-to-distance from the public political culture 
of the nation-state’ (2004: 1).  Groups which fall at the ‘proximity’ end of 
the spectrum see anti-racism as synonymous with ‘democracy, solidarity, 
freedom, equality, tolerance, respect and dignity’ (2004: 2), and most 
importantly, see such principles as inherent to the state in which they 
operate.  In other words, as Lentin puts it, the position of proximity to 
public political culture ‘relates the principles of anti-racism to the 
historically constructed ideologies of the democratic European nation-
state’ (ibid).  Movements which adopt this stance can and do criticise the 
state’s actions, but this criticism does not alter their ‘belief in the just 
nature of the principles upon which the dominant political thought is 
founded’ (2004: 3).  The goal of this form of anti-racism therefore is to 
appeal to as many people as possible, via a discourse which emphasises 
pride in national traditions of liberalism, tolerance and anti-fascism.  
There are, however, potential negative consequences in adopting this 
stance: such movements can be ‘neglectful of the exclusion of the 
racialised, the non-national or minority-ethnic groups’ (2004: 235), and 
can often ‘overlook the origins of the racialisation process’ (ibid) – thus 
finding themselves unable to articulate a discourse which appeals to the 
victims of racism and exclusion themselves.  In the French case, the 
position of proximity can be seen in SOS, which during the years between 
2005 and 2009 has demonstrated an unshakeable faith in the universalist 
republican values of liberté, égalité and fraternité, regardless of the uses 
they are put to by political adversaries such as Sarkozy.  As we shall see, 
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this can be contrasted with the position of MIR, which sees such values 
as having rarely, if ever, lived up to their claims, and thus sees grounds 
for calling them into question.     
 
SOS Racisme was formed in 1984.  According to the movement’s self-
published histories it was founded by a group of friends, who were angry 
about one of them – a young Senegalese man – being falsely accused of 
stealing a woman’s purse (Qu’est-ce que SOS Racisme, 2006).  Whether 
or not this incident happened is unclear, but in any case, it can be stated 
with confidence that the association was initially made up of a coalition of 
students and left-wing political and union activists, organised around 
Julien Dray, now a socialist deputy in the French National Assembly 
(Dray, 1987).  SOS was the subject of a number of criticisms from the 
existing French anti-racist movement, notably from the autonomous 
movement of French North Africans (a tradition which MIR is arguably 
attempting to take up) which grew up in the early 1980s, many of whose 
members felt they had been usurped by a movement seen to be 
controlled by the Socialist Party for the latter’s own electoral gain.  
However, it soon became a phenomenon, and came to be associated in 
the public mind with massive, heavily mediatised public events – a free 
music festival at the Place de la Concorde in 1985 attracting 300,000 
people – and a form of liberal multiculturalism known as ‘the right to 
difference’ (le droit à la différence).  However, as long ago as 1990, the 
organisation’s founding president Harlem Désir was claiming, in an 
interview with Le Nouvel Observateur, that this widespread interpretation 
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of the association’s philosophy was mistaken, stating that ‘nous n’avons 
jamais fait du droit à la différence le principe de notre action’ (‘Harlem 
Désir: Vive la nation!’, 13.6.1990).  Adrian Favell (1998), meanwhile, 
argues that SOS, having found itself on the wrong side of public opinion 
over the Gulf War and the first ‘headscarf affair’ in the early 1990s, chose 
to become part of a growing republican consensus, thereafter articulating 
a discourse which stressed equality of opportunity, laïcité, and ‘colour-
blindness’ in relation to race.       
 
Regardless of when, or if, the conversion happened, it is evident that 
SOS, over my chosen timeframe, saw its role as promoting and 
defending republican values.  Problematically for the organisation 
however, Sarkozy derived much of his popular pitch from the same 
consensual terms of reference.  It is of course clear, as Gérard Noiriel 
(2007a) and others have convincingly pointed out, that in the case of 
Sarkozy and his political associates, the appeal to republican tradition is 
combined with an implicit scapegoating of groups held to infringe its 
values – a process supported by negative media coverage of Islamism 
and at a deeper level by an exploitation of anxieties about French identity 
in the globalised, post-colonial world.  To contest Sarkozian discourse 
and policy, SOS alleges the perversion of republican ideology.  For 
example, in response to the “great debate” on national identity launched 
by the Sarkozy government in 2009, SOS President Dominique Sopo is 
forthright: ‘Le jargon républicain utilisé dans le présent débat ne saurait ici 
faire illusion. Le débat sur l’identité nationale est fondamentalement 
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nauséabond.’ (‘Identité nationale: “un débat à rebours”’, 2009).  Despite 
the apparently mainstream and consensual nature of its discourse, SOS 
has found itself increasingly at odds with government initiatives, and its 
task has been to expose and challenge the government’s conservative 
and exclusionary conceptualisation of national identity, preferring to 
emphasise the mixed and inclusive society which the association has 
consistently argued is closer to the founding principles of the Republic. 
 
SOS maintains that republican values, authentically applied, provide a 
true basis for an anti-racist strategy.  Its central role therefore is to 
promote adherence to the founding principles of the Republic amongst 
the political establishment, and its initiatives are consistent with this aim, 
for example the ‘night of testing’ in 2007, in which racial discrimination is 
exposed by having young people of visibly different ethnic origin enter, for 
instance, the same nightclub, refusals of admission based on race 
potentially being punished via legal action (SOS Racisme, ‘Une nouvelle 
nuit du testing pour SOS Racisme’, 2007).  In addition, SOS challenged 
the government’s setting of deportation targets, which were argued to 
infringe the republican value of ‘indivisible fraternity’: 
 “Parce que ses fondements et ce qu’elle entraîne sont 
profondément contraires à l’idée que nous nous faisons de la dignité 
humaine et mettent en péril l’idéal de fraternité indissociable de la 
promesse républicaine, nous appelons le Gouvernement à mettre fin à sa 
politique du chiffre en matière d’expulsions.” (SOS Racisme, ‘Manifeste 
“30.000 expulsions, c’est la honte”’, 2009) 
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SOS’s 2007 publication Manifeste pour l’égalité affirms its position as 
follows: 
 “”Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité”. La devise de notre République 
renferme en elle les valeurs les plus belles et les plus universelles. 
Appliquer la devise républicaine, c’est après tout la meilleure garantie de 
vivre dans une société débarrassée des miasmes du racisme, de 
l’antisémitisme et des discriminations.” (2007: 11) 
Sopo of course recognises the discrepancy between language and lived 
reality.  Inscribing equality in law is far from creating an egalitarian 
Republic, as he acknowledges in his 2005 book SOS antiracisme.  All too 
often, he argues, ‘une équivalence est posée entre l’existence juridique 
des principes et leur inscription dans la vie quotidienne.  Comme si 
consigner l’égalité dans les lois faisait ipso facto de notre pays une 
république égalitaire!’ (2005: 38).   Nevertheless, for SOS the Republic is 
always the solution, never the problem. There may be deep faults in the 
Republic, but the way to eradicate them is to strive continuously to make 
republican equality work.  As the association’s 2007 ‘mission statement’ 
declares, ‘lorsqu’il existe des failles dans la République, le seul moyen de 
résorber ces failles, c’est bien d’avoir l’ambition de faire vivre l’égalité 
républicaine’ (SOS Racisme, ‘Nos Missions’, 2007).   This consistent 
position, as will be shown, contrasts with that of MIR, whose key thinkers 
see contradictions within the ideology – for example between proclaimed 
universalism and colonial mentalities – and who therefore seek to call it 
into question.  
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A consequence of SOS’s fundamentalist republicanism is a hostility 
towards communautarisme which, ostensibly at least, it shares with 
Sarkozy: communautarisme is held by both to be inherently anti-
republican.  In his 2007 Metz speech, Sarkozy presents it as undermining 
universalism (‘Le communautarisme, c’est [...] la fin de notre conception 
universaliste de l'Homme’), while SOS presents it as a danger on a level 
with ‘fascism’: 
 ““Nôtre rôle, c’est [...] de contribuer à ce que de nouvelles 
générations s’engagent dans le combat antiraciste pour affirmer qu’il est 
urgent de lutter contre le fascisme et le communautarisme, pour 
construire une société qui refuse que les gens se construisent les uns 
contre les autres.” (SOS Racisme, ‘Nos Missions’, 2007) 
However, context and sub-text create significant contrasts, Sarkozy’s 
arguments appearing to stigmatise French Muslims and banlieue 
inhabitants more generally. As Loïc Rigaud, head of SOS’s anti-
discrimination section, put it in a 2011 interview: 
 “Comme Sarkozy, on veut lutter contre le communautarisme. Il 
faut bien savoir qu’est-ce que le communautarisme et où il se situe, et 
non pas se servir de ce mot-là pour stigmatiser l’ensemble d’une 
population. On ne doit pas utiliser le mot à des fins politiques et 
électoralistes – ce qui fait Sarkozy.” (Interview with Loïc Rigaud, 
29.3.2011)  
SOS sees communautarisme as a self-protecting mechanism which 
essentially can only be fought by challenging discrimination and poverty; 
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for Sarkozy on the other hand the term functions as a code-word, tapping 
into a semantic field of ‘threats to society’ – from radical Islam, social 
disorder and illegal immigration.  The extent to which such nuances and 
differences of emphasis would be clear to a general audience unaware of 
the finer points of the movement’s ideology, however, can undoubtedly be 
called into question. 
 
SOS’s campaigning strategies over the period examined in the current 
work derive directly from its determination to reinforce republican ideals, 
particularly in relation to equality.  The approach is practical and low-key, 
contrasting with its (possibly unfair) perceived popular 1980s association 
with spectacle and showbusiness.  This approach can be illustrated by a 
number of initiatives taken by the movement within the timeframe 
discussed in the opening paragraph.  In keeping with the pragmatism of 
SOS’s approach during my chosen period, the ‘Manifeste pour l’égalité’ of 
2007, to take one example, promised ‘un échange sérieux et technique 
sur la base de propositions réfléchies, efficaces mais surtout à l’épreuve 
de la réalité’ (SOS Racisme, ‘SOS Racisme a organisé les “États 
Généraux pour l’Égalité” les 27, 28 et 29 octobre à l’Hôtel de Ville de 
Paris’, 2006).  The final document contains 60 ‘propositions pour l’égalité’, 
divided into six categories: ‘Emploi’, ‘Education’, ‘Culture et vie 
associative’, ‘Logement’, ‘Police et Justice’ and ‘Médias et banlieues’.  It 
would be impractical to summarise all of these propositions, but to take a 
few illustrative examples, plans in employment include obligatory 
anonymous CVs, designed to negate possible racial discrimination 
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amongst employers (2007: 62); in education it is suggested that 
preparatory classes for the grandes écoles are offered in ‘les lycées dits 
“sensibles”’ (2007: 95); cultural proposals include making ‘high cultural’ 
sites (concert halls, opera houses, museums) available for ‘[les] 
productions artistiques issues de la culture urbaine’ (2007: 121); their 
policies on housing include greatly increasing the construction of social 
housing (2007: 135) and ensuring that each new housing development 
contains 10% ‘logements à loyer modéré’ (2007: 138), and so on.  These 
measures emphasise concrete action against discrimination and 
inequality – as opposed to MIR’s more theoretical and ideological 
approach – and support SOS’s self-perception as part of the mainstream 
decision-making process in French politics.  Further evidence of this self-
perception can be seen in the ‘États Généraux’ from which the 
movement’s proposals arose: with its combination of meetings amongst 
‘acteurs sociaux qui œuvrent dans les quartiers’ and presentations to 
‘grandes formations politiques’ (SOS Racisme, ‘SOS Racisme a organisé 
les “États Généraux pour l’Égalité” les 27, 28 et 29 octobre à l’Hôtel de 
Ville de Paris’, 2006), this event posits SOS as an intermediary between 
the world of the quartiers and the world of mainstream politics, and shows 
that although the movement no longer has an overt relationship with any 
political parties, it evidently still sees its role as attempting to lobby and 
influence political institutions from within, rather than trying to challenge 
them from the outside.   
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The policy of ‘testing’, carried out continuously by the association since 
the start of the 21st century, similarly stresses practical action in favour of 
republican ‘colour-blindness’, providing theatrical and media-friendly proof 
of racial discrimination.  Whilst challenging discrimination may seem a 
fundamental objective for an anti-racist movement, critics such as Robert 
Gibb (2003b) see this narrow focus as a dilution of the anti-racist 
movement’s potential to fight for a new conceptualisation of society, due 
to the way in which ‘la discrimination est considérée sous l’angle unique 
d’un rapport entre deux individus’, thus ignoring ‘le caractère structurel et 
structurant du racisme au sein de la société française’.  Although Gibb’s 
article predates the foundation of MIR, his argument shares with this 
movement an emphasis on racism and discrimination as systemic, rather 
than something which can be treated as a conventional crime, with a 
perpetrator and a victim.  This failure to consider the structural nature of 
racism, in favour of ‘colour-blindness’ and anti-discrimination, is arguably 
a weakness of SOS’s discourse, as it does not take into account (as MIR 
points out) the racial hierarchies hidden behind the formal equality of the 
French state, or the way in which subconsciously held opinions and 
prejudices, resulting from an entire history of representations of colonial 
and post-colonial populations, can influence behaviour.  SOS’s rejection 
of the idea that racism is systemic can be seen as an inevitable 
consequence of the ‘republican consensus’ discussed earlier: if a 
movement bases its appeal on republican values it is unlikely to call into 
question the structures of a state which theoretically embodies such 
values. MIR on the other hand, as an autonomous movement in thought 
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and action, feels able to challenge the mainstream consensus and 
propose radical alternative viewpoints (Gemie 2010).  
 
So, based on these initiatives, and the association’s official literature, how 
can the positions of SOS during the years 2005-2009 be summed up?  
Firstly, its approach during this period was generally practical and low-key, 
contrasting with its heyday of media visibility in the mid-1980s, although 
the movement was clearly still aware of the importance of media profile 
as can be seen in its rationale for ‘testing’: as the originator of the policy, 
former SOS President Malek Boutih, put it in 2001, ‘je reconnais que 
nous n’apportons rien d’autre qu’une preuve théâtralisée dont se 
nourrissent les médias’ (2001: 92).  Secondly, in terms of political 
ideology, its position was relatively straightforward – promoting republican 
values and pressing for their proper implementation.  Conversely there is 
a hostility towards communautarisme and towards non-republican forms 
of anti-racism, notably that described by Sopo as ‘exotico-victimaire’ 
(2005: 26) in which communities become ‘trapped’ in the role of victims, 
past suffering becoming an essential support for their identity.  This 
criticism on the part of SOS, one similar to many received by MIR from 
critics of its emphasis on colonial memory, will be examined in greater 
detail in chapter 5. 
 
Finally, how do the organisation’s political and ideological stances affect 
its reactions to Sarkozy’s discourse?  As discussed above, there are 
superficial discursive similarities, but I would argue that these are an 
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occupational hazard for any group working in the field of mainstream 
French politics.  Republicanism, as a highly flexible concept, is supported 
in some form by all mainstream political organisations in France, so the 
battle to define exactly what it means is of vital importance.  As Philippe 
Petit and Alexis Lacroix wrote in Marianne in 2011, ‘La République étant, 
à la fois, une idée, un corps de doctrines, des principes et un idéal, elle 
appartient à tous et – c’est bien là le problème – chacun peut s’en 
réclamer: de Jean-Luc Mélenchon à Marine Le Pen’ (‘République-
démocratie: reprenons le débat!’, 22.1.2011).  Essentially SOS is fighting 
to ensure that its interpretation of republicanism, stressing equality and 
tolerance, prevails in the public debate, rather than that of Sarkozy, 
where the concept is used as cover for the stigmatisation of supposedly 
‘incompatible’ groups within French society.  The movement has had a 
certain amount of success imposing its agenda over recent years, seeing 
its proposal for anonymous CVs discussed in the French Senate, albeit 
without them eventually becoming compulsory (Qu’est-ce que SOS 
Racisme, 2006: 109); claiming responsability for the defeat of Sarkozy’s 
plans for DNA testing of immigrants (as Rigaud notes, ‘Nous avons mis 
en échec les tests ADN pour les immigrés, qui vériferaient les liens 
parentaux qu’ils ont avec leurs enfants.’); and arguably contributing to the 
political failure of 2009’s ‘great debate’ on national identity, following 
which Sarkozy’s ruling UMP were defeated comprehensively in the 
regional elections of January 2010, via a petition published in the left-
wing newspaper Libération which received tens of thousands of 
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signatures (SOS Racisme, ‘Arrêtez ce débat, monsieur le Président!’, 
2009).  
 
Somewhat confusingly however, due to the constraints of mainstream 
French political language, much of the movement’s discourse is 
expressed in almost exactly the same terms of that of its adversaries.  
This makes it very difficult for SOS to get its message across, a problem 
only exacerbated by the massive imbalance in media visibility between 
the official viewpoint and that of even the best-known social movement.  
Certainly, the organisation makes use of the tools at its disposal: 
awareness-raising concerts, online petitions, even the policy of testing 
has one eye on media visibility.  In the end however, how can SOS 
articulate a distinctive and memorable campaigning discourse when the 
fight is over definitions of words, rather than black and white policy 
differences?  It is not certain whether the movement found a satisfactory 
answer to this question over the years examined in the chapter.  What is 
more, as SOS sees France’s mainstream republican political culture as 
both inherently just and inherently supportive of the aims of anti-racism, it 
is difficult to see how the organisation can have much room for 
manoeuvre in terms of the promotion of a new alternative discourse.      
 
 
The Mouvement des Indigènes de la République 2005-2009: radicalism, 
autonomy and anti-colonialism 
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Before moving on to consider the values and strategies of the 
Mouvement des Indigènes de la République over the same period, I will 
consider how Lentin’s schema relates to this movement.  As we have 
seen, SOS can be located at the ‘proximity’ end of her proposed 
continuum.  MIR, on the other hand, could be placed towards the 
‘distance’ end of this continuum, a position in which groups consider the 
essence of anti-racism to be ‘emancipation, empowerment, resistance, 
liberation and self-determination’ (2004: 2).  An emphasis on these 
factors, as Lentin points out, ‘denote[s] a critique of the state’s readiness 
to guarantee freedom and equality, justice and fairness’ (ibid).  
Furthermore, this association between anti-racism, and emancipation and 
resistance carries with it the idea that public political culture is either 
complicit in or responsible for racism in contemporary society: ‘Far from 
supposing an extension of rights and freedoms’, Lentin writes, 
‘democratic political thought is regarded as existing in an historically 
ambivalent relationship with their parallel denial to certain groups, known 
as ‘inferior races’.’ (2004: 3)  MIR, with its radical critique of republican 
ideology, seen as being used to justify the suppression of colonial 
populations, and its view that France remains a colonial state at the level 
of stereotypes and representations of post-colonial populations, the 
discrimination they face and their treatment by the police and justice 
system, can be placed at this end of Lentin’s continuum, providing a 
striking contrast with SOS.  Inevitably however, there are negative 
consequences to this positioning: MIR’s questioning of universalist 
republicanism – the founding ideology of the modern French state and a 
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continuing source of national pride – immediately denies it the support of 
a large majority of the French population, ensuring that its status can 
never, in all likelihood, be anything more than that of an anti-system 
pressure group.  SOS on the other hand, despite (or because of) its 
moderate, consensual and relatively unambitious positioning, can have a 
realistic hope of influencing government policy, particularly in the event of 
the Socialist Party – with which the movement has numerous links at the 
level of personnel – being in power.    
 
Opposition to colonialism and its legacy is a key aspect of MIR’s ideology.  
The group was formed in 2005, during a period in which debates about 
France’s colonial past and its contemporary diversity were particularly 
intense.  As Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch wrote in 2009: 
 “[L]e thème colonial a-t-il resurgi dans la société française sous la 
forme de représentations réactivées notamment pour des besoins 
politiciens.  Mais il s’agit aussi de la résurgence d’une réalité (et pas 
seulement d’un imaginaire): la “non-décolonisation” de la société 
française.  Un demi-siècle après les indépendances, le fait colonial et / ou 
esclavagiste n’a jamais été aussi présent dans les médias, dans les 
publications, dans les commentaires politiques et dans les lois.” (2009: 
166) 
Much of this debate derived from the proposed law of 23rd February 2005 
which evoked the ‘positive aspects’ of colonialism, before this reference 
was removed by order of Jacques Chirac, the President at the time.  
Conservative-leaning academics, for example Daniel Lefeuvre in Pour en 
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finir avec la repentance coloniale also, like Sarkozy, addressed and 
denounced ‘repentance’.  The bitterness of the debate can be gauged 
from the unacademic strength of Lefeuvre’s language: ‘Prétendre que les 
Français doivent faire acte de repentance pour expier la page coloniale 
de leur histoire et réduire les fractures de la société française relève du 
charlatanisme ou de l’aveuglement’ (2006: 229).  Later, in 2007, 
Sarkozy’s fierce attacks on critics of the rehabilitation of colonialism and 
of his highly conservative framing of French history constituted a 
prominent strand in his presidential election campaign.  The Indigènes 
were undoubtedly implicated in, and responsive to, this climate of debate.  
Lefeuvre for instance writes ironically of the new generation of anti-
colonialists who ‘mène combat sur les plateaux de télévision et dans la 
presse politiquement correcte [...] multipliant les appels ou les pétitions 
en faveur des “indigènes de la République”’ (2006: 7). 
 
As argued earlier, Sarkozy’s preoccupation with issues of colonialism and 
‘repentance’ may in part have been framed to differentiate himself from 
his predecessor Chirac, who had shown some willingness to reappraise 
aspects of French history, for example recognising the state’s complicity 
in the mass round-up of Jews at the Vélodrome d’Hiver in 1942, 
promoting a law declaring slavery a crime against humanity and 
apologising, through the French Ambassador to Algeria, for the Sétif 
massacre of 1945.  As Vincent Martigny (2009) has argued, such 
concessions were seen by many older, more conservative sections of the 
electorate as signs of weakness and decline, and Sarkozy was able to 
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catch this mood by exploiting social anxieties and simultaneously 
capitalising on a nostalgia for France’s great colonial past.  Two groups 
bore the brunt of his electioneering rhetoric: firstly, critical historians, 
usually left-wing, who could be presented as an out-of-touch élite thus 
reinforcing Sarkozy’s own populist credentials; and secondly, immigrants 
and their descendants who were challenging a view of history which 
served seemingly to exclude them and to deny the validity of their own 
memory.  In this climate, MIR was both responding to a prevailing 
discourse and arguably helping set an agenda, by keeping unwelcome 
issues of colonialism and multiculturalism in the public eye. 
 
For MIR there are undeniable continuities between contemporary France 
and the colonial period.  Their founding document, the Appel des 
Indigènes de la République of January 2005, forcefully makes this point: 
 “Discriminés à l’embauche, au logement, à la santé, à l’école et 
aux loisirs, les personnes issues des colonies, anciennes ou actuelles, et 
de l’immigration post-coloniale sont les premières victimes de l’exclusion 
sociale et de la précarisation.  Indépendamment de leurs origines 
effectives, les populations des “quartiers” sont “indigénisées”, reléguées 
aux marges de la société.” 
This self-identification as indigènes has proved highly controversial.  
Dulucq and Klein note that in the colonial context, ‘indigène’ is ‘une 
classification ethno-raciale’, often confused with ‘sujet’, which is ‘une 
catégorie politico-juridique’ (2008: 55).  For MIR however, its 
connotations are clear: the term is taken to refer to a non-white inhabitant 
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of the French colonies, denied full citizen status, denied equality in the 
hierarchy of civilisations and in many cases, denied equality before the 
law through subjection to the code de l’indigénat, under which colonial 
administrators were able to apply disciplinary sanctions without judicial 
procedure.  Sadri Khiari, one of the movement’s founders, sums up the 
rationale for the use of the term by arguing that whilst indigène no longer 
exists as a legal status in the (self-proclaimed) universalist and egalitarian 
Republic, the stereotypes and racial hierarchies forged in the colonial 
period continue to make their presence felt: 
 “”Nous sommes les indigènes de la République” signifie: la 
République se prétend égalitaire et universelle; l’indigène n’existe certes 
plus en tant que statut juridique, pourtant, sous des formes renouvelées, 
souvent inédites, le “régime de l’indigénat” hante continûment institutions, 
pratiques et idéologies.” (2006: 17) 
 
In his postface to Manifeste pour l’égalité, SOS president Dominique 
Sopo challenges the above position, arguing that the status of indigène in 
colonial times was ‘un statut de négation de la citoyenneté, qui ne 
reconnaissait aucun droit, aucune liberté à nos ancêtres’ (2007: 182).  In 
contemporary France, on the other hand, ‘nous sommes libres et 
citoyens’ (ibid).  Nevertheless it is possible to see the appeal of MIR’s 
contention for those who feel that the Republic’s declared principles are 
not, and indeed never were quite what they claimed to be.  Many 
supporters of MIR, furthermore, dismiss the semantic debate as reductive.  
Saïd Bouamama, sociologist and signatory of the Appel, for example 
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points out that the juxtaposition of the colonial period and contemporary 
France is figurative and not literal.  What is important in his view is the 
continuity of processes, logics and representations between the two 
periods (2009: 110). 
 
As we will see in chapter 5, this disagreement between the two 
movements on the issue of the potential continuities between the colonial 
period and contemporary France is a fundamental ideological cleavage.  
Dominique Sopo argues that a combination of what he calls ‘la mauvaise 
conscience postcoloniale’ (2005: 27) and ‘l’approche communautariste de 
l’antiracisme’ (2005: 26) leads to a ‘concurrence morbide des drames 
subis dans l’Histoire par telle ou telle population’ (2005: 27), real historical 
hardship leading by this means to an unproductive inability to define 
identity other than through confrontation (2005: 29).  For Sopo there is no 
way forward if social groups, finding a kind of pride in their status as 
victims, abandon the struggle for equality within the republican framework. 
 
For MIR on the other hand, remembering and understanding colonialism 
is a central task for French anti-racism.  The present Republic is seen as 
inextricably bound up with the colonial mindset, which itself derives from 
historical republican discourse.  Houria Boutledja, MIR spokesperson and 
de facto leader, eloquently expressed this linkage in a 2011 interview: 
 “Dans ces structures, elle [la République] est considerée comme 
émancipatrice, comme universaliste, comme droit-de-l’hommiste, etc., 
mais c’est parfaitement bien accommodée au colonialisme.  Ce qui nous 
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intéresse, c’est la contradiction profonde entre le fait qu’on peut être un 
citoyen français libre, et, en même temps, imposer la soumission, la 
domination, au peuple colonisé. [...]  Et cette contradiction profonde 
existe par rapport à l’histoire coloniale, et aussi par rapport au présent 
postcoloniale, puisque la France est toujours, officiellement, 
émancipatrice et universelle.  Mais en même temps, elle discrimine tout 
le temps.” (Interview with Houria Bouteldja, 9.8.2011) 
According to a 2005 MIR statement, the difference between the idealised 
(‘fantasy’) and the real republic must be understood.  The ostensible 
defender of universal human rights has, in the name of this same 
universalism, engaged in what MIR sees as the crime of colonial 
exploitation and subjugation: 
 “La République dont nous parlons, nous la regardons dans ses 
œuvres et au ras de ses pratiques, non dans les discours qu’elle tient sur 
elle-même.  Si nous dénonçons avec vigueur certaines œuvres de la 
République réelle comme la colonisation et la répression, l’exclusion et le 
racisme, nous ne perdons pas notre temps à évoquer la République 
rêvée, celle qui définit un monde qui n’a eu d’existence ou si peu, et dont 
la seule fonction historique aura été de masquer, précisement, la 
République réelle.” (Héricord, Lévy and Khiari, ‘Indigènes de la 
République, réponses à quelques objections...’, 2005) 
Khiari, similarly, argues that French racism has, through the colonial 
enterprise, become progressively institutionalised, leading to what he 
calls a ‘republican pact’ based on race and ethnicity which belies the 
republican claim of ‘colour-blindness’ (2009: 45). 
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Thus, unlike SOS which sees racism as a phenomenon which can be 
defined and challenged, practically and judicially, MIR presents racism 
and discrimination as systemic.  The very existence of the Republic’s 
proclaimed universalism is questioned by Bouteldja, who refers to it as 
‘un universalisme blanc qui masque et nie les hiérarchies structurelles qui 
constituent la république française’ (‘Le “racisme anti-blanc” des 
Indigènes de la République’, 2011).  In other words the universalist 
principles inherited from the Enlightenment, principles forming the basis 
of republican ideology, were only ever applicable to white populations of 
European origin.  For MIR therefore, the Republic is not a safeguard 
against racial inequalities; it is fundamentally based on such inequalities.  
It is this aspect of MIR’s ideology – the belief that racism and 
discrimination are perpetuated by France’s social and political structures 
– that leads to the organisation’s support for a radical rethink of French 
political culture, and which sets it apart from SOS, which sees 
mainstream political culture, properly applied, as intrinsically supportive of 
the anti-racist cause. 
 
Linked to the movement’s discourse on the continuing influence of 
colonial ideology is an emphasis on colonial memory.  This linkage can 
be seen in the decision to hold an annual Marche des Indigènes on 8th 
May, the anniversary of the 1945 Sétif massacre in Algeria7, the 
                                                 
7 In which celebrations of the end of World War II in the Constantine region of Algeria 
became demonstrations for Algerian independence, which were attacked by French 
colonial forces, leading to reprisal attacks on European populations in Algeria and a 
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juxtaposition of national celebration (at Nazi capitulation) and colonial 
brutality serving to illustrate the contradictions within France’s social and 
political structures: 
 “Le 8 mai 1945, la République révèle ses paradoxes: le jour même 
où les Français fêtent la capitulation nazie, une répression inouïe s’abat 
sur les colonisés algériens du Nord-Constantinois: des milliers de morts!” 
(Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, ‘Appel des Mouvement des 
Indigènes de la République’, 2005)  
Of similar significance in MIR’s strategy and discourse is its prominent 
participation in 2006’s march for ‘Vérité et Justice’ commemorating 
events in Paris on 17th and 18th October 1961, when the Paris police’s 
violent repression of a protest by the city’s Algerian population against a 
curfew led to hundreds (figures are still disputed) of demonstrators being 
tortured and killed (see House and MacMaster 2009).  The demands of 
the marchers in 2006 – recognition of a crime committed by the state, 
freedom of access to historical archives and a memorial to the victims of 
colonialism – convey the essence of MIR’s claims-making on the state. 
 
Whilst participants in this march included the Green Party, the 
Communist Party and certain other anti-racist groups (for example MRAP 
and LDH), it is noteworthy that SOS is not involved: as we have seen, it 
prefers to concentrate on present inequality and discrimination, seeing 
too great a focus on the past as counterproductive, potentially trapping 
‘post-colonial’ populations in the role of victims. 
                                                                                                                                    
wider uprising, which was repressed by means of the massacre of – at least – several 
thousand Algerian civilians (Manceron 2013) 
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In the material supporting the march, MIR extends the idea of colonial 
memory from political necessity to the level of moral duty:  
 “Ce n’est qu’à ce prix [ie. of ‘remembering’] que pourront 
disparaître les séquelles les plus graves de la guerre d’Algérie: le racisme 
dont sont victimes aujourd’hui les ressortissants d’origine algérienne ou, 
par extension, du Maghreb ou d’anciennes colonies” (Mouvement des 
Indigènes de la République, ‘17 octobre 1961-17 octobre 2006: Vérité et 
Justice’, 2006) 
Whilst their ultimate aims may be similar, in the sense that all anti-racist 
groups want racial equality and an end to discrimination, we therefore see 
MIR reaching quite different conclusions to SOS on the question of 
colonial memory.  Whereas SOS sees colonial memory as a potential 
impediment to practical anti-racist action, MIR argues on the contrary that 
it is only by facing up to the past that a new future may be created. 
 
As a result of its analysis of France as a colonial state, MIR calls for a 
radical rethinking of French political culture.  To quote the Appel: 
 “La République de l’Égalité est un mythe.  L’État et la société 
doivent opérer un retour critique radical sur leur passé-présent colonial.  Il 
est temps que la France interroge ses Lumières, que l’universalisme 
égalitaire, affirmé pendant la Révolution Française, refoule ce 
nationalisme arc-bouté au “chauvinisme de l’universel”, censé “civiliser” 
sauvages et sauvageons”. 
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But what does such a rethinking imply?  Some answers to this question 
can be found in the movement’s reaction to the ‘great debate’ on national 
identity launched by the Sarkozy government in late 2009.  Whereas SOS 
favours the promotion of a liberal ‘mixed’ Republic in which there remains 
a single unified French culture but one which, contrary to Sarkozy’s 
exclusionary conception, is open to evolution and to enrichment from all 
groups within society, MIR favours – as we will see in chapter 4 – ‘une 
véritable alternative multiculturelle et décoloniale’ (Mouvement des 
Indigènes de la République, ‘Il faut une véritable alternative à la politique 
raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 2009).  The movement here calls into 
question the viability of a single uniform national identity, prescribed and 
imposed from above – an identity arguably never truly available to those 
whose origins are in the former colonies.  MIR’s ‘alternative’ embraces 
the concept of a range of popular cultures, hitherto disregarded or 
‘crushed’ by the centralising state.  This position implies a redefinition of 
the idea of equality, adding to the traditional concept of equality between 
individuals a new form of equality between contributing cultures within 
France.  For MIR, France should be a state in which each person is 
entitled to define their own identity – even if this involves definition based 
on ethnicity, religion or origin.  In a political climate where multiculturalism, 
not only in France but across much of Europe, has become seen in terms 
of social danger, this is of course not an easy message to promote. 
 
Finally, how do MIR’s positions affect its reactions to Sarkozy’s discourse?  
The movement has been successful in causing controversy even if, 
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predictably, much of the media coverage attracted has been negative.  
Furthermore, MIR has presented an imagined alternative to the 
mainstream political consensus, one which may appeal particularly to 
disaffected minority populations.  The Republic, it argues, has not lived 
up to its stated principles – or perhaps more accurately its pretensions.  If 
this is the case, the diagnoses of SOS and MIR have some similarities 
(ironically given the antipathy between the two movements, and their very 
different worldviews).  Their suggested remedies for the disconnect 
between the Republic’s principle and practice, however, differ 
substantially – for SOS, ensuring that republican ideology is more 
thoroughly and honestly applied; and for MIR, challenging the very basis 
of the Republic’s authority.  MIR was never a mass movement during my 
chosen timeframe, and given the radical nature of its discourse, it is 
unlikely that this situation will change.  However, its self-perceived role is 
seemingly to challenge official discourse from the outside, keeping its 
viewpoints in the national conversation from an autonomous, anti-system 
position.  At the time of the writing of this chapter Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
tenure as President has been ended, but for MIR, one suspects, his 
replacement by François Hollande marks no great change.  Although his 
abrasive politics may have influenced MIR’s formation, the movement 
was never simply fighting Sarkozy: he was a prominent antagonist, but its 
real target was what its activists saw as the systemic nature of racism 
and discrimination in French society.  Bouteldja clarifies this point as 
follows: ‘On n’existe pas par rapport à Sarkozy [...] pour nous, Sarkozy, 
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c’est la suite normale de Chirac, la suite normale de Mitterrand et les 
socialistes’ (Interview, 9.8.2011) 
That is to say, for her and for MIR, Sarkozy is nothing but the latest 
administrator of the colonial system.  As we will see in chapter 6, this 
presentation of racism as largely if not wholly systemic, whilst justified in 
some ways, potentially has serious repercussions for the movement’s 
ability to ameliorate genuine problems of racism and discrimination: in 
arguing for a complete re-ordering of French society, and nothing short of 
it, MIR effectively prevents itself from moving out of the domain of theory 
and into the inevitably imperfect and compromised domain of practical 
action.  
 
To sum up, in this chapter I have attempted to offer a comparative 
perspective on two contrasting anti-racist movements – SOS Racisme 
and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République – and the ideological 
divisions within French anti-racism which they represent: that is to say, 
their widely differing perspectives on France’s public political culture of 
republicanism. This analysis is situated within a distinctive political and 
ideological context, based simultaneously upon a consensus on the 
language of republicanism and the predominance of a conservative and 
potentially exclusionary conception of national identity.  The movements 
stand at opposite ends of Lentin’s continuum of proximity to and distance 
from the mainstream political culture.  At the ‘proximity’ end is SOS, 
which seeks to enforce and reinforce Republican ideology in the belief 
that ultimately this will ensure equitable treatment of all members of 
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French society regardless of race or religion.  At the ‘distance’ end, 
meanwhile, is MIR, which sees France’s political and social structures as 
perpetuating the racism, discrimination and inequality derived from 
colonialism.  Despite the substantial differences between the ideological 
positions of the two movements, this has proved a highly challenging 
context for both: SOS finding its chosen republican ideology being used – 
by one of the most powerful political organisations in France – for 
purposes often in total contradiction to its own, and MIR’s emphasis on 
colonial memory and multiculturalism being rejected due to a widespread 
hostility towards ‘repentance’ and communautarisme.  Having examined 
the academic and political context of the thesis, and introduced the two 
movements to be analysed, I now move on to the three thematic ‘case-
study’ chapters.  The first of these looks at the key theme of national 
identity, from the perspective of my two chosen movements: on what 
grounds do they challenge Sarkozy’s discourse?  And do they have their 
own alternative model? 
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Chapter 4  
SOS, MIR and national identity 
 
 
In the first three chapters of the thesis I have focused on establishing 
background and context.  Chapter 1 reviewed existing academic literature 
on French anti-racism, with particular emphasis on the divide within the 
field between those who consider that only an emphasis on republican 
values will combat racism, and those who call into question France’s 
political structures and propose a new model of citizenship and nationality.  
In chapter 2 meanwhile, I considered Nicolas Sarkozy’s discourse on 
national identity, a discourse which arguably defined my chosen period, 
and one whose central preoccupations – immigration, communautarisme, 
colonialism and ‘repentance’ – were at the heart of debates within the 
anti-racist movement.  Chapter 3, finally, served to introduce the ideology 
and strategy of the two movements examined in the thesis, SOS Racisme 
and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, with SOS’s 
republican positioning and emphasis on lobbying for practical action 
being contrasted with MIR’s questioning of republicanism, emphasis on 
the importance of colonialism and anti-system positioning.  In the 
following three chapters, I move on to the central part of the research.  
My aim is to provide a comparative analysis of the positions of my two 
chosen movements in relation to three key themes, by using a 
combination of press releases, official publications and interview material 
alongside relevant secondary sources.  In this chapter, I will begin by 
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considering the reactions of the movements to Sarkozy’s discourse on 
national identity, and their own contrasting visions of this concept.  In 
chapter 5 I will then analyse the organisations’ positions on colonialism, 
examining the role of colonial remembrance within contemporary anti-
racist discourse.  In chapter 6, finally, I will look at the related question of 
‘race’, and whether racial hierarchies and stereotypes inherited from 
colonialism cast doubt upon the republican ideal of ‘colour-blindness’.  
These three themes – national identity, colonialism and race – allow me 
to link the ideologies of my chosen organisations with the political climate 
under discussion in the thesis, and furthermore allow me to draw 
comparisons between the positions of the movements in relation to 
France’s mainstream political culture of universalist republicanism.  The 
following three chapters argue that the respective positioning of the two 
movements – SOS working within the political system to promote 
republican égalité, and MIR taking an anti-system orientation and calling 
into question the existence of universalism – creates significant contrasts.  
Furthermore, the widely differing nature of the movements’ positioning 
serves to underline the ideological diversity of anti-racism in the French 
context. 
 
This first ‘case-study’ chapter, then, looks at the question of national 
identity.  Both SOS and MIR are critical of what they see as Sarkozy’s 
cynical use of the concept for political gain; both reject his narrowly-
defined and arguably exclusionary conception of the idea; and more 
widely speaking, both appear to reject what Sarah Waters calls a 
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‘traditional and essentialist conception of identity’ (2012: 38), in favour of 
an emphasis on ‘the invented, imagined, constructed and performed 
nature of identity and [...] the political and instrumental uses to which it is 
put’ (ibid).  Despite these apparent similarities, however, there are a 
number of apparently irreconcilable differences between the positions of 
the two movements, and it is these similarities and differences which are 
the subject of this chapter.  In relation to structure, a section on each 
movement will focus firstly on the ideological reasons for their rejection of 
Sarkozy’s discourse on national identity, and secondly on the form of 
‘identity’ proposed as an alternative.  I argue that the positions of the two 
movements on national identity are informed by their respective positions 
on republicanism; with SOS’s conception of a République métissée as a 
positive goal for French society contrasting with MIR’s presentation of 
national identity as intimately linked with a negatively-defined République 
coloniale.     
 
I will begin by looking at SOS, which rejects Sarkozy’s discourse for three 
central reasons.  Firstly, the organisation rejects the way that immigration 
is presented solely as a threat to identity.  Secondly, the use by Sarkozy 
and his allies of the vocabulary of ‘republican values’ to justify and defend 
their identity discourse is seen by SOS as a serious misuse of such 
values.  Thirdly and finally, SOS sees the conservative and backwards-
looking conception of national identity touched upon above as dangerous 
for the future of French society, and as being at odds with the 
association’s ideal of a flexible, constantly evolving and inherently tolerant 
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society.  As a consequence of these positions, SOS promotes as an 
alternative conception of society a République métissée: a liberal and 
open variation of the unitary French Republic, whose culture is open and 
accepting of influences from those of immigrant populations.   
 
I will then move on to consider MIR, which like SOS is strongly critical of 
the conservative and backwards-looking nature of Sarkozy’s identity 
discourse, and also like SOS, rejects the way in which immigration is 
seen solely in terms of threat.  Other reasons for MIR’s rejection of the 
discourse, however, differ substantially: national identity is seen by the 
movement as being linked with colonialism, and the idea is also linked by 
MIR to the negative aspects of republican universalism.  As such, the 
organisation’s alternative conception of society is at odds with that of 
SOS, encompassing new conceptions of citizenship; the inalienable right 
of immigrants and their descendants to express their own identities; and 
most controversially, promotion of a form of multiculturalism. 
 
The predominance of the ‘Sarkozian’ conception of national identity over 
my chosen timeframe created problems for both the movements 
examined in the thesis, despite their substantial differences in orientation: 
MIR, with its emphasis on colonial memory and support for 
multiculturalism, found itself almost exactly at odds with a political climate 
hostile to ‘repentance’ and communautarisme.  ‘Multiculturalism’, what is 
more, is widely seen in France’s contemporary political culture as being 
inherently unacceptable in the republican tradition: a narrative in which, 
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as Silverman puts it, ‘’cultural difference’ [...] becomes a euphemism for 
‘anti-France’’ (1999: 59).   For SOS on the other hand, the situation was 
more ambiguous: the organisation shared in the political consensus on 
republicanism (having long since abandoned its own putatively 
‘multiculturalist’ ideal of the droit à la différence, perhaps wary of the 
potential for appropriation of the idea of ‘difference’ by the extreme-right; 
see Lebovics 2004: 132)), but the existence of this consensus – which led 
political actors from across the ideological spectrum to lay claim to 
republican values – meant that republicanism was often being used for 
purposes contrary to the organisation’s own. 
 
 
SOS and national identity: rationale for rejection 
 
Let us begin, then, by considering SOS Racisme, and the association’s 
rejection of Sarkozy’s presentation of immigration in opposition to national 
identity.  Illustrative in this regard is SOS’s reaction to the announcement 
in 2007 of a new ‘Ministry of Immigration and National Identity’: a Ministry 
which, despite claiming to support intégration and développement 
solidaire in its official title, was in practice mainly concerned with 
removing immigrants from French territory8, and which was widely 
criticised for implicitly presenting immigration as contrary to national 
identity, rather than as part of national identity (as Gérard Noiriel argues 
                                                 
8 For example, when Brice Hortefeux took charge of the new Ministry following 
Sarkozy’s victory in 2007 he proclaimed the objective of removing 25,000 immigrants 
over the course of the year (‘Immigration: Brice Hortefeux s’explique’, Le Figaro 
1.6.2007) 
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for instance, it is ‘un ministère qui légitime un amalgame inacceptable’, 
2007a: 145).  The organisation’s objections to the Ministry were based 
principally upon two related viewpoints.  The first of these was that 
Sarkozy was using national identity for political purposes, thus presenting 
a vision of what the historian and ‘Black studies’ theorist Pap Ndiaye, in a 
2011 article for Le Monde Magazine, called ‘un bloc français homogène, 
un “nous” bien circonscrit’ (2011: 26), a vision which furthermore served 
to hide the genuinely existing plurality in both French society and French 
identity.  The second related to the association’s ideological hostility to 
the way in which immigration is presented solely in terms of a threat to 
national identity, seemingly ignoring the possibility that immigrants could 
make a positive contribution to French society.  This vision on the part of 
the President and his party, to quote the same article, presented ‘les 
migrants comme des personnes incapables d’évoluer et de s’adapter’ 
(ibid).  As Loïc Rigaud of SOS’s anti-discrimination section put it in a 
2011 interview: 
 “Le fait de relier ‘identité nationale’ [à l’immigration], ça dirait que 
l’immigration est en opposition avec l’identité nationale.  C’est utilisé par 
Sarkozy pour dire que, en haut, il y a une identité française d’origine des 
Gaulois, qui s’opposerait à la question d’immigration ‘extra-gaulois’.  
C’est une utilisation très politique, et c’est un concept qui a été dénoncé 
par SOS Racisme dès le début.  On est content que, aujourd’hui, le 
Ministère de l’Immigration et l’Identité Nationale ait disparu.  Encore une 
fois, c’est une manipulation pour stigmatiser les immigrés comme les 
gens qui attaqueraient notre identité nationale.” (Interview with Loïc 
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Rigaud, SOS Racisme, pôle anti-discrimination, responsable prévention, 
Paris, 29.3.2011)  
 
Rigaud’s reference to ‘une identité française d’origine des Gaulois, qui 
s’opposerait à la question d’immigration ‘extra-gaulois’’ is a critique of 
Sarkozy’s discourse which is consistent with the ideas considered in 
chapter 2 in relation to his usage of history.  Sarkozy uses French history, 
or at least selected parts of it, mixed with historical myth, in order to 
create an inflexible and exclusionary form of national identity which is 
never truly open to populations of post-colonial immigrant origin.  This 
narrowly-conceived and backwards-looking version of national identity 
can be contrasted with SOS’s ideal of a ‘République métissée’ (Qu’est-ce 
que SOS Racisme, 2006: 90), an idea (also referred to simply as 
métissage) which has formed an important part of the organisation’s 
worldview since the mid-1980s, under its founding President Harlem 
Désir.  It suggests a society which is built on republican structures and 
rejects communautarisme, and one which, in common with classical 
republicanism, has a single common culture.  This common culture, 
however, is seen not as fixed and unchanging but ‘diverse and 
heterogeneous’ (Gibb 1998: 159), evolving and mutating under the 
influence of the ‘mixed’ French population.  This idea will be discussed in 
greater detail later on in this section, when I look at SOS’s own vision for 
the ideal society. 
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Sarkozy, therefore, presents the history of France as ancient, mystical 
and intangible, the backbone of an identity which is, as he puts it in his 
2007 campaign speech in Caen, ‘faite de mille apports, de 
commémorations, de leçons d'instituteurs, de réminiscences qui se 
transmettent de génération en génération, de souvenirs d'enfance, de 
vieilles histoires de grands-pères qui ont fait la guerre et qui racontent à 
leur tour à leurs petits-enfants ce que leurs grands-pères leur ont raconté 
jadis’ (9.3.2007, accessed at sites.univ-
provence.fr/veronis/Discours2007).  Immigrants, and French citizens of 
post-colonial immigrant origin, are considered as relating to this history 
and the ‘national identity’ which results from it in two ways: firstly as a 
threat, and secondly as ‘subjects’ required to assimilate to French values 
and accept the official version of history.  There is no acknowledgement 
that these populations have the right to see history differently, and no 
acknowledgement that they can contribute to French identity in their own 
right.  As such, this discourse is a long way from accepting what theorists 
such as the post-colonial historian Nicolas Bancel see as the necessity of 
a new politics which recognises ‘la multiplicité des modes de vie’, and in 
which ‘la modernité doit désormais se conjuger au pluriel’ (2010: 10). 
 
SOS, for its part, rejects entirely this idea that immigration and national 
identity should be placed in opposition.  As Rigaud argues, 
 “L’identité de la France, c’est les droits de l’homme.  L’identité de 
la France c’est aussi l’accueil politique, des démandeurs d’asile.  [...]  La 
France est une terre d’immigration depuis des années, des centaines 
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d’années; l’identité de la France c’est plutôt une identité multiculturelle 
qu’une identité blanche d’origine chrétienne” (Interview with Loïc Rigaud, 
29.3.2011) 
He calls into question two widely held views on immigration which are 
perpetuated by the discourse of Sarkozy and the UMP government: that it 
is something new in society, and that it is a threat to French values.  
Rigaud and SOS see the question from an entirely different angle to 
Sarkozy, the welcoming of immigrants being presented not in opposition 
to national identity, but as a key part of it, and one which is to be 
celebrated.  This viewpoint is reinforced by the reference to ‘les droits de 
l’homme’: this appeal to universal human rights, a fundamental founding 
principle of the Republic, is used as a critique of those in political power 
who have neglected this principle for short-term electoral gain, reinforcing 
the idea that SOS sees its role as a guardian of republican ideals of 
equality and tolerance. 
 
The links made by SOS between universalist republican values and the 
acceptance of immigration connect to the second central reason for the 
organisation’s rejection of Sarkozy’s discourse: the way in which it was 
presented was seen as a misappropriation of the language of 
republicanism.  Again, this can be illustrated with reference to a key event 
which brought to the forefront of political debate questions of immigration 
and national identity. 
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One of the most high-profile initiatives taken by the Ministry before its 
dissolution in November 2010 was the ‘great debate’ on national identity 
held in late 2009, a debate with the proclaimed aim to ‘favoriser la 
construction d'une vision mieux partagée de ce qu'est l'identité nationale 
aujourd'hui’ (Le Monde 2.11.2009), but which was seen by its critics as 
promoting a narrow and exclusionary conception of the idea, and as 
implicitly giving permission to express racist and Islamophobic opinions 
(see for example Tissot and Tévanian, ‘Les dessous de l’identité 
nationale: Cinq remarques sur une offensive idéologique’ in Les mots 
sont importants, 2010: 229). 
 
SOS opposed the debate on both practical and political grounds, using an 
argument common to the majority of the initiative’s critics: it is the 
movement’s contention that the debate was not a neutral discussion on 
French identity in the modern world, but a cynical attempt to recapture the 
winning formula of 2007 ahead of the 2010 regional elections.  It is the 
ideological reasons for the organisation’s opposition, however, which are 
most relevant to the current discussion.   
 
The official press release announcing the debate defines it in terms which 
SOS is highly familiar with: vivre ensemble, liberté, egalité and fraternité, 
laïcité and equality between men and women are all evoked, and are all 
values which the organisation would be happy to lay claim to in its own 
right (‘Éric BESSON lance un grand débat sur l’identité nationale’, 
immigration.gouv.fr, 2009).  However, the very usage by the government 
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of such values is a major component in SOS’s opposition to the debate.  
The movement itself is attempting to affirm the same concepts in its 
construction of a liberal and tolerant République métissée, and in doing 
this is acting in a manner common to mainstream anti-racist organisations 
in France.  As Koopmans et al put it in relation to such movements, 
‘Instead of seeing the cultural differences brought by immigration as a 
threat to national cohesion and identity, pro-migrant and antiracist 
activists define the nation as an open and universal sphere.’ (2005: 207, 
my italics).  Accordingly, it is clear that SOS does not see a government 
which has used the vocabulary of republicanism to stigmatise France’s 
minority populations as a suitable guardian of the Republic’s principles.   
 
This interpretation of SOS’s standpoint is clearly illustrated in the press 
release written in reaction to the debate by the organisation’s President 
Dominique Sopo: he states unequivocally that ‘Le jargon républicain 
utilisé dans le présent débat ne saurait ici faire illusion.  Le débat sur 
l’identité nationale est fondamentalement nauséabond.’ (‘Identité 
nationale: “un débat à rebours”’, 9.12.2009).  For SOS then, the debate is 
representative of a misuse of republican values, a danger similarly noted 
by Ndiaye, who warns of: 
 “[L]a position française “républicaniste” rigide qui, au nom d’une 
conception abstraite et universelle de la citoyenneté, est indifférente au 
racisme et aux discriminations, hostile à l’égard de certaines demandes 
mémorielles, et tend à devenir un nationalisme chauvin, bien incarné par 
la fameuse “identité nationale”.” (2011: 29)  
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This critique, on the part of SOS and of analysts like Ndiaye, links in with 
one of the movement’s recurrent arguments: that those in political power, 
despite their frequent use of the rhetoric of republicanism, all too often 
have little or no interest in taking serious action to ensure that republican 
principles are applied fairly and consistently throughout society.  As Sopo 
writes in SOS antiracisme: 
 “[L]e discours républicain est d’autant moins crédible qu’il se limite 
à sa simple émission.  Comment ainsi s’étonner que les ghettos et les 
discriminations créent objectivement un terreau favorable à des forces 
communautaristes si la République se cantonne au rappel désincarné de 
ses principes?” (2005: 41) 
 
There would appear, in SOS’s view, to be two levels of misuse in relation 
to republican values.  The first allows these values to be reduced, as in 
the quotation above, to an unthinking recitation, which ignores the reality 
behind them.  The second meanwhile, as in the case of the debate, or the 
2011 ‘burqa ban’ which, according to Sopo, was representative of a 
‘volonté non dite de stigmatiser une partie de la population en se drapant 
dans les habits des plus nobles idéaux’ (‘Tribune de Dominique Sopo sur 
la loi sur le voile intégral’, 2010), uses the vocabulary of republicanism to 
disguise an outcome which would appear to be the very opposite of its 
proclaimed principles.  In either case, it is the movement’s argument that 
republican values are only weakened by their use for what its activists 
see as dishonest purposes, leading to communautarisme appearing an 
attractive prospect for those who feel these values do not apply to them, 
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and to the principles themselves being called into question, as can be 
seen in the discourse of MIR.  It is this line of reasoning which leads SOS 
to prioritise practical action to make republicanism work in reality, a 
position similar to that of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
whose notion of ‘radical democracy’ argues that while the egalitarian 
principles of modern democracy are in themselves sound, they are 
frequently not implemented, thus bringing about the necessity of 
defending and reaffirming these principles, and of forcing societies to live 
up to their proclaimed ideals (1992: 1).  In the case of issues such as the 
2009 debate, however, in which the language of republicanism is used to 
stigmatise minority populations for political gain, a vital strategic question 
remains unanswered: how is the movement able to fight successfully on 
this terrain, when the government, via its initiatives on immigration and 
national identity, presents itself as protecting republican values from 
enemies within and without?  This is arguably the single most important 
question faced by the movement over my chosen timeframe, and one to 
which it never entirely found a satisfactory answer. 
 
As we have now seen then, SOS opposes the government’s discourse on 
national identity on the grounds that it is contrary to republican values, or 
at least, its interpretation of the highly flexible concept of republican 
values.  In addition – moving on now to the final aspect of SOS’s 
opposition – the organisation is opposed to the backwards-looking and 
arguably exclusionary nature of this discourse, a discourse which critics 
such as François Durpaire see as leading France towards becoming ‘une 
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communauté recroquevillée sur elle-même, enracinée dans un passé 
mythifié et sourde à tout enrichissement – une communauté fondée sur 
l’exclusion et la division’ (2012: 55).  Evidently therefore, such a 
discourse is held to be incompatible with SOS’s more open and inclusive 
conception of society: 
 “Il faut dire que ce débat, fondamentalement, reste l’otage de 
l’idéologie du Front National, qui interdit de penser la Nation de façon 
“trop” ouverte et qui pousse à la concevoir comme un ensemble de traits 
muséifiés, renvoyant ainsi à la tare originelle de ce ministère qui accole 
dans son intitulé l’Immigration et l’Identité nationale, sous-entendant que 
cette dernière devrait être administrée – et donc obligatoirement 
formalisée – tandis que le danger qui la menacerait est tout identifié: 
l’immigré et ses mauvaises manières.” (SOS Racisme, ‘Identité nationale: 
“un débat à rebours”’, 2009)  
 
For SOS therefore, the debate is representative of the same worldview as 
the ‘Ministry of Immigration and National Identity’, and much of Sarkozy’s 
2007 election campaign: Sarkozy consistently made clear that there is a 
single non-negotiable national identity, which results from a single non-
negotiable conception of history.  As Gérard Noiriel puts it in Racisme: la 
responsabilité des élites: 
 “La notion d’identité nationale a pu être défendue, évidemment, 
par des gens qui n’étaient ni nationalistes ni racistes.  Néanmoins, 
lorsqu’elle est politisée, elle véhicule des références négatives pour les 
groupes présentés comme des “étrangers”.  Depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, 
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l’identité nationale est reliée à l’idée de protection ou de conservation.  
Comme permanence et conservation d’un passé figé.  C’est pour cela 
que les propos sur l’”identité nationale” ont toujours accompagné les 
discours négatifs sur les immigrés.” (2007b: 91) 
It is not difficult to see how SOS’s denunciation of a form of political 
rhetoric which paints the nation as a collection of ‘traits muséifiés’ is 
linked to Sarkozy’s discourse on history.  As was noted in chapter 2, this 
discourse excludes immigration and critical analysis of colonialism, and 
presents French history as consisting of a list of Great Men and heroic 
military campaigns, a conception embodied in his proposal (withdrawn in 
2012 by the incoming socialist government) for a ‘Maison de l’histoire de 
la France’, which had the declared aims of remedying ‘le renoncement 
aux principes de l’histoire’ and ‘la remise en cause du “roman national”’ 
(Lemoine, H.  ‘“La Maison de l’Histoire de France” – Pour la creation d’un 
centre de recherche et de collections permanentes dédié à l’histoire civile 
et militaire de la France’, 2008). 
 
Although SOS, like Sarkozy, declares itself to be in favour of republican 
integrationism, in the sense that the association rejects 
communautarisme and the primary loyalty to a religious or ethnic group 
which this implies, its leaders see Sarkozy’s rigidly inflexible conception 
of national identity, closed to cultural influences from outside, as 
counterproductive and dangerous for the future of French society.  As 
Sopo argues in his response to the ‘identity debate’ of 2009, for example: 
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 “Ce que nous jugeons comme une inestimable valeur dans les 
sociétés au sein desquelles nous évoluons, c’est tout au contraire leur 
complexité, leurs contradictions, leur perpétuel changement où chaque 
jour s’invente une part de la société à venir.  Le débat sur l’identité 
nationale est à rebours de cette richesse car, tel qu’il est posé, il ne peut 
qu’aboutir à cette muséification mortifière pour la vitalité d’une société.  
Les habitudes et les codes de l’autre n’y sont en effet plus une source de 
curiosité et de découverte mais un danger qu’il faut éloigner à tout prix, 
quel que soit l’attirail sémantique – fût-il traversé du lexique républicain – 
déployé à cette fin.” (SOS Racisme, ‘Identité nationale: “un débat à 
rebours”’, 2009) 
According to Sopo, therefore, the conception of national identity favoured 
by Sarkozy, as embodied by the ‘Ministry of Immigration and National 
Identity’ and by the 2009 ‘identity debate’, leads to a ‘muséification 
mortifière pour la vitalité d’une société’.  What, though, is proposed is 
proposed by SOS as an alternative?  It is this question which is examined 
in the next section.   
 
 
An alternative conception: the République métissée 
 
This clear rejection of the national identity discourse of Sarkozy and the 
UMP government raises the question of the form of national identity 
supported by SOS.  It is evident that Sopo favours a more liberal and 
flexible conception: as can be seen in the quotation above, he sees 
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‘complexité’, ‘contradictions’ and ‘perpétuel changement où chaque jour 
s’invente une part de la société à venir’ not as complications for society 
but as strengths.  Similarly, he argues that the cultures brought to France 
by immigrant populations should not be seen as a threat but as an 
opportunity: ‘une source de curiosité et de découverte’. 
 
The question for SOS is how to reconcile this belief in a flexible, mutating, 
constantly evolving form of national identity with its belief in republican 
values as an ideological framework for society.  The organisation aims to 
solve this problem by supporting the creation of a ‘République métissée’: 
that is to say, by using the inherent flexibility of republican values to 
define them in a way which fits the movement’s existing agenda (just as 
Sarkozy was able to paint the Republic as synonymous with authority, 
hard work, and the fight against delinquency and communautarisme).  
But what does this idea of a ‘République métissée’ consist of?  According 
to Sopo in an interview reproduced in Qu’est-ce que SOS Racisme, the 
concept has existed since the early days of the organisation: 
 “Ce concept est le fruit de notre combat initial, visant à faire 
accepter à la société française son nouveau visage: celui d’une France 
diverse, composée d’individus aux origines, aux religions et aux cultures 
différentes.” (2006: 90) 
 
This idea of a ‘mixed Republic’ consists of two parts.  The first of these 
relates to practical action designed to promote literal mixing of 
populations, with the goal of reducing ‘la méconnaissance et donc la peur 
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de l’autre’ (2006: 91).  It is this aspect of the idea which is behind SOS’s 
fight against ghettoïsation, and it is also at the heart the organisation’s 
action in relation to issues such as education and housing, as is made 
clear in many of the proposals in 2007’s Manifeste pour l’égalité.  This 
first component of the concept, therefore, relates to SOS’s views on 
public policy, which should prioritise, in the eyes of the association, the 
fight against spatio-ethnic segregation and the promotion of brassage 
social, as can be seen for example in its proposals following the riots of 
autumn 2005 for both increased construction of social housing and 
anonymisation of applications for such housing (SOS Racisme, ‘Le temps 
de l’action’, 2005).  For SOS, social mixing is a prerequisite for an 
effective fight against racism, prejudice and harmful stereotypes.   
 
The second part of the concept relates to the movement’s understanding 
of French culture.  Unlike Sarkozy and his political allies, SOS does not 
see France’s national culture, and thus its national identity, as frozen and 
unchanging.  At the same time however, a multicultural conception of 
society is considered as contrary to the ideals of the Republic.  As noted 
earlier in this section, this is an important issue: republican political 
thought in France has a long tradition of deep discomfort with the idea of 
‘difference’.  As Robert Gildea puts it in relation to republicans of the 19th 
century, for example: 
 “[I]t was argued that assimilation was possible only for individuals, 
not for communities, and that while it was permissible to practise religion 
and ethnic traditions in private, there could be no public recognition of 
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ethnic or religious communities that might assert claims against and 
fragment the French nation state.” (2002: 171)   
 
The way in which the movement attempts to square this circle was 
identified by Robert Gibb in a 1998 paper, underlining, as we have just 
seen, the extent to which SOS Racisme’s positions have remained 
relatively consistent across several decades.  In a discussion of Harlem 
Désir’s use of the term métissage in the mid-1980s – a usage which can 
perhaps trace its roots to the Convergence 84 movement, whose most 
famous slogan stated that ‘La France c’est comme une Mobylette, pour 
avancer il lui faut du mélange’ (Bouamama 1994: 77) – Gibb identifies in 
SOS’s discourse a conception of a ‘hybrid culture’, which ‘incorporates 
elements from a diverse range of sources’.  French culture, therefore, is 
seen by the movement as ‘diverse and heterogeneous’.  At the same time 
however, ‘it is nevertheless singular in the sense of being shared by and 
common to all groups in society’ (1998: 159).  The ‘hybridisation’ implied 
by SOS’s discourse here is similarly noted by Ndiaye, who however sees 
this as a naturally occurring process: 
 “Il est caricatural de réduire les immigrés postcoloniaux à leurs 
cultures d’origine, définies comme radicalement étrangères et 
incompatibles avec les sociétés européennes.  Les particularités 
culturelles sont changeantes et s’hybrident mutuellement, de telle sorte 
que les sociétés d’origine et d’acceuil sont transformées par les 
migrations.” (2011: 26) 
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The fact that, in SOS’s vision, there is still a singular culture and a 
singular French identity does potentially raise questions.  For example, 
how, then, does the idea differ fundamentally from simple ‘integration’?  
One potential difference lies in the idea of reciprocity (an idea also 
considered by Gibb, in a later paper (2003a: 92)).  That is to say, it is not 
a question of ‘them’ being integrated into an unaltered ‘us’, but a notion 
which implies an element of movement on both sides.  Further questions 
could relate to the issue of republicanism in a wider sense.  As Silverman 
argues, there is ‘a frightening discrepancy in France between official 
discourse and that of republican social commentary, on the one hand, 
and everyday life, on the other, in which cultural/ethnic difference is 
ubiquitous’ (1999: 60).  Does SOS’s republicanism, even if it is more 
flexible than Sarkozy’s, therefore fail to take into account the realities of 
contemporary society?  Leaving aside these reservations however, it is 
not difficult to see how this idea of a culture which is ‘singular’ yet ‘hybrid’ 
fits comfortably with SOS’s ideology over the period examined in the 
thesis: such a conception of French identity allows the movement to lay 
claim to republican values, whilst rejecting both a multiculturalism which 
is seen as shading too easily into communautarisme, and the inflexible, 
exclusionary conception of national identity embodied by Sarkozy. 
 
This vision of French society is unlikely to be acceptable to more radical 
movements such as MIR, as it leaves the structures of society unchanged 
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and unquestioned9, and does not present to immigrants and their 
descendants an explicit offer of autonomy and self-determination.  Having 
said this however, it is very much compatible with the positions of 
France’s moderate republican centre-left, a potentially vast constituency 
which at the time of writing in is represented by the President François 
Hollande, and by much of the socialist majority in government.  While this 
positioning might seem unambitious to the movement’s critics, it is 
potentially useful, therefore, for the purposes of building a broad coalition 
in favour of a conception of national identity which clearly moves on from 
that of Sarkozy, but does not cause controversy by calling into question 
the ideological underpinnings of French politics and society. 
 
To sum up, in the first section of this chapter I have considered the 
relationship between SOS Racisme and the conservative discourse on 
national identity which defined my chosen period.  Using interview 
material, official publications and press releases reacting to the key 
events which brought this discourse to the forefront of political discussion, 
I began by considering the rationale for the movement’s rejection of 
Sarkozy’s worldview on the subject.  This rationale can broadly be divided 
into three areas.  The first of these relates to SOS’s rejection of the way 
in which immigration is presented solely as a threat to French identity.  
The second is that the presentation and ideological justification of this 
identity discourse by its proponents is seen by the organisation as a 
                                                 
9 SOS is seen by MIR as a ‘white’ movement, which fails both to understand the 
systemic nature of racism and to act in the interest of France’s indigènes; and whose 
members ‘sont convaincus que le racisme n’est qu’un archaïsme idéologique propre à la 
droite ou rechignent à reconnaître qu’ils ont eux-mêmes partie prenante du racisme 
institutionnel’ (Bouteldja and Khiari, À quoi sert l’antiracisme universel?, 16.6.2011)  
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misuse of republican values.  The third, finally, is that Sarkozy’s ‘frozen’ 
and backwards-looking version of national identity is seen as contrary to 
SOS’s ideal of a dynamic and constantly evolving society.  I then moved 
on to consider the movement’s alternative conception of national identity, 
one which, as we have seen above, rejects both Sarkozy’s discourse and 
multiculturalism as a means of organising French society, in favour of a 
liberal ‘mixed Republic’, within which French culture is conceived as 
singular, but diverse, flexible and open to outside influences.  In the next 
part of the chapter, I will examine the positions of MIR in relation to the 
same dominant discourse, and see how its vision of an ideal society 
differs from that of SOS, most notably with regard to the links made 
between national identity and colonialism, the emphasis placed on the 
negative aspects of republican universalism, and the support expressed 
for a form of multiculturalism as an ideological and organisational 
principle. 
 
 
MIR and national identity: rationale for rejection 
 
As noted at the start of this chapter, despite the substantial differences 
between the ideological orientations of SOS and MIR, the two 
movements do share some of the same reasons for rejecting Sarkozy’s 
discourse on national identity.  These similarities can be illustrated by 
taking an extract from the movement’s press release reacting to the initial 
proposal for the new Ministry, in March 2007: 
 202 
 “La dernière déclaration du candidat Sarkozy [...] signifie tout 
bonnement la création d’un ministère de la protection d’une identité 
nationale fermée, figée et chauvine, contre les populations immigrées 
issues des anciennes colonies françaises.  On les reprochait 
communément de “prendre le pain des Français”; on leur accuse de plus 
en plus de polluer l’identité de la France plutôt que d’y voir un 
enrichissement culturel et civilisationnel au bénéfice de tous.”  
(Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, ‘Communiqué de presse du 
MIR: “Ministère de l’Immigration et de l’Identité nationale” ou “Ministère 
des Affaires Indigènes”?’, 9.3.2007) 
 
Whether it is because the proposal was still at this point at the idea stage, 
or because a press release is designed to be acceptable to wider public 
opinion, this critique is less radical than might be expected, choosing not 
to focus on controversial issues such as race and religion.  As noted 
above, it covers very similar ground to SOS’s opposition to Sarkozy’s 
discourse, which is summed up in Sopo’s reaction to the ‘grand débat’ of 
late 2009 (SOS Racisme, ‘Identité nationale: “un débat à rebours”’, 2009).  
In both cases, Sarkozy’s narrowly defined, backwards-looking conception 
of national identity is criticised, MIR describing ‘une identité nationale 
fermée, figée et chauvine’, and Sopo writing of the debate leading to ‘[une] 
muséification mortière pour la vitalité d’une société’.  Both also criticise 
the way in which immigration is presented as a threat to national identity 
(MIR: ‘on leur accuse de plus en plus de polluer l’identité de la France’; 
Sopo: ‘le danger qui la [l’identité] menacerait est tout identifié: l’immigré et 
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ses mauvaises manières’).  And both argue that immigration should be 
seen not as a threat but as an opportunity (MIR: ‘un enrichissement 
culturel et civilisationnel au bénéfice de tous’; Sopo: ‘Les habitudes et les 
codes de l’autre n’y sont en effet plus une source de curiosité et de 
découverte mais un danger qu’il faut éloigner à tout prix’.) 
 
It was not until Sarkozy’s victory in the 2007 Presidential elections, and 
the plan for the new Ministry being put into action, that MIR’s positioning 
diverged from more mainstream critiques and began to set out more 
clearly key aspects of the movement’s ideology.  In these later press 
releases – in sharp distinction with the arguments of SOS, which is 
sceptical of postcolonialism (see chapter 5) and strongly favourable 
towards republicanism – MIR makes connections between national 
identity and anti-colonialism, and between the discriminatory conception 
of national identity in contemporary France and what MIR sees as the 
inherent faults within republican universalism.  These critiques share 
numerous similarities with those made by Saïd Bouamama, who would 
go on to become a prominent member of the movement.  As he argues in 
1994’s Dix ans de marche des beurs: 
 “La France contemporaine hérite d’un rapport à l’altérité et à la 
différence qui est loin d’être positif.  Les racines sont anciennes et se 
reproduisent en permanence. [...]  Le rapport à l’immigration s’est 
construit sur la base [de] peur de la différence, pression assimilationniste, 
diabolisation de l’altérité.” (1994: 230)   
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A communiqué from June 2007 sums up MIR’s positioning on these 
questions of republicanism and colonialism, stating that: 
 “La République [...] a montré à quel point sont associées, dans 
l’imaginaire comme dans le réel, la politique néocoloniale en Afrique et le 
traitement en France-même des populations issues de la colonisation et 
de l’esclavage.”  (Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, 
‘”Couscous, Boubous, Youyous: Halte à la pollution identitaire, et vive le 
ministère de l’identité nationale, de l’immigration, de l’intégration et du co-
développement”’, 28.6.2007) 
From the beginning of this piece, national identity is linked with colonial 
history, with the post-colonial situation in metropolitan France, and with 
the ‘neo-colonialism’ associated with unequal relationships between the 
global North and South in the modern geo-political arena, a wide-ranging 
critique similar to that made by Nicolas Bancel, who connects ‘l’obsession 
sécuritaire, le mythe identitaire et le déchaînement nouveau des passions 
xénophobes’ (2010: 10) with the pressures of globalisation, the failures of 
the European project and France’s refusal to accept the importance of the 
legacy of colonialism in contemporary society. 
 
The link made in MIR’s discourse between national identity and 
colonialism is then spelled out explicitly: national identity is stated to be a 
‘variation actuelle du vieux refrain nationaliste et colonial’ (Mouvement 
des Indigènes de la République, ‘”Couscous, Boubous, Youyous: Halte à 
la pollution identitaire, et vive le ministère de l’identité nationale, de 
l’immigration, de l’intégration et du co-développement”’, 28.6.2007).  MIR 
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suggests, as it did in the March 2007 press release, and SOS did in its 
reaction to the ‘identity debate’ of late 2009, that immigrants are 
presented by Sarkozy and his associates as being a threat to French 
identity.  Here however, it is made clear that it is specifically post-colonial 
immigrants who are being targeted: 
 “À travers lui [Sarkozy], la République dit désormais tout haut ce 
qu’elle pensait tout bas: les Français noirs, arabes et musulmans ne sont 
que de “faux Français”.  Ils ne peuvent participer à ce qu’est la France.  
Sujets et non citoyens, ils se doivent d’accepter sans mot dire les 
inégalités raciales.  Ils se doivent d’oublier leurs cultures, leurs langues, 
de nier la richesse et la multiplicité de leurs histoires.  Pour être tolérés, 
ils doivent admettre leur archaïsme en se prosternant devant l’”identité 
nationale”, c’est à dire la Glorieuse Histoire de France.  Ainsi, peut-être 
(mais c’est pas sûr), ils montreront qu’ils sont capables – 
progressivement, très progressivement... d’accéder à la Civilisation.” (ibid) 
 
This emphasis on colonialism and the negative aspects of the Republic 
comes across as highly provocative in a political context typified by a 
cross-party consensus on republicanism (Waters 2012), and to some 
extent by a rejection of ‘repentance’ (De Cock et al 2008, Noiriel 2007a).  
It also sets MIR apart from a more mainstream, consensus-seeking 
movement like SOS, which is prepared to fight government initiatives on 
national identity, but only to the extent in which they threaten the 
association’s conception of a liberal ‘République métissée’. According to 
SOS’s way of seeing the issue, immigrants are welcome to contribute to 
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the common culture of the Republic, but the political and ideological 
structures of the nation are not called into question.  What is more, self-
organisation amongst immigrants and their descendants is often 
considered – by SOS as by Sarkozy, despite the differing levels of 
nuance in their arguments – as communautarisme, and thus as a threat 
to the Republic.  MIR attempts to move away from a paradigm in which 
republicanism is seen as an unambiguous good, and colonial history is 
not taken into account, towards one in which the idea of national identity 
is placed in historical context, however uncomfortable the resulting 
reading of French history may be for majority opinion. 
 
The passage cited above, therefore, is illustrative of a number of the 
movement’s preoccupations, and how these fit in with its positions on 
national identity.  Firstly, racism is considered to exist within the 
structures of the Republic, and consequently within France’s perceived 
national identity.  If Blacks, Arabs and Muslims are ‘faux Français’, the 
evident subtext is that French identity is ethnically based, a recurrent 
feature of MIR’s discourse which will be examined in chapter 6.  Also 
implicit in MIR’s viewpoint is a critique of the idea of integration, an 
impression reinforced by the argument that immigrants and their 
descendants are expected to forget their cultures, languages and 
histories.  As Koopmans et al note, France ‘requires from migrants a high 
degree of assimilation in the public sphere and gives little or no 
recognition to their cultural differences.’ (2005: 8)  It is MIR’s argument 
that, because of this restrictive conception of culture and identity, even if 
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these populations wanted to integrate, they would not be let to do so by 
wider society.  As Khiari (2006) puts it: 
  “On vous exclut et on vous somme en même temps de vous 
intégrer.  Comme vous ne le faites pas, c’est bien vous le coupable et 
non pas le système politique.  Et comme vous êtes coupables, cela 
prouve bien que celui-ci a raison de vous exclure!” (2006: 55) 
Seen this way, ‘national identity’ is a way of excluding a significant part of 
the population from true participation in the life of the nation, even if it is 
presented as almost exactly the opposite – that is, its acceptance being a 
prerequisite for participation. 
 
Secondly, the reference to populations of immigrant origin being ‘sujets et 
non citoyens’ is a reiteration of the idea that, like methods of colonial 
administration in relation to areas such as policing and the justice system, 
representations of colonial populations are still at play in the conception 
of national identity which serves to shut out their descendants in 
contemporary France.  Thirdly, there is a criticism of the narrowly-focused, 
conservative vision of ‘la Glorieuse Histoire de France’, which makes up 
much of the ‘Sarkozian’ conception of national identity.  As we have seen 
earlier on in this chapter, for Sarkozy there is a single national history, 
made up of an officially-sanctioned set of myths and rejecting critical 
analysis of controversial issues like colonialism; a history (and 
consequently a ‘national identity’) which furthermore is presented as 
something ancient and intangible.  Again, this has the effect of ‘shutting 
out’ newcomers from full access to French identity: even if they have 
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French nationality on paper, they do not share the deep bonds that define 
the ‘true’ Frenchman, an impression reinforced in Sarkozy’s discourse by 
the supposed cultural incompatibility of Muslims, immigrants or 
communautaristes.  Finally, the reference to ‘la Civilisation’, with a capital 
‘C’, would appear to be a reference to the mission civilisatrice10, a lexical 
choice which reinforces the link made by MIR between the exclusionary 
conception of national identity which defined my chosen period, and the 
universalist republican ideology which, as we shall see in chapter 5, was 
used (according to the anti-colonialist viewpoint) as a justification for 
France’s colonial expansion. 
 
The cumulative impression created by the passage is that the idea of 
national identity, as conceived by Sarkozy, contains a false universalism 
and a false integrationism, which claim to offer emancipation, but in 
reality have the effect of freezing out those considered to be culturally 
incompatible: that is to say, ‘post-colonial’ immigrants and their 
descendants.  For Khiari (2006: 150), it is necessary to break the post-
colonial order and its ‘national-chauvinist’ conception of identity.  The 
‘Indigène’, he writes, refuses the idea that France is a fixed and 
homogenous ‘essence’, as well as the idea of a messianic national 
identity charged with the task of bringing reason and culture to the world.  
Linked to this is a rejection of the idea that the nation is not simply 
composed of citizens, but is an expression of ‘eternal’ culture, history and 
values.  ‘National character’, he continues, is never a persistent fact 
                                                 
10 See Dulucq, Klein and Stora, eds. (2008: 74) for a useful discussion of the meaning 
and ambiguities of this term 
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throughout history, but ‘un devenir et une disparition continuels’ (2006: 
151).  In his view, identities participate in a process of permanent 
recomposition of national identity, but this ‘recomposition’ supposes a 
recognition of the legitimacy and right to exist of multiple identities, 
constructed and reconstructed, in a space where the social and political 
hierarchies of postcolonialism have been removed.   
 
How this can happen, however, is another question, particularly in a 
political climate where alternative conceptions of identity, and the related 
question of alternative conceptions of history, appear to be considered as 
inherently suspicious, as can be seen by the currency of terms such as 
communautarisme and ‘repentance’.  Such terms, as Houria Bouteldja 
argues in a 2011 interview, serve to pre-emptively delegitimise 
autonomous movements made up of immigrants and their descendants.  
As she states in relation to the use of communautarisme in mainstream 
political discourse, for example, ‘C’est véritablement une arme contre les 
Arabes, les Noirs...  Ça nous intimide.  On est accusé d’être 
‘communautariste’.  En fait c’est pour nous empêcher d’être ensemble: 
quand on est ensemble, potentiellement, on peut faire la politique.  On 
sait c’est que pour nous empêcher d’être ensemble.  Et ça marche.’ 
(Interview with Houria Bouteldja, 9.8.2011)   
 
Bouteldja, I would argue, is justified in saying that the spectre of 
communautarisme – as noted even by SOS, itself highly critical of the 
phenomenon – has been used by Sarkozy and his allies to shut down 
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debate, and to stigmatise ‘visible minorities’ and banlieue inhabitants as a 
whole.  What is perhaps more debatable, however, is the proposition that 
movements like MIR are rejected by mainstream opinion because many 
of their members are of visible ethnic minority origin.  Whilst this may be a 
contributory factor, it is the organisation’s ideological positions which are 
at the heart of the issue, in particular its rejection of republicanism, and 
what Éric Ferrand calls the ‘sentiment national’ (2007: 10) which 
accompanies the idea: that is, the sense of pride and solidarity derived 
from belonging to ‘une communauté fondée sur la liberté, l’égalité et la 
fraternité’, within which ‘tous les citoyens ont, sur tout le territoire de la 
République, les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs’ (ibid).  Of course, 
the argument of MIR is that is that the views of republican patriots like 
Ferrand bear little relationship with reality, with mainstream discourse on 
republicanism ‘ayant plus à voir avec les représentations idéales et 
incantatoires forgées par les doctrinaires de tout poil qu’avec la réalité 
des pratiques’ – practices which MIR argue include racism, discrimination 
and colonialism (Héricord, Lévy and Khiari, ‘Indigènes de la République, 
réponses à quelques objections...’, 2005).  Nevertheless, in rejecting the 
minimal but consensual form of ‘national identity’ represented by a shared 
belief in republicanism, MIR chooses to place itself entirely at odds with 
political and public opinion, a position consistent with what Sharif Gemie 
sees as the movement’s potential ‘consensus-breaking’ role within the 
landscape of French political debate (2010: 141).       
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On similar lines to analysts such as Étienne Balibar and Gérard Noiriel, 
Khiari traces the origins of today’s discourse on national identity to the 
late 19th century, during the Third Republic.  It was at this time, he argues, 
that a ‘mythical’ conception of national identity came to be created: a ‘lien 
social républicain’ which ‘fabrique et propage le fantasme d’une histoire 
française, glorieuse et triomphante’, and ‘exalte un nationalisme des plus 
chauvins’ (2009: 50).  It was also around this time, he points out, that the 
notion of nationality began formally to be codified, leading to ‘la distinction 
contemporaine entre “nationaux” et “étrangers”, fondée sur une inégalité 
croissante en termes de droits civils et sur la privation des principaux 
attributs de la citoyenneté’ (ibid).  What is more, in addition to the 
increasing disparity in the civic rights granted to ‘nationals’ and 
‘foreigners’, it is Khiari’s contention that the notion of ‘nationality’, which 
entered into French law for the first time in 1889, already at this point had 
numerous cultural, ethnic and racial connotations.   
 
These 19th century political issues are relevant to today’s society because 
they are at the root of contemporary questions of identity which, as we 
have seen throughout the current work, have been at the forefront of 
political discourse over the years examined in the thesis.  Ever since the 
early years of the Third Republic, Khiari argues, French ‘national identity’ 
has contained two key aspects.  Firstly, there is the dimension usually 
understood as constituting national identity: that based around history, 
the ‘national story’ and ‘[le] mythe de la France éternelle aux origines 
prétendument gauloises’ (2009: 56).  It is this conception which is at the 
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surface of Sarkozy’s discourse on national identity, as can be seen in 
chapter 2.  But there is also, paradoxically, a second, transnational, 
dimension to ‘national identity’ based on ‘la suprématie blanche-
européenne-chrétienne’ (ibid), an idea which appears to bear some 
relation to Balibar’s conception of a supranational dimension of racism, or 
‘internationalisme nationaliste’ (1988: 91).  It could perhaps be argued 
that this colonial/racial conception of national/western identity can be 
seen in the subtexts of Sarkozy’s evocation of national identity, in which 
post-colonial immigrants, assumed to be Muslims, are painted as 
inherently incompatible with the French, or western, or ‘white’ way of life.  
In Khiari’s discussion of the Third Republic, therefore, there is a 
reiteration of one of the key aspects of MIR’s discourse: that 
republicanism should not be equated with freedom and equality, but with 
nationalism and colonialism.   
 
As with Bouteldja’s statement cited above, I would argue that this aspect 
of MIR’s ideology is to some extent correct, in that ‘universalist’ 
republican ideology was indeed used to justify colonialism, the concept of 
the mission civilisatrice finding its roots in the Revolution of 1789 and 
reaching its peak of influence under the Third Republic (Dulucq, Klein and 
Stora (eds.) 2008: 74).  The movement is also justified in demanding that 
the French state should look back critically at the colonial period, rather 
than dismissing such self-examination as ‘repentance’.  It is difficult to 
see, however, how any movement for social justice, even MIR, could 
object in principle to the Republic’s ideals of liberté, égalité and fraternité: 
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even if their implementation in reality has left a lot to be desired, a 
genuine ‘universalising’ of these ideals (much easier said than done, of 
course) would serve to remove many of the entirely justified grievances 
felt by post-colonial populations11. 
 
Inherent in MIR’s criticism of the idea of national identity, therefore, is a 
criticism of France’s political structures, and arguably of the nation-state 
itself.  Both are seen by MIR as perpetuating racism, xenophobia and 
inequality.  It evidently follows, then, that a rethinking of national identity 
is required: not an easy task in, as Sharif Gemie puts it, ‘the context of 
one of the most stubbornly old-fashioned state forms of the twenty-first 
century, doggedly loyal to nineteenth-century concepts of nation, culture 
and identity.’ (2010: 158).  In the next part of this section, I will consider 
whether it is possible to detect within MIR’s discourse the outlines of an 
alternative conception of national identity, and how this differs from the 
position of SOS. 
 
 
An alternative conception: multiculturalism and new citizenship 
 
One answer to this question can be found in an opinion piece published 
by the movement in Le Monde in 2005, in which the writers call into 
question the methods by which newcomers to society are expected to 
become French: 
                                                 
11 As may be recalled from the Introduction, the manifesto of the PIR indeed demands ‘la 
fraternité universelle et l’égalité entre les individus, entre les communautés et entre les 
peuples’ (‘Principes politiques généraux du Parti des Indigènes de la République’, 2010) 
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 “Le fait est que nous ne sommes pas plus “intégrationnistes” que 
“communautaristes”.  Nous ne considérons pas que la République fait un 
honneur particulier à ses anciens colonisés en les accueillant chez elle.  
Nous ne considérons pas qu’ils doivent lui en être reconnaissants.  Ils 
sont ici chez eux, elles sont ici chez elles.  Nous sommes ici chez nous, 
c’est-à-dire, que l’on ait ou non la nationalité française, dans un pays où 
chacune et chacun doit jouir des même droits, sans avoir l’obligation de 
se fondre dans une quelconque identité majoritaire.  Chez soi, c’est-à-
dire avec un droit absolu à l’ostentation de ce que l’on est.  Chez soi, 
c’est-à-dire dans une égalité de droit, de dignité, d’espérances.”  (Quoted 
by Lévy (2005: 122), my italics) 
 
MIR makes it clear that, contrary to the political consensus of my chosen 
period, the Republic is nothing to be revered or aspired to.  At the same 
time, the organisation rejects ‘integrationism’, which can be considered 
here as the centralisation and standardisation of French culture and 
identity, originating in the nation-building process of the 18th and 19th 
centuries, and arguably still visible in Sarkozy’s evocation of a 
single ’consensual’ national identity backed up with a patriotic ‘roman 
national’ conception of history.  MIR asks why immigrants and their 
descendants must have ‘l’obligation de se fondre dans une quelconque 
identité majoritaire’, rather than the right to keep hold of their own 
identities, integrationism presuming such an effort to be made.  One of 
the major differences between MIR’s approach and that of SOS is also 
reinforced in the quotation cited by Lévy above.  As will be clear from the 
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chapter up to this point, both movements reject Sarkozy’s conservative, 
backwards-looking conception of national identity, but they diverge on the 
question of the conclusions drawn from this rejection.  According to 
SOS’s ideal of the ‘République métissée’ there is still one unified 
Republic and still, essentially, one national identity.  They differ from 
Sarkozy in that they conceive of a more flexible national identity, enriched 
by the cultures of France’s immigrant populations.  MIR, on the other 
hand, ask uncontroversially for ‘une égalité de droit, de dignité, 
d’espérances’, but at the same time demand ‘un droit absolu à 
l’ostentation de ce que l’on est’.  It would appear therefore that the other 
side of the movement’s rejection of ‘integrationism’ is a support for a form 
of multiculturalism as a means of organising society, a position which 
places them directly at odds with prevailing political thought during the 
period covered by the thesis.  I will consider the substance of MIR’s 
proposed ‘multicultural’ society, and some of its potential drawbacks, later 
on in this chapter. 
 
Also notable in the opinion piece quoted above is MIR’s argument that 
‘Nous sommes ici chez nous, c’est-à-dire, que l’on ait ou non la 
nationalité française, dans un pays où chacune et chacun doit jouir des 
même droits’.  The impression given is that the movement is in favour of 
a decoupling of nationality from citizenship and civil rights, beyond that 
already envisaged by European integration and citizenship.  This is a 
subject which has been addressed relatively frequently in French political 
thought, notably by Balibar, who in 1992’s Les frontières de la démocratie 
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traces the modern conception of citizenship to the time of the Revolution 
(1992: 111), and then goes on to ask whether it is possible for a political 
community to found itself solely on universal human rights, or whether 
some form of discrimination between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ is in fact an 
intrinsic attribute of the nation-state (1992: 114).  In the case of MIR, 
however, it could perhaps be argued that the movement’s position on 
nationality and citizenship implicitly refers back to the Beur movement of 
the early- mid-1980s, of which MIR possibly sees itself as a descendant, 
even if, as was noted in chapter 1, it is arguably more radical and 
confrontational, and places far greater emphasis on the memory and 
legacies of colonialism (Hajjat, in Stora and Temime (eds.), 2007: 196).  
The similarities between the positions on citizenship of MIR and the 
Beurs can be seen by taking an example of Bouamama’s analysis of the 
political positions of the Convergence 84 march.  He argues, like MIR, 
that true equality will not exist until everybody benefits from the same 
rights regardless of nationality: 
 “En effet, si l’égalité est une exigence et un besoin des sociétés 
contemporaines, il faut supprimer tout ce qui peut aujourd’hui l’entraver.  
En particulier, l’égalité suppose que soit brisé le lien actuel entre 
nationalité et accès aux droits, c’est-à-dire, que la citoyenneté actuelle 
soit remplacée par une nouvelle citoyenneté.” (1994: 103) 
 
From the extract cited by Lévy, therefore, it is possible to see two aspects 
of MIR’s vision for an alternative society.  Firstly, there is a demand for 
populations of immigrant origin to express their own identity and culture, 
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rather than having to assimilate to a pre-existing national identity which 
requires these identities and cultures – and even memories and histories 
when they do not fit in to the official narrative – to be forgotten or 
suppressed.  Secondly, it is argued that civil rights should not be 
dependent on citizenship and nationality, a position which could perhaps 
be seen as challenging the Republic to live up to its claims of universality 
by making rights genuinely applicable to all populations, regardless of 
legal status.  Such positions can be seen as a critique and rejection of the 
double-bind identified by Ahmed Boubeker – ‘minorities’ are not 
recognised as ‘true French’, but at the same time are strongly 
discouraged from  developing their own identities: 
 “Privés d’accès à titre individuel aux positions sociales reconnues, 
on leur refuse aussi toute forme d’expression collective, perçue comme 
une dérive communautariste.  Invisibles dans les lieux de représentation 
de la démocratie française, on les accuse de casser l’égalité républicaine 
quand ils revendiquent de trouver leur place.” (2010: 275) 
 
As was the case with SOS, further indications of MIR’s positions on 
national identity can also be found in the movement’s reaction to the 
‘grand débat’ of late 2009.  Like SOS, MIR is critical of the political 
motivations for the debate, which is seen as an attempt to regain support 
ahead of the 2010 regional elections, and as a diversion from more 
important social issues.  More relevantly however, the press release 
reacting to the debate also takes in two distinctive aspects of the 
movement’s discourse.  Firstly, the link between republicanism, race and 
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national identity is reiterated: the debate is representative of ‘le choix 
stratégique de consolider le pilier blanc-européen-chrétien du “pacte 
républicain” dans le cadre du nouvel espace impérial européen en 
construction’ (Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, ‘Il faut une 
véritable alternative à la politique raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 
6.11.2009).  It may be recalled that this idea, that ‘national identity’ has a 
transnational dimension based on being white, Christian and European, 
features heavily in Khiari’s La contre-révolution coloniale en France, and 
it will be discussed further in chapter 6.  Secondly, it is made clear that 
even if the current controversy relates to Sarkozy and the UMP, ‘national 
identity’ is the subject of a consensus across mainstream politics: 
 “Il y a longtemps que la défense de “l’identite nationale” contre les 
cultures portées par les minorités originaires des anciennes colonies est 
un thème largement partagé à droite comme à gauche.  Il est, de ce fait, 
parfaitement vain et bien souvent hypocrite de prétendre s’opposer à la 
politique raciste du gouvernement en l’accusant d’aller chasser sur les 
terres du Front National.” (Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, ‘Il 
faut une véritable alternative à la politique raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 
6.11.2009) 
This positioning on the part of MIR emphasises a number of parts of their 
ideology.  Firstly, by calling into question the mainstream political system 
as a whole, the movement’s own autonomy is highlighted.  Secondly, it is 
made clear that the problems of French society – or at least, those 
related to race, discrimination and so on – are systemic, relating to the 
‘République coloniale’ supported by both parliamentary Left and Right.  
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And thirdly, linked to both of the above points, it is strongly implied that 
these problems will not be solved by the Socialist Party coming to power, 
as would be argued, MIR’s argument perhaps implies, by a mainstream 
movement like SOS Racisme.  As Bouteldja and Khiari argue in a 2011 
article, ‘on ne combattra pas le racisme en ayant pour unique adversaire 
la droite sarkoziste et l’extrême droite car l’un des vecteurs majeurs de la 
politique raciste est également le PS et certaines franges islamophobes 
de la “gauche de la gauche”’ (‘À quoi sert l’antiracisme universel?, 
16.6.2011)   
 
Leaving aside MIR’s criticisms of the debate and its ideological 
underpinnings, however, what does the movement’s alternative 
conception of national identity, alluded to in the title of the press release 
reacting to the 2009 debate (‘Il faut une véritable alternative à la politique 
raciste de l’”identite nationale”’), consist of?  To begin with, it is specified 
that MIR favours ‘une véritable alternative multiculturelle et décoloniale’.  
As noted earlier in this section, an emphasis on multiculturalism on the 
part of MIR can be seen as the logical extension of the movement’s 
rejection of ‘integrationism’ and the expectation that immigrants and their 
descendants must assimilate to pre-existing ‘republican values’.  
However, as has also been noted throughout the thesis, the prevailing 
French view on multiculturalism, amongst mainstream thinkers, politicians 
and social movements (including SOS Racisme) is that it is a danger to 
the Republic, leading to the formation of ghettos and the imposition of 
communautarisme.  It is evident that if MIR’s ideas were to be widely 
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accepted, it would require a major change in France’s political culture.  
Nevertheless, what does MIR’s proposed version of multiculturalism 
consist of?  Firstly, 
 “Il s’agit de mettre en place des dispositifs permettant la promotion 
des cultures populaires écrasées par deux siècles de centralisme 
parisien uniformisateur et par la mondialisation libérale, de reconnaître et 
d’encourager le développement des cultures portées par les populations 
issues de l’immigration coloniale, de favoriser enfin des échanges 
interculturels égalitaires.” (Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, ‘Il 
faut une véritable alternative à la politique raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 
6.11.2009) 
 
As is often the case with MIR, how this is to happen is not addressed, 
perhaps supporting the idea that the movement is more focused on ideas 
than on action – it could perhaps be argued that the organisation 
functions more like a thinktank, attempting to place radical ideas into the 
national political conversation, than a traditional activist movement.  
Leaving aside the point that it is not clear what the proposed ‘dispositifs’ 
involve, however, the quotation gives further insight into the multicultural 
society envisaged by MIR. Again, the long-standing political structures of 
the French state are called into question, in the shape of its 
‘centralisation’ and ‘uniformisation’, a position – like that relating to 
France’s rejection of ‘difference’ in a wider sense – which was set out in 
similar terms by Bouamama prior to the movement’s foundation (‘La 
construction nationale française s’est déroulée à partir d’une négation de 
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la diversité culturelle française et d’une lutte pour la destruction de toutes 
les cultures et langues régionales’ (1994: 230)).  This position provides 
further evidence for the movement’s rejection of the idea that there is a 
single ‘national identity’ that can be imposed from above – an idea 
strongly supported by Sarkozy over my chosen timeframe, as we have 
seen.  It is to be replaced, in MIR’s alternative view of society, by a 
support for the popular cultures ‘crushed’ by the centralising state.  As 
may be expected given its status as a post-colonial and anti-colonial 
movement, MIR emphasises the cultures of ‘les populations issues de 
l’immigration coloniale’, but the wording perhaps also implies a respect 
for the local and regional cultures suppressed (as Bouamama notes in 
the quotation above) in the process of nation-building.   
 
Following on from this point, there is perhaps the suggestion in MIR’s 
discourse of a redefinition of the idea of ‘equality’.  While the notion has 
generally been assumed to apply to equality between individuals – 
although what type of equality, of opportunity or of outcome, is another 
question – MIR appears to suggest in this press release that the concept 
could also apply to equality between cultures within France.  This 
interpretation of MIR’s ideology is supported by the manifesto of the PIR 
(Parti des Indigènes de la République), which promotes ‘la liberté [note, 
as with ‘equality’, the use of the traditional language of republicanism] des 
communautés particulières de préserver et de faire valoir leurs langues, 
leurs cultures et leurs spiritualités’ (Parti des Indigènes de la République, 
‘Principes politiques généraux du Parti des Indigènes de la République’, 
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2010).  However, this new conception of equality between cultures does 
not replace the idea of equality between individuals: the same document 
argues for ‘l’égalité effective entre les citoyens, dans l’égale dignité de 
leurs couleurs, de leurs origines, de leurs cultures et de leurs croyances.’  
It would appear that the central part of MIR’s alternative view of society – 
or, to put it another way, of the organisation’s conception of national 
identity – is multiculturalism and inter-cultural exchange, but this is to be 
placed alongside the more traditional idea of equality between individuals.  
The movement’s argument about equality within a proposed multicultural 
society therefore relates to two, linked, levels: the individual, but also the 
collective. 
 
MIR’s proposed ‘multiculturalism’ potentially raises questions that the 
movement has not fully answered.  Firstly, the term needs, if it is to form 
the basis of a new society, to be defined in greater detail: does it refer to 
the naturally occurring multiculturalism which exists in day-to-day life, or 
to multiculturalism as state policy?  Secondly, does it serve to distract 
from less radical policies which would actually be more beneficial to 
minority populations?  As Ndiaye argues: 
 “Il me semble que les personnes issues des migrations 
postcoloniales demandent avant tout aux autorités publiques qu’elles 
engagent une lutte efficace contre les discriminations et le racisme, [...] 
plutôt que d’obtenir la reconnaissance de leurs éventuels particularismes 
culturels.” (2011: 29) 
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Thirdly and finally, as Michel Wieviorka (in Bancel et al, 2010) points out, 
cultural identities are not ‘facts’ which are stable, but are constantly 
evolving (2010: 252).  Therefore, does the danger not exist that a 
conception of society based on cultural ‘communities’ may lead (like 
Sarkozy’s national identity discourse, albeit from a different direction) to a 
‘freezing’ of identities?  All of these questions would need to be 
addressed if this model of society was to become a reality.  As noted 
above however, MIR works more on ideas than practicality.  With this in 
mind, the movement’s proposals for a multicultural society can be seen 
less as a concrete model for reform than as an implicit critique of narrow 
and exclusive conceptions of national identity, and of a universalist 
republican political culture which has difficulty coping with a genuinely 
plural society. 
 
The press release reacting to the ‘great debate’ also offers two further 
types of reform that, in MIR’s view, must take place if France is to move 
away from a single, centrally-imposed form of national identity towards, 
as the organisation sees it, a model built around inter-cultural respect.  
The first of these relates to laïcité.  This idea refers, very briefly, to the 
religious neutrality of the state, but Sarkozy’s critics have accused him of 
overtly favouring Christianity, and of evoking the concept as a means of 
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stigmatising France’s Muslim population12.  This, however, is not the 
movement’s objection, in this case at least.  The press release states that: 
 “Une autre laïcité devra préserver la séparation de l’État et des 
religions mais considérer les spiritualités, chrétiennes, musulmanes, 
juives comme les religions dites traditionnelles d’origine africaine, 
antillaise ou d’ailleurs, comme autant de besoins sociaux et comme des 
composantes à part entière de l’identité de ce pays.” (Mouvement des 
Indigènes de la République, ‘Il faut une véritable alternative à la politique 
raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 6.11.2009) 
MIR’s position on laïcité in relation to national identity, then, would involve 
less of an overt reform than an extension.  The essence of the term – the 
separation between the state and religion – would be retained, but the 
major religions in France would be joined in official recognition by 
‘traditional’ religions from the former colonies.  This idea is in keeping with 
what we have seen so far about MIR’s position on ‘national identity’: of a 
society in which each person is entitled to their identity – even if this 
involves joining up in groups based on ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc. 
– rather than having to adapt to a pre-existing dominant identity which, 
arguably, is never truly available to those whose origins are in France’s 
former colonies.  
 
The final suggested area of reform relates to education, on which the 
document states: 
                                                 
12 See for example the 2012 article for Le Nouvel Observateur written by François 
Hollande’s 2012 campaign spokesman Bernard Cazeneuve (‘Comment Nicolas Sarkozy 
a bradé la laïcité’, 2.4.2012) 
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 “Le multiculturalisme et l’interculturalisme réellement assumés ont 
également comme impératif une reforme des programmes de 
l’enseignement destinée à battre en brèche le national-chauvinisme et la 
suprématie blanche qui les caractérisent actuellement.” (‘Il faut une 
véritable alternative à la politique raciste de l’”identite nationale”’, 2009) 
It is undoubtedly true that the education system is key to the formation of 
a sense of national identity, and quite possible that it teaches (in 
particular) History in a way which serves to alienate those with ‘colonial’ 
roots.  It would be useful, however, to have more information about how 
the system should be changed: is the idea to teach more colonial history?  
To establish separate schools for different communities (a form of 
segregation likely to be unacceptable to the vast majority of public 
opinion)?  To teach all pupils about the different communities and 
cultures in France (again, very much against republican principles, plus 
any understanding gained would be superficial at best)?  It almost goes 
without saying, furthermore, that whichever type of reform is meant by 
MIR, the movement is diametrically opposed to the mainstream political 
climate in the period under discussion, as typified by a President who has 
repeatedly made it clear that, in his view, there is just one history of 
France, which is to be learned and respected by every one of the 
country’s citizens. 
 
This chapter has considered national identity, the theme which arguably 
defined the period examined in the thesis.  I have attempted to define 
what it is about Sarkozy’s discourse that both SOS and MIR object to, 
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and what their alternative conceptions of French society consist of.  
Answering these questions gives clear insights into their reaction to the 
political context of 2005-2009 – a fundamental issue in the thesis – and 
furthermore allows me to draw conclusions about their ideological 
positions, with particular reference to their relationship with France’s 
proclaimed political culture of universalist republicanism.  I began by 
looking at SOS Racisme, which rejects Sarkozy’s discourse on the 
grounds that it abuses the vocabulary of republicanism, presents 
immigration solely as a threat rather than a potential opportunity, and 
paints national identity as something inflexible and intolerant rather than 
something open to change and evolution.  SOS’s alternative conception 
of society is based on the promotion of a République métissée, a more 
liberal and open version of the Republic which accepts cultural input from 
immigrant populations, but leaves the basic structures of French society 
unchanged.  I then moved on to look at the Mouvement des Indigènes de 
la République, which like SOS rejects Sarkozy’s conservative and 
exclusionary vision of national identity, but sees it not as a perversion of 
virtuous republican ideology but as inherent to France’s social and 
political structures, seen as embodying racial hierarchy and colonialism.  
MIR’s alternative view of society, therefore, is based not around mild 
reform but a fundamental rethinking, promoting multiculturalism and the 
right to define your identity however you wish – even on an ethnic or 
religious basis – rather than having to adapt to a pre-existing national 
identity.  It almost goes without saying that, in adopting this stance, MIR 
places itself directly at odds with a political context in which 
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multiculturalism is seen as synonymous with communautarisme, and thus 
a threat to the very existence of the Republic.  In relation to SOS on the 
other hand, it is quite possible to imagine the principle of the République 
métissée being adopted by the political mainstream without disrupting the 
republican consensus in contemporary France.  It remains to be seen 
whether François Hollande or the socialist majority in government from 
2012 will take any steps in this direction.  In the next chapter I will 
continue the thematic analysis of the two movements by looking at their 
positions on another key issue: that of colonialism, its legacies in 
contemporary France, and the question of how much emphasis should be 
placed by the anti-racist movement on colonial memory. 
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Chapter 5 
SOS, MIR and colonialism 
 
 
As we have seen in chapters 2 and 3, colonial memory, and the part it 
should play in contemporary French society, was a major issue during the 
period examined in this thesis.  It is also one which, when applied to two 
contrasting anti-racist groups, forms the basis of a profitable study of 
some of the ideological divisions within anti-racism, and of the differing 
relationships between anti-racist movements and mainstream political 
discourse.  As with the other two themes examined in the three central 
case-study chapters, my chosen movements’ respective positions on 
republicanism play some part in the formation of their views on 
colonialism.  For MIR, colonialism and the Republic are intimately linked, 
with this relationship being seen as central in understanding 
contemporary French society.  SOS, however, is substantially more wary 
about making this kind of critique, the association seeing the Republic as 
essentially a force for good: a promoter of equality rather than a colonial 
oppressor.    
 
In this chapter, using as before material from interviews, press releases 
and official publications, I intend to consider the positions of SOS 
Racisme and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République in relation 
to the issue of colonialism.  As the chapter will make clear, the two 
organisations are largely opposed in their viewpoints on the use of the 
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legacies of France’s colonial past, both within anti-racism and within 
French society as a whole.  It could perhaps be argued that, in this way, 
they are representative of the divisions exposed in society by the debate.  
Very broadly speaking, SOS rejects any recourse to colonial memory 
amongst both post-colonial populations and their sympathisers, preferring 
to concentrate on inequality and discrimination happening in the present, 
and seeing too much focus on the past as potentially placing these 
populations permanently in the role of victims.  For MIR on the other hand, 
the question of colonialism and its legacies in contemporary society is of 
paramount importance: the ideological justification for colonialism is held 
to exist within France’s republican political structures; representations of 
colonial populations are seen as still being at work in the discrimination 
faced by their descendants in contemporary society; and the police and 
justice systems are seen as treating post-colonial populations comparably 
to their ancestors in the colonial period.  Despite the substantial 
differences in the positions of the two movements, it could perhaps be 
argued that, paradoxically, both SOS and MIR see contemporary post-
colonial populations in terms of victimhood: that is to say, as being victims 
of the colonial past.  They differ, however, in the conclusions drawn from 
this understanding: whereas SOS sees this as a negative representation 
which impedes collective action, MIR sees it as a constructive and 
enabling representation which fosters collective action. 
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The first section of the chapter will look at the viewpoints of SOS, but 
before doing this I would like briefly to review the political context in 
relation to colonialism and its place in society. 
 
The early part of the 21st century, during which my timeframe falls, was a 
period in which issues around France’s colonial past were the subject of 
heated and passionate debate.  As Respect Mag’s 2010 ‘Appel pour une 
République multiculturelle et postraciale’, launched by authors including 
the post-colonial historian Pascal Blanchard and the French football 
captain turned anti-racist activist Lilian Thuram, summed up this period: 
 “Cinquante-cinq ans après Dien Bien Phu et le début du conflit 
algérien (1954), [la] politique de non-mémoire semble se fissurer 
aujourd’hui.  Le silence n’est plus possible.  Une page est tournée, au 
cours de laquelle nous avons pris conscience de la fracture coloniale 
dans la société française.  Cette prise de conscience a été portée par le 
travail des historiens, les commémorations engagées sur la traite et les 
abolitions de l’esclavage depuis 1998, les demandes sociales d’une 
mémoire apaisée mais aussi, paradoxalement, par les “dérapages” de la 
loi datant de février 2005 sur le “rôle positif de la colonisation”” (2010, 
accessed at www.respectmag.com) 
This proposed law of 23rd February 2005 was particularly controversial, 
arguably bringing to prominence the fracture coloniale13 touched upon 
                                                 
13
 The idea of la fracture coloniale was popularised by Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire 
in their 2005 book of the same name.  As they note in the introduction, ‘Ce concept 
voudrait à la fois signifier la tension et les effets de la postcolonialité: il recouvre des 
réalités multiples et des situations hétérogènes, dans la mesure où ces réalités et ces 
situations peuvent être éclairées, en partie, par des processus de longue durée, reliés à 
la situation coloniale.’ (2005: 13)   
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above to a greater extent than any other event over the period.  It was to 
evoke the ‘le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, notamment 
en Afrique du Nord’ (LOI n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005, accessed at 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr) and order their teaching in schools, a move 
seen by critics such as Gérard Noiriel as an attempt to impose 'une 
logique mémorielle fondée sur des jugements de valeur' (2007b: 85).  
The then President Jacques Chirac, seeing that a poisonous national 
argument would ensue, personally ordered the removal of the offending 
passage.  As Dulucq, Klein and Stora point out however, the debate 
around colonialism was intimately bound up with the debate on national 
identity which, as was discussed in chapter 4, arguably defined my 
chosen period: 
 “Le passé colonial constitue l’un des points de cristallisation de la 
réflexion fébrile qui s’est nouée autour de l’”identité nationale”, au sein 
d’une société française éminemment diverse dans ses origines.” (2008: 3) 
 
This was especially noticeable in the discourse of Sarkozy and his 
political and intellectual allies on ‘repentance’.  This discourse is closely 
linked to Sarkozy’s usage of history: as will be clear from the thesis so far, 
he favours the idea that there is a single history of France, to be learned 
and respected by every French inhabitant, and rejects the argument that 
history is made up of a multiplicity of competing interpretations.  Those 
who deviate from his viewpoint, therefore, find themselves accused of 
‘repentance’, ‘self-hate’ and ‘denigration of the nation’, presented as 
being at the root of the ‘crisis of identity’ which Sarkozy presents himself 
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as the man to solve.  As may be recalled from chapter 2, targeted by this 
discourse are two groups: firstly, historians and academics who look back 
critically at France’s colonial past; and secondly immigrants and their 
descendants, whose family background in the colonies leads them to see 
French history differently to the ostensibly consensual ‘national story’ 
promoted by Sarkozy.  As De Cock et al note, Sarkozy strongly rejects 
post-colonial ideas.  The authors link his refusal to 'repent' about France's 
colonial past with his refusal to accept that prejudices formed in colonial 
times could influence the situation of immigrants and 'ethnic minorities' in 
contemporary French society (2008: 159), and argue that he 
systematically associates ’le souci pour les violences passées’ with ‘[le] 
“refus de s’intégrer” de certains immigrés’ (2008: 157).  For Sarkozy 
therefore, post-colonial thinking and colonial memory (or at least, forms of 
colonial memory based around criticism and questioning rather than 
justification and celebration) are inherently incompatible with national 
identity, and by extension with the Republic in a wider sense, as they are 
contrary to his favoured ideal of assimilation, seen as implying complete 
acceptance of the official version of history.  Keeping in mind this context, 
I will now start by considering the position on colonialism of SOS 
Racisme. 
 
 
SOS and colonialism: the perils of victimisation 
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While Sarkozy's positioning, then, is relatively unambiguous, the 
characterisation of SOS made in the first paragraph of this chapter – as a 
movement which entirely rejects the idea that colonial memory has any 
part to play in anti-racism – deserves (although it is largely accurate) to 
be nuanced somewhat in my analysis.  As the interview with Dominique 
Sopo and former SOS vice-President Samuel Thomas in Qu’est-ce que 
SOS Racisme makes clear, the organisation is opposed to France’s 
apparent ‘horreur de revenir sur les pages sombres de son passé’ (2006: 
116).  Attempting to forget or cover up the darker aspects of French 
history, according to this viewpoint, is harmful to French society and its 
prospects for social cohesion, and can lead to the perpetuation of harmful 
stereotypes and discrimination, a position which, as we will see later on in 
this chapter, is surprisingly similar to that of MIR.  As Sopo and Thomas 
argue: 
 “Ne pas revenir sur l’esclavage, c’est en quelque sorte ne pas 
revenir sur l’idée selon laquelle le Noir serait un grand enfant ou un 
sauvage.  Ne pas revenir sur la guerre d’Algerie, c’est entretenir l’idée 
selon laquelle les Algériens, et par extension les Maghrébins et les 
personnes d’origine maghrébine nées en France, seraient des individus 
violents et toujours prêts à vous poignarder dans le dos.” (ibid) 
For SOS therefore, historical work on issues such as colonialism and 
slavery has an important role to play in putting such issues in the past 
and coming to terms with them, eventually leading to a genuinely shared 
history, which like the organisation’s ideal Republic, is not ‘frozen’ and 
exclusionary but open to evolution and discussion.  It would perhaps be 
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more accurate, consequently, to say not that SOS is opposed to colonial 
memory per se, but that it rejects any attempt to bring it out of the domain 
of history.  That is to say, it rejects the idea that it should affect the way in 
which post-colonial populations are seen and treated in contemporary 
France; it rejects the idea that it should form the backbone of these 
populations’ identities; and it rejects the idea that immigrants and their 
descendants have the right to see themselves as victims solely because 
of their colonial heritage.  In this positioning, SOS is partially supported by 
Noiriel, who argues that the stereotypes and discrimination faced by post-
colonial populations 'ne s'expliquent pas, principalement, par l'”imaginaire 
colonial”' (2007b: 24), but who elsewhere provides little comfort for SOS 
or the wider anti-racist movement, claiming that such stereotypes and 
discrimination are caused primarily by recurrent media images of violence 
in the banlieues, Islamist terrorism and wars in the middle-east, and that 
'on ne peut pas lutter contre cela avec les outils et les catégories de 
pensée de l'antiracisme actuel' (ibid).  Most relevantly for this thesis 
however, it is in this rejection of post-colonialism that the positioning of 
SOS diverges substantially from that of MIR, which sees understanding 
the legacies of colonialism as the key to understanding modern French 
society.  And it is to this positioning that I now turn. 
 
SOS’s discourse on the extent to which the colonial past can be used to 
explain the present is the subject of a detailed analysis by Sopo, in his 
2005 book SOS antiracisme.  It is his view that two related worldviews in 
relation to the theme – worldviews he refers to as ‘la mauvaise 
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conscience postcoloniale’ and ‘le discours exotico-victimaire’ – have 
proved highly detrimental to anti-racism, or at least to the form of anti-
racism, based on republican principles of equality, seen as appropriate by 
SOS.  According to Sopo’s argument, these two discourses have been 
harmful in two ways: to the relationship between (presumably white) 
French anti-racists and post-colonial populations, and to the self-
perceived identities of immigrants and their descendants.  I will begin by 
looking at the first of these arguments. 
 
Sopo makes clear that he rejects colonial nostalgia, and the vision of the 
‘ex-colonisé’ – ‘barbare et rétif aux lumières civilisatrices que l’Occident 
prétendait vouloir lui apporter’ (2005: 16) – which comes along with it.  
However, perhaps influenced by Pierre-André Taguieff, who in La force 
du préjugé (1987) claimed that anti-racism all too often contented itself 
with being the ‘double’ of racism, Sopo argues that this negative vision of 
colonial and post-colonial populations has an unwelcome mirror image 
amongst those members of the French population who see themselves 
as anti-racist.  This mirror image replaces the representation of colonial 
‘natives’ (and implicitly their children and grandchildren in contemporary 
France) as uncivilised and uncivilisable savages with one which places 
them in the role of victims.  As Sopo puts it: 
  “Effrayées par les crimes passés (et présents) de l’Occident, les 
personnes submergées par la mauvaise conscience postcoloniale ne 
conçoivent leurs relations avec le tiers-monde et avec les populations 
d’origine maghrébine et africaine que comme une perpétuelle action de 
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repentir.  Repentir d’autant plus justifié, dans leur esprit, qu’il s’exerce à 
l’endroit d’individus assignés au rôle de victimes tous terrains et toutes 
époques.” (2005: 17) 
 
For Sopo and SOS, this discourse of ‘victimisation’ is a trap which must 
be avoided by any anti-racist movement which is serious about 
attempting to solve France’s social problems.  It leads, in their view, to a 
situation in which those belonging to populations of immigrant origin 
cease to be considered as individuals, and begin to be considered – in 
contradiction with republican ideology which, theoretically at least, judges 
individuals in their own right rather than as representatives of an ethnic 
group or religious affiliation – as existing solely in the ‘exotic’ category in 
which they have mentally been placed.  It also leads, Sopo argues, to a 
situation in which ‘la critique d’un comportement individuel équivaut à la 
critique d’une population déterminée’ (2005: 18).  That is to say, that 
because whole populations have stopped being seen as individuals, 
instead being placed in a box labelled ‘post-colonial-thus-victim’, any 
criticism of individual behaviour within these populations becomes 
perceived as criticism of a whole community, and any critical examination 
is equated with stigmatisation.  And this situation, in turn, leads to the 
denial of the existence of problems which genuinely exist, such as 
delinquency in the banlieues, leaving the field clear for racist 
interpretations from the extreme-right.  Again, this argument is on very 
similar lines to that of Taguieff, who is critical of the way in which anti-
racist movements can inadvertently cement social divisions via a 
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discourse which makes stereotypical assumptions about the racial and 
cultural identity of whole groups, as if all members of communities are the 
same, and categories and affiliations are fixed (1987: 380).  It is 
somewhat ironic that SOS, having been (implicitly or explicitly) the target 
of Taguieff's rhetorical ire in the late 1980s, has come to agree with many 
of his critiques and prescriptions in relation to anti-racism, rejecting 
communitarian / sectarian rights and identity movements in favour of the 
universalised, secular principles which he himself espouses.      
 
To sum up this argument then, it is SOS’s position that too many of those 
who see themselves as anti-racist, although well-meaning, in fact harm 
their cause by replacing racist representations of colonial and post-
colonial populations with a discourse which sees such populations solely 
in terms of victimhood.  As was also the case with communautarisme, 
discussed in chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis, this argument is rational and 
fully consistent with the movement’s proclaimed ideology, but at the same 
time it is arguably of little utility as the basis of a campaigning strategy in 
the particular political context examined in the present work.  Sopo, it 
must be acknowledged, takes care to point out that ‘la surdélinquance est 
le fruit des conditions économiques, sociales et urbaines dans lesquelles 
les populations concernées ont été placées’ (2005: 20), thus rejecting any 
analysis which presents young Black or Arab men as inherently 
predisposed to delinquency, and taking the opportunity to reiterate his 
frequent calls for investment in the quartiers and action against racial 
discrimination.  What is more, he acknowledges in a footnote the 
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weaknesses of the French justice system, and the continuing influence on 
it of ingrained negative images of post-colonial populations, a problem 
also highlighted by MIR.  He writes: 
 “Les institutions de l’État impliquées dans le traitement pénal de la 
délinquance – la police et la justice – fonctionnent partiellement comme le 
reste de la société.  Les clichés, les stéréotypes et les à priori y jouent un 
rôle.  La justice est peut-être réputée aveugle mais ceux qui la rendent 
ont des yeux...” (2005: 19) 
Again, these are valuable points, and well made.  The problems faced by 
SOS in respect to this positioning, however, are the result of the political 
context examined in the thesis – in particular, of course, Sarkozy’s 
discourse on immigration, security and national identity.  This discourse, 
repeated unceasingly in the media over my chosen timeframe, served to 
turn terms such as ‘delinquency’ and ‘repentance’ – both used, as we 
have seen, in SOS’s official publications – into highly emotive trigger-
words evoking threats to society from immigrants and their 
‘unassimilated’ descendants.  Despite the nuances of SOS's discourse, 
therefore, it can appear on the surface as if the association is supporting 
what Ahmed Boubeker calls 'un consensus politicien [qui] tend à réduire 
le malaise des banlieues à un problème d'ordre public causé par 
quelques minorités délinquantes' (2010: 271).  
 
It is for this reason that it would have been difficult for SOS to base a 
campaign around such terms: any nuances would disappear when faced 
by the dominant interpretations of Sarkozy and his allies.  Indeed, the 
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movement itself appears to have been of a similar mind.  Despite the 
importance of the issue and its prominence in political debate, there do 
not appear to be any examples of SOS campaigns with an explicitly post-
colonial dimension over my chosen period.  Their lobbying for equality of 
opportunity and action against discrimination, as we shall see in chapter 6, 
focused instead on socio-economic factors, with an ideological basis in 
classical republican ‘colour-blindness’. 
 
The second part of SOS’s critical discourse on ‘la mauvaise conscience 
postcoloniale’ and ‘le discours exotico-victimaire’ relates to what the 
movement sees as the negative consequences of colonial memory on the 
anti-racist struggle, as well as to its negative consequences on the self-
perception and identity of post-colonial populations.  I will begin by 
looking at the first of these issues, summed up well by the following 
argument from Sopo, an argument whose different elements, in particular 
that relating to agency, will be dealt with shortly: 
 “Définir l’antiracisme permet également de dire ce qu’il n’est pas: 
la défense d’une minorité contre une majorité ou celle d’une minorité 
contre une autre minorité.  Or, le discours exotico-victimaire [...] ne peut 
atteindre le but de l’antiracisme (pour des raisons ontologiques – on ne 
peut pas atteindre l’égale dignité quand on se vit comme une victime – et 
pour des raisons stratégiques – on ne se mobilise pas quand on se vit 
comme une victime).” (2005: 26) 
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This quotation clearly highlights SOS’s position on what anti-racism 
should and should not be: the organisation, as can be seen throughout 
this thesis, sees it as a fight for equality, in common with the proclaimed 
principles of the Republic.  This is conceived of in concrete, socio-
economic terms in the movement’s discourse on equality of opportunity, 
but also, secondarily, in less measurable ways such as the ‘égale dignité’ 
touched on above.  SOS’s republican positioning can also be seen in the 
statement that anti-racism is not ‘the defence of a minority against a 
majority’ or ‘the defence of a minority against another minority’.  This 
argument is of a piece with the movement’s hostility towards 
communautarisme, a central understanding of which being that, as 
Rigaud puts it, ‘on se réunit dans votre communauté, pour défendre les 
valeurs contre ceux des autres’ (Interview, 29.3.2011).  If anti-racism is to 
be, as envisaged by SOS, a republican combat, it must in the view of the 
association be at least theoretically ‘universal’: open to all and based 
upon consensual ideological principles.  It can be surmised therefore that 
for SOS,  the ‘ideal type’ anti-racist organisation is something very much 
like itself, while smaller autonomous movements which reject republican 
ideology and base themselves on ethnic or religious grounds are to be 
viewed with considerable suspicion.  This position is consistent with 
SOS’s ideology, but the organisation’s inflexibility in seeing republican 
universalism as the only acceptable organisational principle for anti-racist 
movements arguably has the effect of making it appear irrelevant to those 
who suffer most from racism and discrimination: post-colonial populations 
who have seen the Republic consistently fail to live up to its promises, 
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consequently turning to religiously or ethnically based groups in a search 
for pride and identity in an apparently hostile society.  It should be 
acknowledged that SOS is aware of this problem, and argues that 
genuine action and investment to fight the problems of the banlieues will 
increase attachment to the Republic and its values by translating into 
action its rhetoric on equality14.  While this is potentially an effective 
strategy in the long run, SOS’s attachment to moderate mainstream 
republicanism can have the effect of making it appear out of touch with 
the realities of life in France’s poor suburbs, and thus unrepresentative of 
the populations in whose name it theoretically speaks.  In this positioning, 
SOS is representative of the wider mainstream left in France.  As Herman 
Lebovics argues, from the mid-late 1980s: 
 “This sentiment [of unitary republicanism] prevailed, finally, on the 
left.  Official recognition of mixity, multiplicity and difference faded in the 
move to close ranks against the sowers of ethnic discord.” (2004: 187) 
Although the principles of universalist republicanism make an excellent 
starting point for anti-racist ideology – a point related to Chantal Mouffe’s 
argument (1992: 1) that the assertion within modern democracy that all 
human beings are free and equal can be used as the basis for a radical 
refoundation of the concept – without a certain amount of flexibility, to at 
least acknowledge the legacy of colonialism and the continuing impact of 
ethnic origin in French society, both SOS and the parliamentary left will 
                                                 
14 See for example the critical and nuanced discussion of the State’s urban policies in 
Manifeste pour l’égalité (2007), in which the association argues that ‘si l’on veut que la 
politique de la ville réussisse, il est impératif de tenir deux exigences.  Il faut qu’elle soit 
un “plus” pour les populations qui seraient concernées afin de rétablir une égalité réelle 
entre les populations et les territoires.  Mais il faut également que les outils dont elle se 
dote deviennent des outils d’excellence qui se généraliseraient dans l’ensemble de la 
société.’ (2007: 15) 
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find it difficult to solve this crisis of legitimacy and representation.  This 
issue will be discussed further in the next chapter.   
 
At the centre of SOS’s suspicion of post-colonialism, however, is its 
rejection of the discourse of ‘victimhood’.  As we have already seen in this 
chapter, the movement rejects the ‘well-meaning’ liberal discourse which 
as a result of past colonial crimes (of which SOS does not deny the 
existence), paints immigrants and their descendants as eternal victims.  
On similar lines, the organisation refuses to accept – as can be seen in 
the quotation above – the idea that a sense of shared victimhood can 
form the basis of an anti-racist movement: it is regarded as an 
impediment to mobilisation and a justification for inaction (because it can 
become seen as an excuse and all-purpose explanation for the situation 
of post-colonial populations in contemporary France), and as an obstacle 
to the formation of a society based on universal equality.  It could also 
perhaps be argued that victimhood does not lend itself easily to the 
construction of a positive identity upon which to mobilise.   As we will see 
later on in this section, this refusal to link the treatment of ‘native’ 
populations during the colonial period with the treatment of their 
descendants in modern-day French society leads to a considerable 
hostility to movements like MIR, which place this link at the centre of their 
proclaimed worldview. 
Similarly, SOS rejects ‘victimhood’ as a basis for the identity of post-
colonial populations, seeing the risk of ‘une concurrence morbide des 
drames subis dans l’Histoire par telle ou telle population’ (2005: 27), and 
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a situation in which such populations find ‘une fierté à travers un statut de 
victimes’ (ibid).  Again, it should be pointed out that SOS does not deny 
the importance of the colonial past, and sees it as an important area of 
historical study.  What the movement does reject, however, is any 
situation in which the suffering of different populations becomes an 
essential support for their identities, which therefore come to conceive of 
themselves in terms of confrontation and hierarchy with other identities.  
According to Sopo, slavery or the Holocaust, for example, should be seen 
as ‘des leçons pour l’humanité’ and ‘des messages universels sur les 
méfaits de la folie humaine’ (2005: 29), rather than as central to the 
identity of Black and Jewish populations respectively.  Furthermore, he 
argues that for populations who have suffered from racism, anti-Semitism 
and discrimination, pride should come from acquiring a status as a full 
citizen, while coming to terms with history rather than letting it define you.  
For Sopo, conflating, for instance, Black experience as a whole with that 
of victims of slavery, is to reduce Black people to the status of passive 
indigènes, incapable of writing their own history (2005: 32): a position 
which, according to this argument, serves (ironically) to maintain the 
colonial stereotype that ‘native’ populations had no worthwhile history of 
their own, one controversially reinforced by Sarkozy in his 2007 speech in 
Dakar, in which he stated that ‘l'homme africain n'est pas assez entré 
dans l'Histoire’, due to a mentality in which ‘il n'y a de place ni pour 
l'aventure humaine ni pour l'idée de progrès.’  (Discours de Nicolas 
Sarkozy à Dakar, 26.7.2007, accessed at http://www.geo-
phile.net/IMG/pdf/discours_de_dakar-2.pdf)  
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SOS’s warnings about the dangers of self-definition as indigènes are 
reflective of the movement’s rejection of the use of the colonial past as a 
way of understanding and constructing the present, and also reflective of 
their rejection of victimhood as a basis for personal identity.  Whilst it is 
not clear whether MIR is specifically targeted, it is clear that their way of 
thinking is not seen by SOS as an appropriate way of organising the anti-
racist movement.  As Sopo puts it in the postface to Manifeste pour 
l’égalité: 
 “Alors, ne cédez pas aux sirènes de ceux qui vous diraient que 
vous êtes traités aujourd’hui dans les quartiers comme l’étaient vos 
ancêtres dans les colonies.  Ne cédez pas aux sirènes de ceux qui vous 
expliquent que, finalement, rien n’a changé et rien ne changera jamais.  
Nos grands-parents et nos parents se sont battus pour préparer un avenir 
meilleur à leurs enfants.  Respectons leur combat car il n’a certainement 
été vain!” (2007: 182) 
For Sopo and SOS then, drawing parallels between the colonial period 
and contemporary France is not a source of pride and unity, or even a 
legitimate basis for a protest movement, but a sign of resignation and 
submission.  They argue furthermore that such comparisons are 
inaccurate, as colonial populations had few rights, little freedom and no 
citizenship, whereas their descendants benefit from all three.   
 
Aspects of this argument can and have been called into question.  Saïd 
Bouamama for example, in a response to the criticisms received by MIR, 
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questions ‘la dénonciation de l’amalgame que réaliserait l’appel entre la 
période coloniale et la situation actuelle’ (2009: 109).  To say, as SOS 
implies in the quotation above, that movements like MIR which place an 
emphasis on post-colonial thinking argue simply that banlieue inhabitants 
are treated the same as their ancestors in the colonies is, for Bouamama, 
evidence of wilful misunderstanding and stereotyping.  As he points out: 
  “Mettre en analogie deux facteurs ne signifie pas qu’on les 
considère comme identiques.  C’est tout simplement souligner qu’ils ont à 
voir l’un avec l’autre ou qu’ils empruntent des processus, des logiques et 
des représentations qui sont en proximité.  Parler de racisme post-
colonial, ce n’est donc pas non plus prétendre que les descendants de 
colonisés vivent une situation identique en tous points à celle de leurs 
ancêtres.” (2009: 110) 
SOS, as was touched upon in the introduction to this chapter, chooses 
not to emphasise colonial memory and post-colonial thinking, preferring 
to prioritise racism and discrimination happening in the present.  This 
emphasis, although not problematic in itself, leads to the organisation 
taking little care to acknowledge the nuances in the worldviews of 
movements which do emphasise these themes, as can be seen in the 
difference between Sopo’s simplistic denunciation of ‘ceux qui vous 
diraient que vous êtes traités aujourd’hui dans les quartiers comme 
l’étaient vos ancêtres dans les colonies’ and Bouamama’s argument that 
the question is more complicated than MIR’s critics allow, taking in ‘des 
processus, des logiques et des représentations’, perpetuated both 
consciously and unconsciously over generations.   
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Furthermore, SOS’s scepticism about the possibility of post-colonial 
explanations to contemporary social issues causes the movement to 
downplay the importance of the theme in its campaigning discourse, thus 
downplaying in turn its importance in society.  This arguably leads SOS to 
appear remote from the problems of poor French inhabitants of colonial 
origin, who experience racism and discrimination precisely because of 
these origins.  As Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch puts it: 
 “Une bonne partie des Français voient les descendants d’immigrés 
d’origine coloniale avec un regard particulier parce qu’ils les relient aux 
“indigènes”, c’est-à-dire à une caste inférieure légalement.” (2009: 165) 
Although the movement, unlike Sarkozy and his allies in politics and the 
media, acknowledges the importance of the colonial period as an area of 
critical historical study, it appears to see a divide between the colonial 
past and post-colonial present which, at the time of writing, is a long way 
from existing in reality. 
 
So, how can SOS’s discourse on colonialism over my chosen timeframe 
be summed up?  Much as with national identity, discussed in the previous 
chapter, the organisation is charting an awkward course between the 
intolerant conservatism of Sarkozy and the radical positioning of an 
autonomous, anti-system movement such as MIR.  In the previous case, 
this led to the rejection of both multiculturalism (as favoured by MIR) and 
Sarkozy’s inflexible and arguably exclusionary conception of national 
identity, in favour of a consensual and moderate liberal position focused 
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on the idea of a République métissée.  In this case, as noted above, SOS 
does not accept (at least not entirely) Sarkozy’s discourse on 
‘repentance’, seeing the colonial past as an important area of critical 
historical study.  Elsewhere however, despite the intense political and 
academic debate over the colonial past during my chosen period, the 
theme is downplayed by the movement.  Perhaps because of the 
awkward questions it raises about the association’s favoured ideology of 
universalist republicanism, SOS rejects the post-colonial interpretation of 
society, according to which stereotypes, representations and logics 
inherited from the colonial period are central to the racism and 
discrimination faced by post-colonial populations in contemporary France 
(Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), 2005).  This rejection, supported 
by a discourse which presents as a danger the perception and self-
perception of these populations as ‘victims’, serves to cut off the 
organisation from an important and enduringly relevant area of debate.  
Whilst SOS’s emphasis on practical action against racial discrimination 
and in favour of equality of opportunity is potentially highly beneficial to 
French society, the lack of importance it places on post-colonialism is a 
possible weakness in their discourse.  The movement is aiming to treat 
the symptoms of France’s social problems, but at the same time it 
chooses not to focus on one of the major causes: as Silverman puts it, in 
an important argument of the type not fully accepted by SOS, 'The 'post-
colonial' era is not a clean break with the colonial past; it is thoroughly 
determined by it.' (1992: 110)  Or to put it another way, returning to the 
Respect Mag appeal cited at the start of the chapter:  
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 “La France [...] est une des rares nations où les traumatismes du 
passé sont encore visibles dans le présent.  Identités, enjeux politiques et 
représentivité, égalité sociale, discriminations...  Autant de questions 
essentielles qui trouvent une partie de leurs origines dans ce temps 
colonial.” (‘Appel pour une République multiculturelle et postraciale’, 
www.respectmag.com, 2010)   
Having considered in the first part of this chapter the reluctance of SOS to 
acknowledge the importance of colonialism to contemporary society, due 
to potential dangers around confining post-colonial populations to an 
identity of victimhood, and perhaps also due to a disinclination to make a 
societal critique which links its favoured republican ideology with colonial 
racism and exploitation, in the second I will examine the positions of MIR, 
for whom, in contrast, this question is absolutely central.        
 
 
MIR and colonialism: the all-encompassing colonial Republic 
 
MIR's emphasis on colonialism takes a number of different forms, of 
which two are particularly notable in the context of this thesis.  The first of 
these relates to the continuities seen by the movement between the 
administrative and legal treatment of colonial and post-colonial 
populations.  The second relates to the link made by MIR between 
republican ideology and colonialism from the late 19th century to the 
present day.  In both these ways, MIR's positions are in complete contrast 
to those of SOS, which does not see the Republic's past links with 
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colonialism as a reason for calling its underlying ideology into question, 
and as we have seen, is exceptionally wary about making links between 
the colonial past and the post-colonial present.  Having examined these 
key aspects of MIR's anti-colonial ideology, I will go on to consider what 
this anti-colonialism means in practice: that is to say, what the influence 
of this ideology is on MIR's strategy and practical aims. 
 
One of the major contentions made by MIR in relation to the legacy of 
colonialism in contemporary French society is that there is a continuity 
between the legal and juridical methods used in the colonial period and 
those used in recent years, particularly in France's poor suburbs, home to 
many of the descendants of formerly colonised populations.  As the 
French-Cameroonian political philosopher Achille Mbembe notes, this 
continuity affects post-colonial populations regardless of legal status.  He 
argues that: 
 “[A] conflation is occurring between colonial modes of control, 
treatment and segregation, the treatment in metropolitan France of men 
and women judged undesirable, and the treatment of citizens considered 
to be second-class simply because they are not “French of pure stock” or 
“of the white race”.” (2009: 52) 
 
MIR's position concerning this argument can be illustrated with an 
example in which the movement's discourse on colonialism coincides with 
one of the key events in my chosen timeframe: the widespread urban 
riots of autumn 2005.  In a press release reacting to the imposition of a 
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curfew, entitled – in a way which makes the organisation's position clear 
from the start – ‘Non au couvre-feu colonial!  La révolte n’est pas un 
crime!  Les véritables incendiaires sont au pouvoir!’, MIR claims that 
strategies used to quell anti-colonial revolts in previous decades are now 
being used in the repression of the riots and rioters of 2005.  Noting that 
the law which allowed the declaration of a state of emergency, and 
therefore a curfew, was adopted in 1955 in the fight against the Algerian 
independence movement, and used on the night of the 17th October 1961 
when possibly hundreds of Algerian demonstrators were tortured and 
killed by the Paris police (House and MacMaster 2009), MIR emphasises 
the historical continuity of colonial practices: 
 “La matrice idéologique ayant permis ces crimes coloniaux 
animent toujours les manières institutionnelles de voir, de penser, de 
ressentir et de traiter administrativement les populations issues de la 
colonisation et assignées à résidence dans ces nouvelles zones 
d’indigénat que sont les quartiers populaires.” (‘Non au couvre-feu 
colonial!  La révolte n’est pas un crime!  Les véritables incendiaires sont 
au pouvoir!’, 9.11.2005) 
 
For MIR, as can be seen in the 2005 Appel which launched the 
movement, post-colonial populations are discriminated against in every 
area of society, are victims of social exclusion, and are not equal before 
the law: a claim which, if true, means that the Republic has broken one of 
the oldest and most central parts of the universalist promise, dating back 
as far as the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme of 1789.  Although it was 
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the Right which was in power throughout my chosen period, MIR's press 
release takes care to point out that  'la gestion coloniale des populations 
issues de l’immigration' exists 'quel que soit le régime en place, de droite 
comme de gauche'.  This positioning is illustrative of the movement’s 
emphasis on autonomy, as well as of its position that racism and 
discrimination are systemic, rather than the fault of individuals.  This is a 
major distinction from SOS's strategy, according to which it is beneficial to 
identify cases of racial discrimination and take legal action, and has major 
implications for MIR's reaction to the political climate under discussion in 
the thesis.  Even if the period was defined by Sarkozy and his discourse 
on national identity, race and immigration, MIR does not concentrate its 
efforts on combating him specifically: as Bouteldja puts it, ‘On n’existe 
pas par rapport à Sarkozy’, specifying that ‘pour nous, Sarkozy, c’est la 
suite normale de Chirac, la suite normale de Mitterrand et les socialistes’.  
For MIR therefore, Sarkozy is nothing but the latest administrator of the 
colonial system, while the parliamentary Left, hidebound by a consensus 
on the universalist ideology used to justify colonialism, is unwilling to 
promote an alternative view of society15. 
 
The continuity of the colonial system, regardless of who is nominally at its 
head, is a key theme of Sadri Khiari’s 2009 book La contre-révolution 
coloniale en France.  For Khiari, the 2005 riots were ‘une résistance à la 
                                                 
15 It is MIR’s argument that the role of ‘universalist’ anti-racist movements should not 
(solely) be to fight the right and far-right, but to force parties of the left to take genuine 
anti-racist action: ‘Transformer les rapports de forces suppose, outre la mobilisation et 
l’organisation autonome des indigènes eux-mêmes, de transformer en profondeur la 
gauche elle-même.  C’est là une des tâches de l’antiracisme universel sincère: 
bousculer la gauche, la dénoncer, l’obliger à se rallier à une démarche anti-raciste.’ 
(Bouteldja and Khiari, À quoi sert l’antiracisme universel?, 2011)    
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politique coloniale poursuivie dans les quartiers, notamment en termes de 
gestion policière’ (2009: 121), and he concludes from this that ‘La révolte 
nationale en novembre 2005 est, à ce titre, une révolte anticolonialiste.” 
(2009: 122).  Somewhat counterintuitively however, he then goes on to 
argue that the fact that those involved do not themselves see it this way 
does not alter the underlying truth of what he is saying, a line of argument 
similar to the Marxist idea of false consciousness: 
 “Il importe peu, de point de vue qui nous préoccupe ici, que les 
propos qui ont été tenus par les acteurs de cette révolte ne contestaient 
pas explicitement le système de l’indigénat. [...]  Cette révolte a été une 
protestation en acte, rassemblant indigènes et Blancs, contre la politique 
d’indigénisation des banlieues populaires menée par les différents 
gouvernements depuis des années.” (ibid) 
It would certainly be possible to question this interpretation: there is a 
sense that Khiari is retrospectively telling the rioters what they should 
have been thinking, rather than listening to what they were saying.  
Furthermore, there is a sense that the facts are being placed into a pre-
determined framework of anti-colonialism, rather than being let to speak 
for themselves.  Nevertheless, Khiari’s comments provide further 
evidence of the consistency of MIR’s positions.  The emphasis is again 
placed on the continuity between the colonial period and contemporary 
France (‘indigénisation’ of banlieues), and the continuity in policy between 
different governments, as was also pointed out by Bouteldja.   
 
 253 
As Jérémy Robine argues in a recent chapter on the movement, MIR's 
discourse has the aim of turning 'la situation post-coloniale' – that is, the 
simple fact of a society which exists after the formal end of colonisation – 
into 'un problème post-colonial': the promotion of a worldview according 
to which 'la représentation selon laquelle les traces laissées par les 
rapports coloniaux sont aujourd’hui problématiques pour le 
fonctionnement de la société, et même [^] pour les représentations 
dominantes de la nation et des identités.' (2011: 142)  Again, as Robine 
points out, this idea can be questioned: is it not too much of a 
generalisation to say that modern French society is first and foremost the 
result of the legacies of colonialism?  And is it not too simplistic to argue 
that the inequality and discrimination suffered by immigrants and their 
descendants can similarly be explained by such legacies, rather than by 
socio-economic factors, globalisation, xenophobia and racism, or 
Islamophobia?  (ibid)  These are both pertinent questions for the 
movement, but in making this critique, which unambiguously links 
colonialism with the state of contemporary French society and the 
position within it of post-colonial immigrant-origin populations, MIR has 
been able to define a memorable campaigning discourse, and to find a 
niche within the French political landscape – as Gemie argues, MIR has 
‘claim[ed] the right to exist within the political invisibility of the Republic 
(2010: 158).  What is more, the breadth and flexibility of MIR's central 
position means that the movement can legitimately claim that xenophobia, 
racism, Islamophobia and so on are themselves part of the legacy of 
colonialism.  MIR's arguments on the 'continuum colonial', although they 
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can be criticised, allow it to keep its discourse in the public eye, despite 
its small size16, lack of mainstream political support and apparent 
incompatibility with France's republican political culture.         
 
Khiari's comments also highlight a notable contrast between an 
ambitiously theoretical movement like MIR and a far less ambitious, but 
far more practically-minded movement like SOS Racisme.  MIR has a 
closely thought out anti-colonial ideology which provides an interpretation 
for events involving ‘post-colonial’ populations in France, as can be seen 
above.  What the movement does not have, however, is a clear position 
in relation to what should be done about the problems faced by these 
populations.  SOS, on the other hand, is perhaps too quick to reject out of 
hand the continuing influence of colonial thinking, but has a simple view 
on social issues which arguably addresses more of the daily problems 
faced by the inhabitants of France’s poor suburbs, for example lack of 
opportunities and discrimination in employment.  The problem for SOS, 
however, is that it is widely seen as out of touch with the situation ‘on the 
ground’ in the banlieues – MIR’s view of SOS, one shared with many 
Beur activists in the 1980s, that it represents ‘un antiracisme “touche pas 
à mon pote”, paternaliste, exclusivement moral, abstrait’ (‘À quoi sert 
l’antiracisme universel?’, 16.6.2011) is typical of this criticism – and that 
its lobbying of the government for concrete initiatives to solve the 
                                                 
16 Gemie notes that ‘It is hard to provide any estimate of numbers [for MIR’s 
membership]: it is quite possible that there may only be a hundred hardcore militants in 
the MIR.  However, to date, its importance has been more as a forum to debate ideas 
rather than as a group which organizes events, and it is probable that its influence 
stretches far more widely than its dedicated members’ (2010: 155) 
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problems it analyses has frequently not been effective enough to make a 
real difference. 
 
However, the major underlying difference between MIR and the majority 
of the French anti-racist movement, as we have seen throughout the 
thesis, is its positioning on republicanism.  This positioning can be linked 
with the aspect of MIR’s discourse discussed above, that of the link 
between the administration of ‘natives’ during the colonial period and the 
administration of banlieue populations, containing many of their 
descendants, in the post-colonial period.  As will now be clear, SOS 
downplays the importance of colonial history and memory, and presents 
the Republic in a universally positive manner.  As Sopo argues, 
 “”Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité”.  La devise de notre République 
renferme en elle les valeurs les plus belles et les plus universelles.  
Appliquer la devise républicaine, c’est après tout la meilleure garantie de 
vivre dans une société débarrassée des miasmes du racisme, de 
l’antisémitisme et des discriminations.”  (2007: 11) 
Any possible link between the Republic and colonialism, moreover, is 
disregarded or considered as irrelevant.  For MIR, however, this link is 
absolutely central in understanding the systems of domination that have 
been faced by both colonial and post-colonial populations.  It is this link in 
MIR’s discourse that I now intend to examine. 
 
The movement’s position is summed up by Houria Bouteldja in the 
interview cited earlier.  Bouteldja argues of the Republic that: 
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 “Dans ces structures, elle est considerée comme émancipatrice, 
comme universaliste, comme droit-de-l’hommiste, etc., mais c’est 
parfaitement bien accommodée au colonialisme.  Ce qui nous intéresse, 
c’est la contradiction profonde entre le fait qu’on peut être un citoyen 
français libre, et, en même temps, imposer la soumission, la domination, 
au peuple colonisé. [...]  Et cette contradiction profonde existe par rapport 
à l’histoire coloniale, et aussi par rapport au présent postcolonial, puisque 
la France est toujours, officiellement, émancipatrice et universelle.  Mais 
en même temps, elle discrimine tout le temps.” (Interview 9.8.2011) 
Bouteldja’s analysis here is similar to that made by MIR in a document 
released by the movement in February 2005 following the first wave of 
controversy surrounding the Appel.  In this document, the authors argue 
that the Republic evoked by politicians across the ideological spectrum, 
and by ‘consensual’ anti-racist movements like SOS, is nothing but a 
‘République rêvée’.  This Republic, which believes in liberté, égalité and 
fraternité, and universal human rights, has only ever existed in an 
abstract sense; in ‘les discours qu’elle tient sur elle-même’.  The contrast 
is made with the ‘République réelle’.  It is this version of the Republic 
which is the subject of MIR’s criticisms: one which uses the language of 
civilisation and universalism as a cover for ‘colonisation, repression, 
exclusion and racism’ (Héricord, Lévy and Khiari, ‘Indigènes de la 
République, réponses à quelques objections...’, 24.2.2005). 
 
This contradiction, between an 'official' Republic which is universalist, 
emancipatory and a defender of human rights and the way in which, often 
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in the name of this same universalism, it has engaged in what MIR sees 
as the crime of colonial exploitation and subjugation, has not gone 
unnoticed even by some committed universalists.  Tzvetan Todorov, for 
example, notes that: 
 “One of the common reproaches directed against the 
Enlightenment is that it provided the ideological foundations for late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth-century European colonialism.  The 
reasoning runs as follows: the Enlightenment posited the unity of the 
human race and hence the universality of values; convinced they stood 
for superior values, European states considered themselves authorized to 
bring their civilisation to those less privileged than they and to guarantee 
the success of their enterprise; thus, they had to occupy the territories 
where these populations lived.” (2009: 28) 
For Todorov however, colonialism was never a true reflection of the 
values of the Enlightenment.  All that the rhetoric of the mission 
civilisatrice proves, in his view, is that the idea of the Enlightenment 
‘enjoyed great prestige at the time’ (2009: 30) and the colonisers 
therefore wanted it on their side, as had been the case with Christianity in 
the Spanish and Portuguese colonisations of the sixteenth century (ibid).  
What is more, he points out that the colonisers were quick to drop their 
humanitarian arguments: ‘The politics of colonization were camouflaged 
behind Enlightenment ideals, but in reality they were driven by 
straightforward national interests.’ (2009: 31).  He goes as far as to turn 
the arguments of those who link universalist ideals with colonialism 
entirely on their heads, by claiming the Enlightenment for the anti-colonial 
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camp.  As he argues: ‘The anti-colonialist movements were [...] much 
more directly inspired by the principles of the Enlightenment, in particular 
when they posited human universality, equality between peoples and 
individual freedom.’ (ibid).  Therefore, although Todorov acknowledges 
the anti-colonial critique of Enlightenment universalism, he does not, 
largely speaking, accept it.  For him, the mission civilisatrice argument 
was a misuse of universalist values, and a smokescreen which served to 
hide a genuine agenda based on nationalism and self-interest.  It is 
notable that this 'smokescreen' argument is similar to that made by those 
who aim to attack Sarkozy from a republican position over my chosen 
timeframe, as can be seen in the discussion of SOS Racisme in this 
thesis: much of the language used is the same, so the case has to be 
made that Sarkozy is using it incorrectly and dishonestly.  Importantly, in 
both cases – Todorov on the self-proclaimed 'universalism' of French and 
European colonisers, and SOS on the self-proclaimed ‘republicanism’ of 
Sarkozy – the underlying ideology remains unscathed and unquestioned. 
 
MIR, for its part, rejects this kind of argument in two ways.  Firstly, rather 
than seeing colonialism as the exception, and continuing to present the 
Republic as essentially a force for good, its activists use the fact that 
France’s colonial enterprise was justified with reference to the same 
Enlightenment thinking which underpins the Republic as a platform for a 
wider-spread critique of mainstream French political thinking.  And 
secondly, this link between republicanism and colonialism is placed, in 
MIR’s discourse, at the centre of a long-established ideological system 
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which has acted consistently against the interests of indigènes (with a 
small ‘i’), and conversely in favour of white, western ‘colonialists’. 
 
Although MIR sees the entire history of western colonialism as one of 
racially-based domination, Sadri Khiari (2009) places the origins of this 
‘République coloniale’ – that is to say, the system which links colonialism 
with French political ideology – in the Third Republic, which ran from 
1870 to 1940.  Khiari writes of this regime that: “C’est à elle que l’on doit 
l’institutionnalisation du nationalisme français, du racialisme et du 
colonialisme, comme autant de réalités indissociables.” (2009: 45).  It is 
his argument therefore that the ‘pacte républicain’ (2009: 44) which 
results from this ‘institutionalisation’ is inherently based on ethnicity 
(contrary to republican claims of 'colour-blindness' in relation to race), and 
inseparable in its origins from France's colonial enterprise.   
 
In making this link between colonialism, race and France's political 
structures, Khiari follows the lead (amongst others) of Étienne Balibar, 
who in Les frontières de la démocratie argues that 'Rien n'est plus faux 
que de se représenter la colonisation comme une entreprise “extérieure”' 
(1992: 57); and that 'Le racisme en France est d'essence coloniale, non 
au sens d'une “survivance” du passé, mais au sens d'une production 
continuée de rapports actuels.” (1992: 63)  The question which must be 
considered in relation to this worldview as expressed by MIR is how these 
factors manifest themselves in a modern society, in which colonialism, 
officially at least, no longer exists.  The first way in which this happens 
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relates to the idea discussed earlier in this chapter, of a continuity 
between colonial and post-colonial periods.  As Stefan Kipfer (2011) 
argues in his analysis of the movement, one of MIR's key missions is to 
draw attention to the fact that the French Republic, contrary to its 
proclaimed ideals of equality, treats some of its residents as ‘quasi-
colonial subjects’ who are ‘relegated to the margins of society’.  The 
second relates to the defining theme of the period under discussion in the 
thesis: that of national identity.  It is Khiari’s argument that within the 
‘pacte républicain’ increasing emphasis has been placed upon an 
ethnically-based form of identity: 
 “L’equation identitaire qui fonde le pacte républicain – et donne 
aujourd’hui sa raison d’être au ministère de Hortefeux – peut se dire en 
deux propositions: 1) Le Français est blanc; 2) Le meilleur du blanc est 
français.” (2009: 60) 
 
For Khiari, this ethnically-based form of national identity has grown in 
importance for political reasons.  More specifically, it has grown in 
importance due to a political context in which the Republic (in the sense 
of the political regime) has, in practice if not in theory, abandoned many 
of its proclaimed principles in favour of a consensus  on economic 
liberalism and the 'fight' against immigration.  Sylvie Tissot and Pierre 
Tévanian of the Les mots sont importants collective make a similar 
analysis, arguing that 'vingt ans de consensus libéral, sécuritaire et 
xénophobe [^] ont supprimé le risque de sursaut humaniste et 
antiraciste.' (2010: 211)  Sarkozy, according to this viewpoint, was 
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elected to protect the white population and their privileges from 
‘indigènes’ within and outside France, while promoting a form of identity 
(‘la suprématie blanche’) compatible with European construction and ‘la 
globalisation libérale-coloniale’ (Khiari 2009: 219).  Both of these ways in 
which the colonially-based ‘pacte républicain’ manifests itself in 
contemporary France – via the continuities in the treatment by the 
authorities of colonial and post-colonial populations, and via the formation 
of a national identity implicitly based on ethnicity – can be linked to a 
further key theme in MIR's discourse, that of the continuing importance of 
'race' (despite the Republic's promises of colour-blindness) in French 
society.  The positions of my chosen movements in relation to this 
question will form the basis of chapter 6. 
 
So far in this section I have considered MIR's positions in connection with 
the influence of colonialism on contemporary French society, looking at 
the links made by the movement between the administrative and legal 
treatment of colonial and post-colonial populations, a critique which has 
encouraged a lively debate amongst academics writing on contemporary 
France.  As Jim House writes on MIR, for example: 
 “This group’s claims, often made in deliberately bold terms, were 
challenged, at times aggressively, as the organization was accused of 
collapsing both the distinctions between colony and metropolis and those 
between past and present.  From an academic perspective, these highly 
polemical debates were arguably useful to have: historians of 
contemporary France interested in colonial legacies examine precisely 
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the ‘space’ that exists between what might be similar – to varying degrees 
– with previous or indeed simultaneous modes of unequal power relations 
occurring in different geographical settings (or possibly the same places), 
and yet what is certainly not identical.” (‘October 1961: On the Past and 
its Presence’, Bulletin of Francophone Postcolonial Studies, 3.2 (Autumn 
2012))  
 
In addition, I have considered the links made by the movement between 
republican ideology and colonialism, a critique which is at the centre of 
the differences of opinion between MIR and SOS on this issue: whilst 
MIR presents the Republic as synonymous with colonial racism and 
exploitation, it is seen by SOS as representing equality and emancipation.  
The respective viewpoints of the two movements on the Republic typify 
their positions at opposite ends of the ‘continuum of proximity-to-distance 
from the public political culture of the nation-state’ (2004: 1) proposed by 
Alana Lentin in her analysis of European anti-racism, as was discussed in 
chapter 3.  In the remainder of this section, I intend to consider what 
MIR’s anti-colonial positioning means in practice: that is, what it means 
for the movement's strategy, and for its vision for an ideal society. 
 
According to Houria Bouteldja, MIR’s anti-colonial positioning translates 
into an emphasis on the need for the creation of a ‘décolonial’ form of 
society and politics.  Again, the movement's thinking echoes that of 
Balibar, who argues that: 
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 “C'est donc [^] d'une véritable décolonisation de la France qu'il 
faut aujourd'hui parler, en remettant pratiquement en cause le fait même 
d'une construction nationale qui implique toujours la coexistence de deux 
populations à droit inégaux, l'une dominante [^], l'autre sujette et 
dominée.” (1992: 65)    
It is not however, in her view, possible to give a simple definition of what 
this 'decolonised' society involves.  The alterations to be made seem 
quite intangible – ‘un procès en mouvement’ in Bouteldja’s words 
(Interview 9.8.2011) – involving the questioning of the racially- and 
colonially-based structures of French and western society, and a move 
away from traditional western forms of thought, even those, Marxism for 
example, towards which the movement is broadly favourable.  It is also a 
question, it appears, of increasing awareness of the continuing influence 
of colonial ideology:  
 “Notre priorité, c’est de faire comprendre le fait colonial, et la 
persistance de la pensée coloniale, dans le monde actuellement.  Donc 
pour nous, le combat, c’est de décoloniser en sens global du terme: 
décoloniser la pensée, décoloniser la politique... c’est une approche 
extrêmement globale.” (Interview 9.8.2011) 
The apparent vagueness of this proposal is representative of a recurrent 
weakness in MIR's discourse.  While the question of how to 'decolonise' 
French society may be an interesting one to discuss within the movement, 
there is no clue given to how this might happen in reality, or even what 
the first steps towards it may be.  MIR, it must be acknowledged, does 
function mainly as a theoretically-based movement, a kind of radically 
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anti-colonial thinktank periodically issuing provocative statements and 
awkward questions designed to keep their positions in the national 
political conversation.  Considered purely in these terms, the organisation 
is relatively successful.  However, the lack of emphasis placed by MIR on 
practicalities does raise questions as to its effectiveness and credibility as 
a social movement, as opposed to a simple protest group.  As Gemie 
argues, despite being broadly favourable towards the movement: 
 “There remains one crucial weakness [in MIR’s discourse]: while 
the MIR has come a long way in re-thinking ideas about identity, 
exclusion and autonomy, while they have actually grown and developed 
as a discussion group and activist organisation, they are still very weak in 
presenting positive ideas. [...] MIR is a political group, and has to function 
in a political world.  In order to continue to grow, it will have to develop a 
political programme through which to represent its supporters’ interests.” 
(2010: 157) 
 
Linked to this hope for a ‘decolonised’ society is a wish for an anti-
colonial reading of history to be shared across French society.  This is a 
recurring theme in the discourse of MIR and its key representatives, 
appearing in Khiari’s works, in the interview with Bouteldja, and in the 
movement’s original Appel, which states that ‘la lutte anti-coloniale est 
indissociable du combat pour l’égalité sociale, la justice et la citoyenneté’; 
and that ‘Dien Bien Phu n’est pas une défaite mais une victoire pour la 
liberté, de l’égalité et de la fraternité!’ (As with Todorov earlier in this 
section there seems to be a connection drawn between anti-colonialism 
 265 
and Enlightenment values, but it is arrived at by MIR via a very different 
route).  It is clear that for MIR, a widespread acknowledgement of the 
importance of colonial memory is a prerequisite for the existence of a 
decolonised society.  This position is made explicit by Bouteldja when she 
asks, ‘Comment être une société ensemble quand une partie, une grande 
partie de la société française, pense que notre victoire à nous de 
libération, d’émancipation du colonialisme, c’est leur défaite à eux?’ 
(Interview 9.8.2011)  The apparent existence of this prerequisite for the 
creation of MIR’s ideal society would seem to be a substantial obstacle 
for the movement, as the trend in my chosen timeframe is in almost 
entirely the opposite direction.  As will be clear from chapter 2, the 
mainstream conception of history in this period, as represented by 
Sarkozy, involves a rehabilitation of France’s colonial enterprise, and a 
denunciation of critical examinations of the past as ‘repentance’ and even 
‘self-hate’.   
 
This phenomenon is acknowledged by Khiari, who argues that the revival 
of colonialism as a dimension of national identity – first seen, it may be 
recalled from earlier in this section, under the Third Republic in the 19th 
century – is seen as ‘une des préoccupations principales du Pouvoir 
blanc’ (2009: 173), and is best represented by the proposed law of 23rd 
February 2005, which evoked the ‘positive role’ of France in the colonies.  
This rehabilitation involves an attempt to ‘dissocier les méthodes les plus 
violentes de l’expansion coloniale de la vérité républicaine, 
nécessairement salutaire pour les colonisés.’ (ibid)  But despite the 
 266 
unfavourable political context, Khiari does not intend to soften his line: as 
he reminds his readers, ‘L’identité de la République, c’est la colonisation, 
c’est-à-dire la hiérarchie raciale.’ (2009: 174)  Again, there is seemingly 
little thought given to the way in which the movement's aims might be 
achieved.  And again, MIR is a step more radical than most of its anti-
racist peers, few of whom would argue that the Republic's identity is 
inextricable from colonisation and racial hierarchy.  In this case however, 
with only a relatively small amount of compromise the movement could 
find itself within a substantial coalition of academics and historians 
(Nicolas Bancel, Pascal Blanchard, Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, 
Sandrine Lemaire, Achille Mbembe, Benjamin Stora and Sylvie Thénault, 
amongst others), social movements and political actors, who favour a 
conception of history unafraid to look back critically at France's colonial 
past.  As noted in chapter 3, MIR has already taken part in a march in 
memory of the events of October 17th 1961, alongside the Communist 
Party, the Green Party, and the anti-racist movements MRAP and LDH.  
Whether the movement, in the longer term, makes alliances where it is 
realistic to do so, or whether it prioritises absolute ideological purity, 
remains to be seen. 
 
In his 2006 book Pour une politique de la racaille, Khiari identifies three 
aspects of unity and shared identity between the indigènes of France.  
The first of these is a heritage of oppression: he argues that these 
populations are discriminated against because they are the descendants 
of slaves and colonial subjects.  The second relates to memory: 
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descendants of slaves and colonial subjects have a shared collective 
memory of colonial atrocities, and society’s blindness about these 
atrocities excludes these populations from the ‘vivre ensemble’ promoted 
widely across mainstream politics in France (including frequently by SOS 
Racisme).  The third, finally, relates to a common heritage of anti-colonial 
and anti-racist struggle, which reconstructs the ‘histoire brisée’ (2006: 103) 
of post-colonial populations, enabling them to recreate ‘un lien positif qui 
comble le vide des mémoires’ (ibid).  Again, we can see the importance 
of colonial memory for Khiari and MIR.  However, whereas the examples 
discussed earlier focused on its importance for society as a whole, this 
part of Khiari’s argument focuses on its importance to ‘post-colonial’ 
populations themselves, as a way of defining themselves within a political 
system which rejects their cultures of origin as unacceptable 
communautarisme, but rarely lets them truly ‘assimilate’ to a version of 
French culture too often defined, MIR would argue, with reference to 
ethnicity.  Khiari, thus, writes of the movement’s desire to construct ‘une 
identité de lutte comme identité anticolonialiste’; an identity not narrowly 
focused on culture or religion but ‘une identité pour l’action’ (ibid), inspired 
by anti-colonial movements throughout history.  Khiari pursues this line in 
the 2009 text quoted earlier.  The importance of the movement, he 
argues, does not come from its capacities for action and mobilisation, but 
from ‘la problématique coloniale/postcoloniale qu’il a systématisée’ (2009: 
139).  MIR, for him, has been responsible for a reading of contemporary 
French and world reality as a renewed process of colonial domination and 
the reproduction of ‘la fracture raciale’ (ibid), opening up the possibility of 
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a ‘convergence décoloniale’ of different indigène communities in France.  
This, then, would appear to be the intended outcome of MIR’s anti-
colonial ideology: a situation in which different groups of ‘post-colonial’ 
immigrants and their descendants join together to fight against the 
‘colonial’ representations, and consequent treatment by the authorities, 
discussed earlier in this section, an aim of consciousness-raising within 
‘minority’ communities which perhaps echoes Black Power thinking in 
1960s America17.  This point is reinforced later on in Khiari’s book in his 
argument that: ‘La décolonisation de la société française [...] ne se fera 
pas si les indigènes échouent à se constituer en puissance politique 
autonome.’ (2009: 221)  It is perhaps this desire for an autonomous, anti-
colonial political force which led to the decision to launch the PIR (Parti 
des Indigènes de la République). 
 
The anti-colonial nature of the new Party is made clear throughout its 
‘manifesto’, written in 2010.  This can be seen immediately in the 
preamble to article 1: ‘La dignité humaine a pour principale négation 
l’impérialisme, le colonialisme et la hiérarchisation raciale qui en est 
consécutive.’  Also made clear is the importance of autonomy, as 
mentioned above.  The Party aims for ‘la conquête par les indigènes de 
leur liberté de pensée, de décision et d’action par rapport à l’idéologie 
coloniale et raciale, par rapport à l’État et ses institutions ainsi que par 
rapport à l’ensemble des forces politiques non-indigènes’.  This is a 
                                                 
17 MIR’s discourse frequently refers to the Black Power movement – the conference at 
which the principles of the PIR were established, for instance, was known as the 
‘Congrès Malcolm X’ (‘Le Congrès constitutif du « Parti des Indigènes de la République 
» (P.I.R.) a eu lieu’, 2010)   
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declaration of autonomy in relation to France’s major political parties 
(SOS Racisme’s relationship with the PS perhaps serving as a counter-
example), and also a declaration of autonomy in terms of thought, 
therefore a rejection of the ‘republican consensus’ discussed in chapter 3, 
in which a disproportionate amount of political debate comes down to a 
battle to define what ‘republicanism’ stands for.  Leaving aside the 
principles of the Party, however, what does it intend to do in relation to 
the anti-colonial struggle?  Firstly, it appears that the aim is to organise 
the political activity of France’s ‘indigènes’: 
 “Le PIR a pour objectif la construction d’une Puissance politique 
indigène indépendante, représentant les intérêts et les aspirations 
légitimes des indigènes et capable d’organiser et d’orienter leurs 
résistances dans une perspective décoloniale.” 
And secondly, it aims eventually to create a political grouping powerful 
enough to enact its ‘decolonial’ reforms: 
 “Le PIR a pour objectif politique l’avènement d’une majorité 
politique contrôlant les principaux leviers institutionnels et déterminée à 
engager les profondes réformes institutionnelles, sociales, économiques 
et culturelles, nécessaires pour poursuivre le processus décolonial, dans 
ses différentes dimensions, et combattre les inégalités raciales.” 
 
But how does it intend to go about achieving these objectives?  As often 
seems to be the case in relation to MIR, this is not made clear.  Indeed, in 
certain cases, as with the example above, the Party’s principles seem to 
be in contradiction with its aims: how, for instance, is a desire for 
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complete autonomy from mainstream political parties compatible with the 
aim of creating ‘une majorité politique contrôlant les principaux leviers 
institutionnels’?  There are signs that even those within the movement are 
aware that the grand plans set out in the PIR’s constitution are not 
imminently achievable.  The constitution itself ends with a section on the 
importance of the media, including the pledge that ‘Le PIR agit pour 
combattre l’expression du racisme et des idéologies coloniales dans 
l’espace médiatique’.  In a similar vein, Houria Bouteldja acknowledges 
that the difference between the MIR and the PIR rests largely in 
semantics: ‘si s’appeler parti politique a plus d’impact que s’appeler 
mouvement politique, on est parti politique’ (Interview 9.8.2011).  While 
the situation may change in the future, in the political climate under 
discussion in the thesis, in which many of the movement’s key positions 
were anathema to mainstream politicians, MIR’s anti-colonial struggle can 
by necessity consist of little more than keeping its positions in the public 
eye, and fighting ‘l’expression du racisme et des idéologies coloniales 
dans l’espace médiatique’.  It is in this light that the decision to launch the 
PIR can perhaps best be seen. 
 
Summing up, in this chapter I have considered the positions of SOS 
Racisme and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République in relation 
to colonialism and its continuing impact in contemporary French society.  
Of course, SOS and MIR do not represent the full spectrum of opinion on 
this question amongst French anti-racist movements: MRAP (Mouvement 
contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples), for instance, 
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arguably represents a middle way between my chosen movements, being 
a long-established and relatively mainstream organisation, but one which 
places substantial emphasis on ‘Histoire, mémoire [et] anticolonialisme 
en France’ (see www.mrap.fr/histoire-et-memoire). 
 
Nevertheless, examining the positions of SOS and MIR on the issue 
provides a case-study of two distinctively different approaches, even if it 
is possible to argue, as noted at the start of the chapter, that both 
movements, despite their differences, see contemporary post-colonial 
populations potentially as victims of the colonial past, with SOS arguing 
against this representation and MIR seeing it as a basis for unity and 
collective action.  
 
Broadly speaking, SOS accepts colonialism as a legitimate area of 
historical study, but rejects the idea that its legacy should be seen as a 
vital determining factor in modern-day France, seeing as dangerous any 
discourse which presents post-colonial populations as victims.  For MIR 
on the other hand, the link between colonialism and contemporary France 
is of paramount importance, a connection being made between the legal 
and juridical management of colonial populations and that of their 
descendants in France's poor suburbs, and between colonialism and the 
ideology of universalist republicanism.  How can these two positions be 
evaluated?  I would argue that SOS is justified in saying that victimhood 
is not a sustainable basis for an identity, and in saying that priority should 
be given to racism and discrimination happening in the present.  It is 
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perhaps over-simplistic, however, to label as 'victimhood' any identity 
which draws upon the colonial past.  The organisation is also perhaps too 
quick to dismiss the effect of this past on the post-colonial present.  MIR, 
meanwhile, is justified in drawing attention to the links between colonial 
and post-colonial periods which SOS – and the majority of mainstream 
political discourse – choose to ignore.  It is again an over-simplification, 
however, to present the Republic in purely negative terms, and in addition, 
the movement could do more to balance its justified critiques of society 
with ideas about where it could go next.  A weakness of both movements 
is that, due to their positions at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum, 
neither is entirely open to a compromise position which combines an 
emphasis on practical action to reinforce republican values with a 
willingness to look back critically at the colonial past and accept its links 
with the present.  These are both important issues for the French anti-
racist movement, and there is, I would argue, no need for them to be 
seen as mutually exclusive.   
 
In the next chapter, the last of the three which focus on comparative 
analysis of my two chosen movements, I will consider the question of 
race, and the tenability of the republican ideal of 'colour-blindness'. 
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Chapter 6 
SOS, MIR and the question of ‘race’ 
 
 
In the first two of the three ‘case study’ chapters which form the centre of 
this thesis, I have considered the positions of my two chosen movements 
in relation to the issues of national identity (chapter 4) and colonialism 
(chapter 5).  The examination of these issues has provided insights into 
the reaction of SOS and MIR to the political context defined by the 
discourse of Nicolas Sarkozy and his allies on ‘Frenchness’, and the 
supposed threat to it from immigration, Islam and historical ‘repentance’.  
These chapters have also had the aim of examining the second central 
question in the thesis: the relationship of the two movements with 
France’s self-proclaimed political culture of universalist republicanism.  It 
is this question which is at the heart of the current chapter, which 
considers the ever controversial issue of ‘race’18.  It should of course be 
pointed out that there is not, biologically speaking, a ‘French race’, and 
that neither of the movements examined in the thesis believe this to be 
the case.  It would perhaps be more accurate to talk of ‘visible ethnic 
difference’, the effect it has in society, and whether the acknowledgement 
of such ethnic difference has any part to play within the French anti-racist 
movement.  The very different answers given by SOS and MIR in respect 
to these questions are informed by their equally very different positions 
                                                 
18 As this chapter is finalised, this potential for controversy is being illustrated by the 
debate around the attempts of the socialist government elected in 2012 to remove the 
word ‘race’ from French legislation, and eventually from the Constitution (Le Monde 
16.5.2013)   
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concerning the universalist republican political culture touched upon 
above.  The central difference here – a substantial one, to say the least – 
is that SOS criticises the government by demanding that it remains true to 
foundational republican principles, whilst MIR rejects republicanism, 
seeing it as an inherent source of racism and discrimination.  In other 
words, the one calls for a reinforcement of republican principles as a 
response to racism, whilst the other calls for a rejection of the Republic, 
as a source of racism.   
 
As with chapters 4 and 5, this final thematic ‘case study’ chapter will be 
divided into two sections.  The first of these will look at SOS.  I will begin 
this section by considering why SOS rejects in principle the idea of ‘race’, 
or ethnic difference, and its potential use as a means of classifying the 
population.  I will then consider an example of what this rejection means 
in practice, by looking at the organisation’s action against discrimination 
and social inequality over my chosen timeframe.  The second section, 
meanwhile, looks at MIR, and the way in which the movement sees racial 
hierarchies and discrimination, inherited from colonialism, as ingrained in 
France’s social and political structures.  This analysis, as we will see, 
leads MIR to posit forcefully that the central cleavage in French society is 
not based on class or wealth, but race.  The primacy of the ‘racial 
question’ over the ‘social question’ in MIR’s discourse can be seen as 
further evidence, if more were needed, of the seemingly irreconcilable 
differences between its worldview and that of more mainstream 
organisations such as SOS. 
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SOS: republicanism, colour-blindness and the ‘social question’ 
 
Let us begin, then, by considering the positions of SOS Racisme.  As will 
be clear from the thesis up to this point, the organisation bases its action, 
and its appeal to the French population, on its interpretation of republican 
values, emphasising égalité in its vision of an ideal French society 
(‘equality’ being considered in the sense of equality of opportunity and 
equality before the law rather than equality of outcome, an interpretation 
dating back at least as far as the Déclaration des droits de l’Homme of 
1789), and fraternité in its dealings with immigrants and sans-papiers.  In 
the case of SOS’s positioning in relation to ‘race’ however, the 
association evokes not (or at least not directly) the classical republican 
devise, but a principle which has come to constitute a core component of 
French republican identity: that of ‘colour-blindness’.  As Article 1 of the 
Fifth Republic’s constitution states, ‘La France est une République 
indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.  Elle assure l’égalité devant la 
loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, de race ou de religion.’  
The extent to which the ideal of colour-blindness reflects the reality of 
French society has been questioned, by radical anti-system movements 
like MIR, as we will see, and by a number of academic analysts.  As 
Silverman puts it for example, the French state has for much of its history 
‘preached inclusion according to universalist criteria’, while 
simultaneously ‘practising exclusion through racialising the French 
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community and its other’ (1992: 9).  Nevertheless, the mere existence in 
principle of this colour-blindness has had a significant effect on 
mainstream French anti-racist movements like SOS, in that it is seen as 
supporting evidence for the idea that republican principles are inherently 
favourable to anti-racism.  As Alana Lentin argues: 
 “French conceptualisations of anti-racism are to a great extent tied 
to the republican ideologies that are central to the public political culture 
of that country. [...] The importance periodically placed on anti-racism in 
French post-war politics reflects the extent to which, rather than being the 
preserve of groups of the racially marginalised, it has been constructed 
as inherently French, and therefore hegemonic.  The ideals of anti-racism 
have been construed as universally applicable through their connection 
with the republican principle of liberty, equality and fraternity.” (2004: 115) 
 
Lentin’s analysis of French anti-racism is very much applicable to SOS, a 
movement which, as we have seen throughout this thesis, positions itself 
firmly in the political mainstream in terms of ideology, seeing universalist 
principles as an unambiguous good – regardless of the discriminatory 
purposes they may periodically have been put to over the course of 
French history – and as the only acceptable way of organising the wider 
anti-racist movement.  This ideological inflexibility has the potential to 
lead to a certain measure of disarray in the event of the language of 
republicanism being appropriated by powerful political actors like Sarkozy, 
for purposes which, as we saw in chapter 2, serve to divide rather than 
unify the population.  Leaving aside this reservation however, it is clear 
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that SOS, as it does with republican principles as a whole, chooses to 
take the idea of colour-blindness entirely at face value.  As Loïc Rigaud of 
the organisation’s anti-discrimination section puts it in a 2011 interview, 
for example: 
 “On ne doit pas concevoir la République française par un biais 
ethnique. [...] En France, on considère que tous les citoyens sont égaux, 
et qu’on ne peut pas différencier les gens en raison de leurs origines.  En 
raison de leur comportement peut-être, en raison de leur niveau social, 
mais pas au niveau ethnique, ce n’est pas un biais qu’on prend en 
compte en France.” (Interview 29.3.2011) 
This way of seeing things on the part of SOS has notable consequences, 
relating particularly to the way in which, within mainstream French anti-
racism and mainstream French political thinking more widely, ‘racism is 
deracinated from its roots as a political idea with an historical function in 
the modern French state’ (Lentin 2004: 116).  That is to say, SOS rejects 
the idea, strongly favoured by MIR as we will see, that racism and 
discrimination are systemic, and are inherent within the structures of the 
nation-state.  That SOS, wedded as it is to the universalist republican 
thinking which underlies the modern French nation-state, rejects this way 
of thinking is perhaps no surprise.  An argument exists, however, that this 
worldview is representative of a form of denial: that the abstract rights of 
republicanism lead parties, movements and the wider population to 
ignore the fact that race is a major factor in influencing life chances.  As 
Ahmed Boubeker puts it for example, ‘La France refuse de regarder en 
face la dimension ethnique des inégalités sociales’ (2010: 272).  The 
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‘refusal’ identified by Boubeker can undoubtedly be seen in the positions 
of SOS, and is illustrated particularly strongly in the movement’s 
discourse on discrimination: as we will see later on in this section, this 
discourse rejects any form of ethnic monitoring, even that which aims 
simply to gauge the effectiveness of measures taken to fight the problem. 
 
Before moving on to discuss SOS’s rejection of race in practice however, 
I would like to consider further the reasons for the organisation’s rejection 
of the idea in principle.  On the evidence of press releases and official 
publications released by the movement over my chosen period, its 
objection to the idea of distinguishing between different ‘races’ – or 
ethnicities – can be divided into three categories.  The first of these 
categories relates to SOS’s view of what French anti-racism is, or should 
be.  The second relates to the movement’s interpretation of what France 
itself is, or again, what it should be, concerning its identity and self-
perception.  The third, finally, relates to practical objections to the idea of 
basing a society around ethnic classifications. 
 
As Lentin notes in the quotation above, mainstream anti-racist 
movements in France, almost without exception, draw strongly on 
universalist republicanism as a basis for their ideology.  Their 
relationships with the question of ‘race’, therefore, have a tendency to 
take the ‘colour-blind’ view proclaimed by a succession of republican 
constitutions.  SOS, for its part, deviates little from this worldview, a 
worldview which as may be expected has a major influence on SOS’s 
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conception of what the role of an anti-racist movement should be.  To 
take an example, Dominique Sopo, SOS’s President throughout the 
timeframe examined in the thesis, argues in Manifeste pour l’égalité that 
the organisation’s aim is to ‘faire en sorte que chacun, quelles que soient 
ses origines, ait les mêmes opportunités que n’importe qui dans la 
société’ (2007: 45).  Elsewhere, such as in its 2007 ‘mission statement’, 
SOS sets out a very similar vision for the wider anti-racist movement: 
‘L’antiracisme, pour nous, a toujours été la volonté de voir chacun vivre à 
égale dignité dans la société, quelles que soient ses origines, sa 
confession ou ses pratiques culturelles’ (‘Nos missions’, 2007).  It is not 
difficult to see the similarities between SOS’s view of the role of anti-
racism, on one hand, and the constitutional promise that ‘[La République] 
assure l’égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d’origine, 
de race ou de religion’, on the other.  In both cases, the idea of 
distinguishing between France’s inhabitants on the basis of ethnicity is 
seen as inherently incompatible with republican ideals.   
 
As we have seen, the form mainstream anti-racism takes in a given 
society relates to the prevailing concept of the nation-state.  Therefore, as 
France does not officially recognise or monitor ethnic groups, movements 
generally emphasise inclusiveness and egalitarianism.  Although there is 
much to be said for prioritising social equality over racial equality (MIR, as 
we will see in the second part of this chapter, arguably goes too far in the 
other direction), it is also possible to see this close attachment to 
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republican ‘colour-blindness’ as a weakness in the approach of 
movements like SOS.  As Koopmans et al. point out: 
 “[T]he French approach has difficulty in dealing with the fact that 
cultural group differences, which are denied as legitimate policy 
categories, do form the basis of discrimination and racism from the side 
of the majority population. [...] Insisting on the equal treatment of all and 
loathing group-specific approaches, France to some extent ties its own 
hands when it comes to combating forms of social exclusion that are 
rooted in ethnic and cultural differences.” (2006: 14) 
In other words, how is it possible to fight, for example, discrimination 
which is based on race and ethnicity, using the tools provided by a 
political ideology which refuses to take race and ethnicity into account?  
Although SOS did attempt to find ways around this problem, for example 
by focusing anti-discrimination action on disadvantaged territories rather 
than disadvantaged communities, the second part of this section will 
show that the organisation never entirely found a satisfactory answer to 
this question over my chosen timeframe. 
 
Regardless of the potential difficulties and contradictions within the idea 
of republican colour-blindness, SOS sees the idea not only as an 
ideological basis for the French anti-racist movement, but as an 
ideological basis for France itself.  The organisation’s discourse presents 
any ethnic classifications of the population as contrary to the desire, 
expressed in a succession of republican constitutions, not to distinguish 
between France’s inhabitants on the grounds of ‘origin, race or religion’.  
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Additionally however, SOS presents such classifications as contrary to 
the less tangible and inevitably more subjective idea of France’s ‘identity’.  
As may be recalled from chapter 4, SOS’s conception of national identity 
rejects the conservative and exclusionary vision of Sarkozy, in favour of a 
‘République métissée’ in which immigrant populations are seen not as a 
threat, but as welcome contributors to French culture and society.  The 
movement brings a similar perspective to its arguments against 
classifying France’s population by ethnicity.  As Sopo argues in the 
interview reproduced in Qu’est-ce que SOS Racisme, France is ‘une terre 
de métissage’ (2006: 96).  And if France is inherently, as SOS contends, 
a ‘terre de métissage’, then taking into account ethnic difference is 
automatically contrary to the underlying ideological ‘essence’ of French 
society.  As Sopo’s argument continues, classifying populations in this 
way: 
 “[P]ousserait les populations à se référer à des categories 
particulières et non plus à la catégorie de la citoyenneté.  Or, une des 
grandes richesses de la France, qui explique d’ailleurs la force du 
métissage, réside justement dans le fait que, dans notre pays, les 
barrières ethniques, culturelles et religieuses sont très poreuses.” (ibid) 
 
For SOS therefore, there must be no deviation from what could be called 
the ‘universal citizen’ proclaimed theoretically by the French constitution.  
That is to say, race, ethnicity and religion should all be subordinate to the 
greater ideal of French citizenship, and no forms of community 
organisation based on these categories should intervene between the 
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citizen and the ‘universalist’ state.  It is this line of thought, of course, 
which leads to SOS’s hostility to the notion of communautarisme.  Indeed, 
many of the arguments against a society based around ethnic difference 
and classifications elsewhere in SOS’s published material warn against 
the dangers of ‘communities’.  In his introduction to Manifeste pour 
l’égalité, for example, Sopo argues that: 
 “[I]nviter les gens à se vivre comme appartenant à telle ou telle 
“catégorie ethnique” ou “communauté” (qu’on aura d’ailleurs en réalité 
définies à leur place!), c’est évidemment prendre le risque de créer des 
barrières et donc, sous couvert de lutte contre les discriminations, de 
basculer dans une société communautarisée qui ne correspond en rien à 
notre idéal de vie.” (2007: 43) 
 
It is the view of the movement, then, that ethnic classifications lead to 
individuals from ‘visible minorities’ being seen not as true citizens, but as 
undifferentiated members of such communities.  For SOS, this leads to a 
situation in which, as the organisation put it in a response to a proposal 
by Patrick Lozès, President of the Conseil Représentatif des Associations 
Noires, to introduce ethnic statistics in the fight against discrimination, ‘Je 
représente une communauté qui pèse tant de pour cent de la population 
et donc, reconnaître pleinement cette communauté, c’est me reconnaître 
moi.’ (Discriminations: évitons les faux débats, 2009).  A society which 
divides its population on an ethnic basis, SOS argues consequently, 
brings with it substantial dangers at the level of identity.  Just as 
Sarkozy’s conception of national identity is arguably racialised – in the 
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sense of what Étienne Balibar calls an ‘ethnicité fictive’ (1988: 70), an 
imaginary unity defined in opposition to internal or external groups who 
are ‘not us’ – it is SOS’s argument that taking into account ethnic 
classifications leads populations to racialise their own identities, making 
them inflexible and unchangeable.  Both these forms of racialised identity, 
despite coming about in very different ways, are seen by SOS as contrary 
to the more fluid conceptions of identity embedded within the 
organisation’s ideal of métissage and its manifestation in its proposals for 
a République métissée.   
 
There is certainly some merit in SOS’s arguments on this theme.  I would 
argue that the movement is justified, for example, to warn of the potential 
issues resulting from a social system which divides the population into 
ethnically (or religiously)-based communities.  Equally, however, aspects 
of these arguments can be called into question: SOS arguably ignores 
the reasons why ‘ethnic minority’ populations may want to divide 
themselves into such communities (for example to support each other in 
an apparently hostile society), and also arguably ignores the possibility 
that the agents of ‘ethnicisation’ are not state institutions but ordinary 
people, possibly influenced subconsciously (as MIR would argue) by 
stereotypes of colonial and post-colonial populations.  SOS’s premise that 
France is inherently a ‘terre de métissage’ is also questionable: it may be 
in theory, and in SOS’s ideals, but is it in reality?  A potential issue 
relating to political actors who draw upon republicanism as a basis for 
their action, as Fysh and Wolfreys (2003: 207) point out, is that they see 
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the Republic as it should be, rather than as it is.  Over the years 
examined in this thesis, SOS has at times perhaps been guilty of falling 
into this trap. 
 
The final rationale for SOS’s rejection in principle of the idea of taking into 
account race and ethnicity in French society relates to practical objections: 
how would a society which did take into account these issues function 
should state policy move in this direction?  This issue is addressed by 
Sopo in Manifeste pour l’égalité.  Objections expressed to the idea 
include the difficulty of coming up with workable groupings – ‘il serait très 
compliqué, en France, pays très métissée, de définir des catégories 
ethniques “pertinentes”’ (2007: 43) – as well as the question of who gets 
to decide and why: ‘Qui définit les catégories ethniques?’ (ibid)  Both of 
these objections potentially raise highly complex issues on the nature of 
race and ethnicity: for example, is ethnicity objective or subjective?  Is it 
something you can define yourself (as is assumed, for example, by the 
UK census)?  Or is it something which can only be imposed by other 
people?19  The centre of SOS’s objection to a racially-defined society, 
however, is that an emphasis on ethnic difference serves to ‘évacuer la 
question sociale’ (2007: 44).  For Sopo and SOS, the ‘social question’ – 
emphasising the centrality of inequality as the major issue in society – 
must be the priority, and therefore action must be taken in favour of 
equality of opportunity.  It is the position of the movement that the work of 
anti-racism, and government action against discrimination, should focus 
                                                 
19 See for example the discourse of MIR’s key thinkers on ‘social races’, which will be 
discussed in the second part of this chapter  
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on issues which improve the lives and prospects of poor and disfavoured 
populations regardless of ethnicity.  This position can be seen clearly with 
regard to an example which illustrates SOS’s rejection of the idea of race 
and ethnicity in practice: that of the movement’s own action against 
discrimination and social inequality. 
 
The place of race and ethnicity in the fight against discrimination and 
social inequality has been the subject of intense debate in the study of 
contemporary French social policy.  As is so often the case, the differing 
viewpoints on the subject are reflective of the underlying debate on 
republican ideology.  The fundamentalist republican position is to reject 
unequivocally the idea of bringing ethnicity into the fight against 
discrimination, whether in a high-profile, proactive way – positive 
discrimination, quota systems – or in a more passive and low-key way, 
such as ethnic monitoring designed to gauge the effectiveness of anti-
discrimination policies.  Such a position can be seen, to take one 
example, in the writing of Elisabeth Badinter, who argues: 
 “Les moyens d'accroître les connaissances sur les discriminations 
et d'agir pour les réduire ne manquent pas.  Beaucoup sont à portée de 
main, mais il manque une volonté gouvernementale pour les saisir et les 
développer.  Au contraire, en facilitant la formation de communautés 
ethniques, culturelles, raciales, religieuses, en encourageant la prise en 
compte de ces appartenances, le gouvernement ne fait pas simplement 
diversion pour masquer les inégalités sociales croissantes: il concourt à 
la division de la France.” (2009: 25)  
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Analysts taking this position have a tendency – like SOS, as we have 
seen earlier in this section – to take at face value republican claims of 
'colour-blindness', and to see as inherently dangerous and anti-republican 
any action which deviates from this worldview.  These potential 'dangers' 
include the inadvertent promotion of communautarisme ('la formation de 
communautés ethniques, culturelles, raciales, religieuses...'), and what 
Badinter (2009: 11) calls the 'institutionalisation' of difference: that is to 
say, a situation in which France's 'ethnic minority' inhabitants cease to be 
seen as individuals, and as either current or potential French citizens 
benefiting from equal rights, and begin to be seen solely as faceless 
representatives of their allotted 'communities'.  Because of this rejection 
of any recourse to ethnic monitoring, those who take this view must by 
necessity conceive of action against discrimination, and in favour of 
equality of opportunity, in purely socio-economic terms.   
The second school of thought in relation to the role of race in the fight 
against discrimination, on the other hand, sees some degree of ethnic 
monitoring as necessary if this fight is to be led effectively.  This is the 
position adopted by Patrick Simon (in Guénif-Souilamas (ed.) 2006), who 
argues that far from benefiting ‘ethnic minority’ populations, the official 
invisibility of such minorities within universalist republican ideology may 
actually serve to harm these populations and work against their interests: 
 “[L]a stratégie d’invisibilisation des minorités sur laquelle est 
fondée l’equation politique universaliste conduit non pas à leur assurer 
protection et accès à l’égalité, comme elle en a fait la promesse, mais au 
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contraire à les désarmer face aux effets d’une hiérarchisation ethnique et 
raciale abritée derrière l’égalité formelle.” (2006: 162) 
According to this viewpoint therefore, those who argue for a purely 
'colour-blind' republican response to racial discrimination are to some 
extent in denial of reality: just because ethnic categorisation and 
hierarchisation should not exist, this does not mean that they do not exist.  
And this denial means that France's mainstream anti-racist movements 
are ill-equipped to combat such hierarchisation and its social effects.  As 
we will see in the second part of this chapter, MIR is one of the very few 
French anti-racist movements which would fully accept Simon's analysis 
of the continuing importance of ethnicity, seeing the racial hierarchies and 
stereotyping inherited from the colonial period as pivotal in determining 
the life-chances of an individual in contemporary society. 
 
But what of SOS?  As may be expected given the movement's strongly 
republican-based ideology, it belongs to the first of the schools of thought 
set out above: one which states, as Éric Ferrand puts it, that 'La 
République exclut [^] toute forme de régression du sentiment national à 
l'identité ethnique, culturelle ou religieuse' (2007: 10).  Accordingly, over 
the period examined in this thesis SOS has shown itself, consistently and 
repeatedly, to be opposed to the idea of keeping ethnic statistics as a 
means of organising the fight against discrimination and measuring the 
effectiveness of any measures taken.  But what, more specifically, are the 
grounds for SOS’s hostility towards such measures?  One answer can be 
found in the response (touched upon earlier in this section) by the 
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organisation’s President Dominique Sopo to his counterpart in the French 
'Black' association CRAN, Patrick Lozès, following the latter's comments 
in favour of ethnic statistics in 2009.  According to Sopo: 
 “[D]emander de façon exhaustive et répétée aux personnes de se 
déterminer sur un spectre ethno-racial, c'est – alors que cela n'a aucune 
utilité en matière de lutte contre les discriminations – pousser la 
population à racialiser son identité et à la figer alors qu'une des grandes 
forces de la France, c'est précisement que les identités y sont fluides et 
qu'elles sont avant tout fondées sur une référence à une citoyenneté 
politique.” ('Discriminations: évitons les faux débats', 7.4.2009) 
 
Although the argument that keeping ethnic statistics is of 'aucune utilité' 
can be and has been questioned (as we shall see later on in this section), 
Sopo's statement is entirely consistent with the movement's ideology as 
discussed in the thesis up to this point.  His critique of the potential 
'racialisation' of identities is, as may be recalled from chapter 5, of a piece 
with his denunciation of any discourse which serves to paint France's 
'ethnic minorities' not as individuals but as representatives of a 
'community'.  The quotation is also representative of SOS's rejection of 
'frozen' and unchanging identities in a wider sense.  Indeed, the 
statement can be seen as an implicit restating of the movement's ideal of 
a République métissée, discussed in chapter 4, an ideal which rejects 
both multiculturalism (in the sense of separate 'closed' communities with 
their own cultural traditions) and the inflexible and backwards-looking 
vision of national identity favoured by Sarkozy (a vision which itself is 
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arguably 'racialised'), in favour of an identity which is diverse and 
constantly evolving ('une des grandes forces de la France, c'est 
précisement que les identités y sont fluides...'), but is still conceived of 
within the political and social structures of the Republic ('...et qu'elles sont 
avant tout fondées sur une référence à une citoyenneté politique.') 
 
Similar objections can be found in SOS's reaction to a report by the 
Franco-Algerian businessman Yazid Sabeg, the 'commissaire à l'égalité 
des chances' in the Fillon government, who like Lozès proposed the idea 
of keeping ethnic statistics as a means of measuring the effectiveness of 
action taken against discrimination.  For SOS, the idea is a threat to 
'cohésion nationale'; is representative of a 'dynamique communautariste'; 
and threatens to cause '[la] fragmentation de la société' and 'le 
remplacement de la recherche de l'égalité entre les individus par la 
recherche d'un équilibre entre les communautés.' ('Yazid Sabeg et la 
“mesure de la diversité”: des déclarations inquiétantes', 2009).  And the 
movement was similarly voluble in its opposition to a proposed change in 
immigration legislation in 2007, which was to authorise the collection of 
ethnic statistics: in an SOS petition against the move, signatories 
(including François Hollande, then General Secretary of the PS) were 
asked to assent to statements such as the following: 
 “Je refuse que quiconque me demande ma couleur de peau, mon 
origine et ma religion.  Je refuse que l’on puisse faire de même avec mon 
conjoint, mes enfants, mes parents.  Je refuse que mon identité soit 
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réduite à des critères d’un autre temps, celui de la France coloniale, ou 
de Vichy.” (‘Campagne contre la statistique ethnique’, 2007) 
The movement's position, then, is clear.  Distinguishing between 
members of the French population on ethnic grounds is unacceptable 
under any circumstances, without exception.  It is seen as being contrary 
to, and a threat to, the founding principles of the Republic. 
 
This being the case, how does this uncompromising positioning translate 
into concrete policy proposals?  The association's anti-discrimination 
initiatives over my chosen period can be illustrated by two appeals, the 
first relating to housing and the second employment, launched circa 2006.  
To take the first of these examples, in an appeal entitled 'Faire reculer la 
discrimination dans les HLM', the movement noted that ‘les émeutes de 
novembre dernier nous ont rappelé le caractère insupportable de la 
discrimination raciale qui engendre la ségrégation raciale et nourrit la 
révolte sociale’.  This line of argument echoes that taken by SOS during 
the 2005 riots themselves: the organisation, rather than focusing 
specifically on the pronouncements of Sarkozy and his allies, took the 
opportunity to remind the government that ghettoïsation, exacerbated by 
the long-term failures of official policy, was a contributory factor in the 
violence, and that the solution was to ensure republican égalité was a 
reality for every citizen, including those in the poorer suburbs.  The 
appeal on social housing aims to take action to these ends, noting that ‘la 
loi promet à chacun un droit égal au logement'.  And, in keeping with the 
ideology discussed in this chapter, the movement is highly critical of the 
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unspoken practice amongst local housing boards of discriminating 
between candidates on ethnic grounds: 'Il est totalement interdit de limiter 
le droit d’un individu en raison d’un seuil ou d’un quota'.  As is often the 
case, SOS bases its argument here on its interpretation of republican 
values, and amongst republican values, the movement places the 
greatest emphasis on equality: the appeal states that ‘l’égalité entre tous, 
quelle que soit notre origine et notre nationalité doit être notre ambition 
commune’.  The organisation proposes to implement this equality via 
‘l’anonymisation des candidatures’.  As noted in Manifeste pour l’égalité, 
 “Les offices HLM n’ont pas besoin de savoir le nom des 
demandeurs de logements ou leur lieu de naissance.  Les seules 
informations nécessaires au traitement d’une demande de HLM sont les 
revenus, la composition familiale ainsi que l’ancienneté de la demande.” 
(2007: 140) 
This ‘anonymisation’, it is hoped by the movement, will promote a 
‘brassage de populations’ (2007: 141), referred to in the appeal as ‘la 
mixité sociale’.  In turn, the ‘mixing’ of different populations brought about 
by the theoretical impossibility of racial discrimination, allied to a 
proposed increase in the stock of social housing (2007: 135), is seen as a 
means of fighting against ghettoïsation.   
 
A similar logic applies to the movement's appeal against discrimination in 
employment, entitled ‘Pour une égalité d’accès à l’entretien d’embauche: 
Le CV anonyme’.  That is, the logic that anonymity of candidates is an 
effective way of fighting prejudice: 
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 “Pourquoi s’intéresser aux prénoms et noms, au sexe, à l’adresse 
ou à l’âge d’une personne quand on cherche un commercial ou un 
ingénieur?  Objectivement, cela ne sert à rien!” 
As with much of SOS's action over my chosen period, the underlying 
basis is that of equality of opportunity, an idea seen by the movement as 
central to a fair and 'anti-racist' society.  The logic of the initiative is that 
because CVs under this proposal would contain no name, address or 
photograph, potential candidates could not be stereotyped by employers 
and thus rejected without an interview.  The candidate, therefore, would 
have the opportunity to promote their cause in an interview when, 
according to SOS, they would previously have been rejected out of hand: 
 “Grâce au CV anonyme les candidats auront les mêmes chances 
d’accéder à un entretien d’embauche.  Le recruteur n’aura pas d’autre 
choix que de se concentrer sur les compétences des individus plutôt que 
sur leur état civil.” 
Whilst aspects of this idea can be questioned – for example, could 
employers not reject a candidate on racial grounds having interviewed 
them?  And could employers not feel that they had 'done their bit' by 
simply interviewing 'minority' candidates, thus relieving any potential guilt 
at not giving them the job? – it is illustrative of SOS's thinking on social 
justice and its links with republican ideology, and at the time of writing is 
still a major part of the organisation's plans for promoting such social 
justice in French society20. 
 
                                                 
20 See for example the official website of SOS’s campaign for anonymous CVs 
(http://www.justsignit.fr/), set up in 2013 
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On the evidence of the examples studied in this section then, much of 
SOS’s anti-discrimination action over my chosen timeframe focused on 
making ethnic origin invisible to gatekeepers of social opportunity.  This 
positioning was accompanied by a refusal to take into account ethnic 
statistics.  It can perhaps be seen, therefore, as a literal enforcement of 
the Republic’s proclaimed ‘colour-blindness’.  How can these proposals 
be evaluated?  Certain analysts argue on very similar lines to SOS: 
Gérard Noiriel, for instance, is highly sceptical of ethnic statistics 
(‘L’histoire montre que lorsqu’un pouvoir administratif impose de 
nouvelles catégories statistiques, celles-ci sont utilisées ensuite par les 
acteurs du champ politique qui les transforment en personnages pour 
alimenter leurs récits sur “eux” et “nous”.’ (2007b: 77)), and argues that 
ethnically-based anti-racism can end up hiding other more important 
issues, such as the fight for equality in socio-economic terms.   
 
Others, however, argue that this approach must be called into question: 
De Rudder et al, for example, argue that the republican notion of the 
‘individu-citoyen universel’ (2000: 7) and the consequent rejection of the 
entire notion of ‘minorities’ leads to serious difficulty in taking action 
against racial, ethnic or religious discrimination; while Alana Lentin takes 
a similar argument a stage further, seeing a inherent contradiction in 
mainstream ‘republican’ anti-racism in France, in that it is ‘constantly 
required to reconcile its opposition to discrimination on the grounds of 
difference with the republican principle that advocated a colour-blind 
approach’ (2004: 117).  Because of its rejection of ethnicity as a dividing 
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line between French inhabitants, SOS conceives of the fight against 
discrimination (as Noiriel counsels) in socio-economic terms, thus 
implicitly asserting the primacy of class over race as the central cleavage 
in French society.  This is a persuasive argument: it could certainly be 
held that a poor white person surely has more in common with a poor 
black person, than a poor white person does with a rich white person (as 
Tissot and Tévanian put it in their argument against 2009’s ‘identity 
debate’, for example, ‘[L]e “travailleur français” dont se réclame Sarkozy 
a davantage en commun avec son collègue de travail ou son voisin de 
palier étranger et/ou africain et/ou musulman et/ou sans papiers qu’avec 
Éric Besson [...] ou n’importe quel patron ou actionnaire franco-français’ 
(2010: 236)).  One potential issue however – one which supports Lentin’s 
idea of a contradiction between republican colour-blindness and the fight 
against discrimination based on difference – is with how to measure the 
effectiveness of measures taken against discrimination.  Without some 
form of ethnically-based statistics, how can the success of initiatives such 
as those discussed above in relation to employment and housing be 
judged?  Due to its outright rejection of ethnic monitoring, this is not a 
question answered by the movement over my chosen period – a potential 
weakness in SOS’s discourse.  Presumably it is hoped that action in 
favour of socio-economic equality will create racial equality as a by-
product, but leaving such an important issue to chance, while 
understandable purely at the level of the movement’s proclaimed ideology, 
can be seen as a major omission in its anti-discrimination action. 
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In the first section of this chapter, I have considered the positions of SOS 
Racisme on the question of ‘race’.  The association, in keeping with the 
Republic’s proclaimed ‘colour-blindness’, rejects entirely the idea that 
race and ethnicity have any part to play in French society, thus 
representing the dominant view within the mainstream French anti-racist 
movement21.  In the first part of the section, I considered the question of 
why the organisation rejects this idea in principle.  In the second 
meanwhile, I considered the question of what this rejection means in 
practice, by looking at its discourse on discrimination.  While many 
analysts see potential difficulties in attempting to use universalist 
republicanism as a means of fighting discrimination, SOS bases its anti-
discrimination strategy entirely on these grounds, calling for 
anonymisation of candidates for jobs and housing and conceiving of 
equality in socio-economic rather than racial terms.  In the second section 
of the chapter, I will consider the viewpoints of MIR, which sees the 
question of race in French society in a very different way. 
 
 
MIR: ‘republican racism’ and the primacy of the ‘racial question’ 
 
The majority of mainstream French political actors – SOS Racisme, as 
we have seen, very much included – see republican principles as the 
                                                 
21 See for example the view of MRAP that ‘il n'y a qu'une race, la race humaine’ 
(http://www.mrap.fr/contre-le-racisme-sous-toutes-ses-formes/suppression-du-mot-
abracebb-une-premiere-mesure-qui-en-appelle-dautres/), that ‘C'est au nom de la 
prétendue existence de « races » que les crimes les plus monstrueux ont été commis 
dans l'histoire de l'humanité’ (ibid), and that ‘nous sommes tous des égaux, partageant 
les mêmes Droits de l’Homme garantis par la Constitution française’ 
(http://www.mrap.fr/tout-savoir-sur-le-mrap/histoire/combats-du-siecle-et-daujourdhui) 
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antidote to racism and discrimination.  Where differences of opinion occur, 
they relate to the interpretation of these principles, how they can be 
applied in society, which ones should be prioritised, and so on.  Despite 
these differences (as can be seen for example in the differences between 
the 'republicanism' of SOS Racisme and the 'republicanism' of Sarkozy) 
there is little thought given to the idea that the principles themselves 
should be called into question.  The major difference, then, between MIR 
and the majority of mainstream French political thought on this subject is 
the following: far from seeing republicanism as the solution to the 
question of racism, the Indigènes see racism as existing within republican 
ideology, an argument of a piece with the movement’s insistence that the 
problem is systemic, rather than relating to a problem between individuals 
or groups.  In this argument, MIR, as in a number of cases, appears to 
draw on the theories of Étienne Balibar, who as noted in chapter 1, writes 
in Les frontières de la démocratie that: 
“[L]a thèse principale que je defends est celle de la structure 
institutionnelle du racisme.  Tout racisme n'est pas un racisme d'État, 
officialisé, mais tout racisme est ancré [^] dans la structure des 
institutions et dans le rapport conscient ou inconscient des individus et 
des masses à ces institutions.” (1992: 11) 
 
The assumption underlying much of the mainstream discourse mentioned 
above is that republicanism is, by definition, universal: there should be no 
differentiation between France’s inhabitants based on ethnicity or origin.  
If this type of differentiation is found to have taken place, the solution (a 
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recurrent theme in the ideology of SOS Racisme) is to work harder at 
implementing republican ideology throughout society, in other words to 
work harder at becoming genuinely ‘universal’.  MIR, on the other hand, 
reverses these widespread assumptions by referring in its discourse to 
'white universalism' (an oxymoronic concept for any believer in 
republicanism), and indeed to the 'white Republic'.  Take, for example, 
this extract from a 2011 conference speech by the movement’s de facto 
leader Houria Bouteldja: 
 “En France, les indigènes ont pris l’arme de la race pour combattre 
une rhétorique redoutable: l’universalisme.  Un universalisme blanc qui 
masque et nie les hiérarchies structurelles qui constituent la république 
française.”  (Houria Bouteldja, ‘Le “racisme anti-blanc” des Indigènes de 
la République’, 2.6.2011) 
In other words, for MIR the ‘universalist’ principles which were inherited 
from the Enlightenment, and went on to form the basis of republican 
ideology, were only ever truly applicable to white populations of European 
origin.  As may be recalled from the earlier section on MIR and 
colonialism, this contradiction manifested itself historically in the mission 
civilisatrice rationale for France’s colonial enterprise: if the values 
favoured by France were genuinely universal, why was it supposedly 
necessary to impose them forcibly upon the native populations of the 
colonies?  What is more, Bouteldja argues, the widespread belief in the 
universalist nature of republican values has served to cover up the 
systemic nature of racism and discrimination in French society. 
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For MIR, then, the Republic is not a safeguard against racial inequalities, 
it is fundamentally based on racial inequalities, an idea spelled out 
explicitly in the manifesto of the PIR: 
“La République est un système politique, idéologique et social 
basé sur les inégalités raciales au sein de l’Hexagone, à l’encontre de 
l’immigration coloniale et de ses enfants et plus spécifiquement des Noirs, 
des Arabes et des musulmans.” (Parti des Indigènes de la République, 
‘Principes politiques généraux du Parti des Indigènes de la République’, 
2010) 
It is the movement's position that the prevalence of race as a determining 
factor in French society can be attributed to the formation of the French 
nation-state.  As Florence Bernault (in Tshimanga, Gondola and Bloom, 
eds., 2009) puts it: 
 “For the Indigènes, race is not prior to, or distinct from, the project 
of modern nation-building, but has historically emerged as a state-
sponsored tool of distancing and othering, while the French republican 
order, under the pretense of imposing universal civil rights over cultural 
and racial loyalties, has essentialised racial and cultural differences.” 
(2009: 129) 
 
Institutional racism, therefore, is seen by MIR as an intrinsic part of the 
modern nation-state, and more specifically of the French Republic.  But 
how does the movement itself use the concept of ‘race’?  It is this 
question I now intend to consider.  In the conference speech cited earlier 
in this section, Bouteldja states that ‘Pour le PIR, la race existe, les races 
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sociales existent.’ (‘Le “racisme anti-blanc” des Indigènes de la 
République’, 2011)  This idea is at the centre of the movement’s 
discourse on race: that of ‘social races’.  It is expanded upon by MIR 
member Pierre Tévanian in his 2008 book La mécanique raciste.  He 
writes that: 
 “Ce qui est faux est de nier toute existance à “la race”, car si les 
races n’existent pas en tant que réalités biologiques, elles existent bel et 
bien en tant que croyance collective, et cette croyance se répercute dans 
la réalité sous la forme de paroles et d’actes – injures, discriminations – 
qui font qu’être Blanc et être Noir sont deux expériences très différentes.” 
(2008: 79) 
In other words, as he goes on to put it, ‘il est vrai que nous ne sommes 
des Noirs, des Arabes ou des Blancs [...] que dans le regard de l’autre’, 
but the problem is that ‘toute l’existence humaine est une existence avec 
les autres’ (ibid).  Of course, MIR is in accordance with the great majority 
of mainstream thought in their view that race is not a biological reality but 
a social construction.  Where the movement differs from many political 
actors, however – particularly those working in the tradition of French 
republicanism – is the conclusion drawn from this realisation.  For MIR, in 
order to fight against racism, it is necessary not to affirm that there is no 
such thing as ‘race’, but to recognise that, in practice, there is22.  This can 
of course be contrasted with the position of SOS Racisme: SOS, as we 
                                                 
22 MIR does not deny the existence of hierarchies and discrimination based on social 
class, but sees them as subordinate to those based on race.  In a 2012 piece arguing 
that recognition of white privilege is a prerequisite for the creation of an effective anti-
racist movement, for instance, MIR member Atman Zerkaoui argues that ‘oppression 
économique, certes réelle [...] n’explique pas l’écrasement des non-blancs’ (‘Il nous faut 
un antiracisme politique’, 19.8.2012)   
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have seen, refuse to differentiate between races, however they are 
conceived, preferring to concentrate on promoting a ‘universal’, ‘colour-
blind’ conception of equality. 
 
For MIR, the ingrained existence of social races in French society has led 
to equally ingrained racial hierarchies.  As Sadri Khiari asks, for instance: 
 “Qu’est–ce qui spécifie la relation sociale qui produit et oppose, 
dans le même temps, des groupes sociaux hiérarchisés qui se pensent et 
s’opposent comme races, délimitées par des différences imaginées et 
réifiees?” (2009: 21) 
It can be seen across much of MIR’s discourse that the movement’s 
proclaimed aim is to end such hierarchies.  As is stated in the manifesto 
of the PIR: 
“Le PIR est un parti politique qui agit pour défaire le caractère 
impérial, colonial et racial de l’Etat français ainsi que tous les 
mécanismes qui contribuent au sein de la société à reproduire les 
hiérarchies raciales.” (Parti des Indigènes de la République, ‘Principes 
politiques généraux du Parti des Indigènes de la République’, 2010) 
There is a fundamental difference, then, in the role of anti-racism as seen 
by MIR, and the role of anti-racism as seen by republican-based 
movements like SOS Racisme.  In the view of MIR, as we have seen 
above, the predominant role of anti-racist movements should be to fight 
the racial hierarchies which continue to exert an influence on French 
society.  This is perhaps easier said than done, as such hierarchies are 
rarely, if ever, explicitly stated: rather, they are made up of generations of 
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stereotypes embedded in the subconscious mind of the population, and / 
or disguised as something else, such as a discussion of the 
incompatibility of various ‘immigrant’ cultures with that of France (as seen 
frequently in Sarkozy’s 2007 campaign speeches).  It is possibly the case 
that MIR sees increasing awareness of these hierarchies as the first step 
to doing something about them.  Nevertheless, leaving aside this issue, it 
is clear that the Indigènes see movements like SOS, which refuse – on 
the grounds of fidelity to republican values and fear of endorsing 
communautarisme – to differentiate between races as fundamentally in 
denial of social reality.  A similar argument has been made frequently in 
academic circles, although without impacting significantly on France's 
entrenched political culture.  As Achille Mbembe puts it for example, 
“[H]ow can we not be astonished that a country of such education, 
filled with so many brilliant minds, displays such an inability to understand 
that the abstract concept of radical equality can paradoxically serve as a 
veil to conceal state racism?” (2009: 58) 
 
It follows, therefore, that for MIR the most important cleavage in French 
society is not based on class, or wealth, or opportunities for social 
advancement, but race.  This is an absolutely central difference between 
MIR's positioning and that of SOS.  Whilst SOS is (of course) an anti-
racist movement, its underlying focus is on the 'social question': of 
fighting inequality and discrimination in French society on socio-economic 
grounds, with racial issues addressed only as a by-product.  For MIR on 
the other hand, the 'racial question' is paramount, with class, wealth and 
social opportunity seen as subsets of this central issue.  The primacy of 
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race as a determining factor is confirmed by Houria Bouteldja in the 2011 
interview cited throughout the discussion of MIR in this thesis: 
 “Il faut comprendre le système de domination, et les clivages.  
Nous, on est inscrit sur un clivage racial, et colonial.  C’est à dire que le 
clivage de classe – gauche/droite, riche/pauvre – pour nous, ce n’est pas 
suffisament pertinent pour qu’on comprenne la situation des indigènes en 
France.  Donc, pour nous le clivage le plus important, c’est le clivage 
racial.  Et nous disons que, si on veut lutter contre les discriminations, et 
pour plus de justice entre les blancs et les non-blancs, il faut comprendre 
le clivage racial; la fracture de race.  Que la race, comme phénomène 
socio-historique, existe.” (Interview 9.8.2011) 
 
Again, in this quotation it is possible to find major differences between 
MIR’s positions and those of SOS.  Firstly, there is the question of 
‘systems of domination’: broadly speaking, for SOS racism is something 
that takes place between an individual and an individual, or an individual 
and an institution (employers, housing associations, schools, etc.), and 
can be fought against through legal action, and state action in favour of 
equality.  For MIR on the other hand, racism is systemic, or even, as we 
have seen earlier in this chapter, intrinsic to the formation of the modern 
nation-state.  Secondly, there is the idea of ‘justice entre les blancs et les 
non-blancs’.  As has been noted throughout this section so far, this 
separation is something that SOS would simply not countenance: as Loïc 
Rigaud of the organisation’s anti-discrimination department puts it in a 
2011 interview, ‘En France, on considère que tous les citoyens sont 
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égaux, et qu’on ne peut pas différencier les gens en raison de leurs 
origines’ (Interview 29.3.2011).  For MIR however (as noted above) this 
attitude is a result of wilful blindness towards social realities: in the view 
of the movement’s key thinkers and analysts, race forms the essential 
dividing line between populations in France.  And within this, as we shall 
see shortly, the central cleavage is between white and non-white 
populations. 
 
This focus by MIR on the continuing existence of racial divisions, 
contradicting the official republican viewpoint, has led to accusations of 
‘anti-white racism’.  These accusations are summed up by Bouteldja, in 
the 2011 speech quoted throughout this chapter, as follows: ‘Vous, les 
Indigènes, vous essentialisez les Blancs.  Vous les réduisez à leur 
couleur de peau.  Finalement, vous ne valez pas mieux que le Front 
National.  Vous faites du racisme anti-blanc.’ (‘Le “racisme anti-blanc” des 
Indigènes de la République’, 2011)  The movement’s key thinkers have 
addressed these accusations in a number of ways.  Firstly, there is the 
counter-accusation that, in effect, the movement’s critics have been 
blinded by republican dogma: that because their chosen ideology officially 
refuses to distinguish between races, discrimination based on race 
logically cannot exist.  This leads these critics, MIR’s counter-argument 
continues, to ignore the evidence that race is a determining factor in 
French society, instead choosing to shoot the messenger, by blaming 
racially-related issues on groups like MIR which point them out.  
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Bouteldja, in the same piece, responds to these accusations by pointing 
out what she sees as their (perhaps deliberate) lack of logic: 
 “Dans la tête de nos détracteurs, parler de la race et en faire un 
enjeu politique a un pouvoir performatif en soi.  En d’autres termes, on 
crée la race en même temps qu’on en parle.  Constater, expliciter, 
analyser un phénomène équivaut à créer le phénomène.” (‘Le “racisme 
anti-blanc” des Indigènes de la République’, 2011) 
 
The central point in MIR’s reaction to these allegations of ‘anti-white 
racism’, however, relates to another recurring aspect of the movement’s 
discourse: that of the systemic nature of racism, or as Saïd Bouamama 
puts it, 'Le racisme en tant que processus de hiérarchisation sociale, 
économique et politique c'est-à-dire en tant qu'outil des systèmes de 
domination' (2009: 109).  More specifically, it is the argument of MIR’s 
leading analysts in this case that anti-white racism cannot be said truly to 
exist in contemporary western societies. The reason for this is that in their 
view, racism is not simply something that happens between individuals, 
but (as Bouamama notes) a system of domination: an act of the powerful 
against the powerless.  Khiari (2006) argues in this vein that racism 
should not be seen as an abstract notion, but within the context of the 
systems which form the framework of society: 
“S’il s’agit [referring to racism] de relations sociales et politiques [...] 
si l’on veut combattre la détestation de l’Autre qui en procède, on se doit 
de definir précisément ces relations sociales et politiques.” (2006: 92) 
 305 
Racism therefore, for Khiari and MIR, cannot be isolated from society: 
rather, it must be seen as inextricably linked.  As we shall see shortly, 
one of the ‘social and political relations’ noted above relates to the racial 
hierarchies touched upon earlier in this section.  Uncomfortable as it may 
be to talk about for those schooled in republican colour-blindness, it is a 
clear fact for MIR that, in French society as it currently stands, white 
people are ‘dominant’ and hold the vast majority of power in every field, 
while non-whites, particularly ‘post-colonised’ Blacks and Arabs, are 
‘dominated’, holding very little power.  We return, therefore, to the idea of 
racism as an act of the powerful against the powerless: Khiari argues that 
different types of ‘racism’ must be distinguished, depending on who is 
speaking, who is being targeted, and their relative positions of power in 
society: 
 “[O]n ne peut evidemment identifier dans une même catégorie la 
haine raciale du dominant à l’encontre du dominé et la haine raciale du 
dominé à l’encontre du dominant.  Toutes deux sont produites par le 
même système raciste mais l’une est un agent actif tandis que l’autre 
constitue une réaction voire une forme de résistance au système raciste.  
L’une est armée, l’autre est désarmée.” (ibid) 
In addition to a reiteration of MIR’s positions on the centrality of the racial 
cleavage in French society and the systemic nature of racism, this 
argument could also be seen as a more or less overt attack on the 
‘universalist’, or ‘consensual’ conception of anti-racism, as represented by 
movements such as SOS Racisme.  For MIR, this form of anti-racism 
chooses deliberately to decontextualise the acts of discrimination it 
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targets, by focusing on the acts themselves rather than the racial power 
relations which underpin them.  A colour-blind form of anti-racism, in their 
view, is clearly insufficient when firstly, society is not in reality ‘colour-
blind’, and when secondly, not all forms of racism are equal. 
 
Linked to this idea of the dominant / dominated relationship within racism, 
and the connected question of racial power relations in French society, is 
the idea that all white people, regardless of social class, benefit from 
social privileges due to their race.  Tévanian (2008: 74) argues that like 
‘Black’ or ‘Arab’, ‘Blanc n’est en effet pas une catégorie raciale, mais une 
catégorie sociale’ – but unlike the privileges that arise from being part of 
the visible majority, non-white populations suffer from disadvantages in 
society based on their skin colour.  This idea recurs a number of times in 
MIR’s discourse over my chosen timeframe.  To take one example, it is 
discussed by Khiari in Pour une politique de la racaille, where it is linked 
to another of the movement’s preferred themes, that of the legacy of 
colonialism in contemporary French society.  As he puts it, ‘on ne peut 
pas de toute façon considérer que tous les Français blancs soient 
racistes, quand bien même – admettons-le aussi – ils bénéficieraient 
indirectement et involontairement du régime postcolonial’ (2006: 90).  In 
this type of argument, Khiari and MIR seem to move the argument about 
racism completely away from anything related to individual agency, and 
posit it instead as something entirely systemic: white populations benefit 
from the ‘postcolonial régime’ whether they like it or not, and conversely, 
non-white populations suffer from it.  This critique reinforces the argument 
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touched upon in the previous paragraph: if MIR’s argument is correct, 
movements like SOS are missing the point by seeing racism as 
something that can be isolated and legislated against.   
 
Whilst MIR is justified, to at least some extent, in claiming that racism is 
systemic – for example, in the sense that stereotypes and negative 
representations of colonial populations have been perpetuated 
(consciously or unconsciously) throughout French history since the 
colonial period, and have come to apply to their descendants in 
contemporary society (see Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.), 2005) 
– this worldview has serious repercussions for MIR's ability to come up 
with a solution to the problems it describes.  The position comes across 
almost as an admission of defeat: if racism is systemic, and nothing but 
systemic, and always has been and always will be, effectively nothing can 
be done about it, short of a complete re-ordering of French society, a re-
ordering whose outlines are themselves left somewhat hazy in MIR's 
discourse.  It must be acknowledged, of course, that MIR's positioning is 
intentionally polemical and provocative, but in taking this all-or-nothing 
view the organisation seemingly cuts itself off from a whole field of 
practical action (such as that proposed by SOS against discrimination 
and in favour of equality of opportunity) which, while not solving the 
problem of systemic racism, has the potential, if properly applied, to make 
a genuine difference to the lives of France's disfavoured populations. 
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The legacy of colonialism, Khiari's argument continues, is founded on 
ethnic and cultural discrimination.  And this discrimination, he argues, 
forms stronger barriers than social class: 
 “De ce point de vue, les personnes qui ne sont pas issues de la 
colonisation font partie de la société dominante même si elles y sont 
intégrées dans une position subalterne.  Elles appartiennent au monde 
des dominants même si elles ont fait le choix de nier subjectivement leur 
propre situation.” (2006: 91) 
Social relations, thus, are ‘ethnicised’, an insight far from unique to MIR 
(as Silverman writes for example, 'When the frontiers of national identity 
are racialised, neither legal immigrant status nor French nationality 
necessarily confer legitimacy.' (1992: 136)).  There is a ‘dominant’ 
population specified as ‘white’, and a ‘dominated’ population specified as 
‘non-white’, even if the reference to skin colour is often masked by 
references to culture (as in Sarkozy’s 2007 election campaign, for 
instance).  Furthermore, as (perceived) ethnicity is, in MIR’s view, a 
stronger social determiner than social class, it would seem to be 
impossible for a white person, however poor, to ever entirely become part 
of the ‘dominated’ population.  Conversely, for MIR a Black or Arab who 
succeeds in moving up in society will never entirely leave behind their 
status as part of the ‘dominated’ population: they will still be stopped by 
the police, still be the subject of racial discrimination, still be suspected of 
not being truly ‘French’.  MIR’s positions on the primacy of race within 
social relations would be highly discomfiting for anyone raised to believe 
that the French Republic is (firstly) ‘colour-blind’, and (secondly) a 
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meritocracy – perhaps one of the reasons why the movement’s discourse 
has often faced a hostile reception from mainstream commentators.  For 
MIR, however, an acknowledgement of this situation is a prerequisite for 
a movement towards a truly anti-racist – or post-racist? – society. 
 
It is clear, however, that no such official acknowledgement was evident 
during the period examined in this thesis, a situation which has changed 
little since.  Many major aspects of society relating to the question of race, 
aspects which in MIR’s view required systemic change, have therefore 
been left unaddressed.  As was noted in chapter 4 for instance, there is 
the question of French identity being perceived as white, Christian and 
European.  Most importantly, however, there is the question of race in 
relation to the French political system.  As Stefan Kipfer (2011: 1162) 
points out, a further recurring point in MIR’s discourse is that the political 
system itself is ‘racialised’.  It is, to use Khiari’s phrase, a ‘champ politique 
blanc’, or ‘white political arena’.  All mainstream political parties are 
included within this ‘arena’, the PS just as much as the UMP.  In Khiari’s 
view these parties can be defined as ‘white’ because they contribute to 
the reproduction of ethnic hierarchies in postcolonial society (2006: 57).  
That is, they do nothing to change the status quo of white domination, as 
discussed above.  He argues that they cannot claim to represent the 
whole population while this is the case: 
 “Ces partis politiques qui agissent en fonction des enjeux d’un 
champ politique dont sont exclus les non-Blancs; ces partis, dirigés par 
des Blancs, occupés par des adhérents presque exclusivement blancs, 
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sont donc des partis blancs.  C’est mentir que de les prétendre 
“universels”.” (ibid) 
Note that this argument is of a piece with that discussed at the start of 
this section: for MIR, ‘universalism’, in practice, is not ‘universal’ but 
‘white’.  Khiari specifies that the ‘champ politique blanc’ can include non-
whites, but they are engaged to fight for interests that are not their own.  
Note also that, for Khiari, SOS Racisme is unambiguously part of the 
‘champ politique blanc’: it is, he writes, ‘une entreprise 
d’exclusion/inclusion’ (2006: 60).  That is to say, like the mainstream 
political parties mentioned above, it ‘includes’ a few non-white members, 
but ‘excludes’ discussion of the major issues which concern them. 
 
France’s political system, then, is characterised by MIR as a ‘champ 
politique blanc’, run almost entirely by the ‘dominant’ white population, in 
their own interests.  This system, furthermore, exists within a ‘white 
imperial Europe’, to quote the 2010 manifesto of the PIR.  Although he 
did not invent it, Sarkozy is seen as representative of this system and its 
faults.  As Minister of the Interior, firstly, Khiari argues that Sarkozy based 
his strategy around aggravating divisions between the different ‘social 
races’.  Symbolic security for France’s white populations was his priority: 
to make these populations ‘secure’, it was considered necessary to 
‘terrorise’ non-whites (2009: 170) – hence his ‘militarised’ approach to the 
banlieues, particularly during the riots of 2005.  Secondly, there is his 
election as President in 2007.  Sarkozy’s win, despite the contradictions 
in his campaign and his apparent indifference to what should (particularly 
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in economic terms) be the concerns of the majority of his voters, can be 
explained by the racial cleavage discussed throughout this section.  He 
represents, in Khiari’s view, ‘la défense de la suprématie blanche à 
l’échelle mondiale et dans l’espace hexagonal.  Sarkozy a gagné grâce à 
un vote de race’ (2009: 206).  Once again, the primacy of race as a 
determining and dividing factor in French society is emphasised: it has 
surpassed, for MIR, both social class and the traditional political division 
between left and right.  The subtext is the same one that has been seen a 
number of times during this section: mainstream politics must admit the 
continuing influence of race on society, in order to begin ‘deracialising’ 
and ‘decolonising’.  Hidebound by republican ideology, however, it is 
collectively unwilling or unable to do so. 
 
MIR’s positions, then, would seem to be in contradiction with what Gemie 
(2010: 148) accurately calls ‘the forceful attempts by the French state to 
deny the validity of identities based on ethnic criteria’.  Having said this, in 
the view of its activists MIR is not an ethnically-based movement.  
According to the 2005 document ‘Qui sommes nous’, an early attempt to 
outline the movement’s thinking, ‘Le ‘Nous’ des Indigènes de la 
République n’est ni ethnique, ni religieux, ni culturel, ni à base d’origine.’  
MIR is, however, opposed to those who deny the importance of 
discrimination based on (racial) origin: 
 “Nous nous construisons en opposition à celles et ceux qui nient 
l’existence des disriminations en raison de l’origine, à celles et ceux qui 
les reconnaissent mais les considèrent comme secondaires, à celles et 
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ceux qui les reconnaissent mais adoptent une posture de l’impuissance.” 
(Mouvement des Indigènes de la République, ‘Qui sommes nous?’, 2005) 
Achieving the movement’s goal of a ‘décolonial’ society, Bouteldja argues 
in the 2011 interview cited throughout the present work’s analysis of MIR, 
means understanding that ‘les blancs ne sont pas le centre du monde.  
Les références des blancs, les priorités des blancs, ne sont pas les 
priorités du monde, et ne sont pas les priorités des indigènes.’ (Interview 
9.8.2011)  Again, therefore, it is implied that France’s political system has 
failed to do this: its proclaimed ‘universalism’ only truly applies to the 
majority white population.  Achieving this goal, Khiari (2009) argues, also 
involves moving away from the ‘anonymous’ systemic racism which 
draws a line (implicitly) between the ‘dominant’ race, considered as white, 
Christian, civilised, Western and ‘universal’; and the ‘dominated’ race, 
considered as ‘savage’, Black, Muslim, terrorist, immigrant (and so on).  
But how can this be done?  Is it possible to create a ‘champ politique non-
blanc’?  This question is considered by Khiari in his 2006 book, but he 
argues that it is not possible to give a simple answer.  Paradoxically, he 
points out, ‘sa finalité n’est pas d’exister mais de disparaître avec la 
disparition du champ politique blanc en tant que blanc.’ (2006: 58).  Until 
such time as the French political system gives equal respect to its 
inhabitants, regardless of racial origin, cultural practices and citizenship 
status, however, MIR’s role would seem to be to continue as a politically 
and intellectually autonomous movement, and to continue posing the 
awkward questions that ‘postcolonial’ Western societies have yet to 
resolve. 
 313 
 
In this chapter, I have considered the positions of my two chosen 
movements in regard to the question of ‘race’, or more specifically, 
whether it continues to exert an influence on contemporary French 
society, and whether the acknowledgement of ethnic difference has any 
part to play in the anti-racist movement.  The answers given to these 
questions are strongly illustrative when it comes to considering their 
differing positions in respect to their relationships with France’s 
mainstream republican political culture.  I began by looking at SOS which, 
as was illustrated with examples from press releases, official publications 
and anti-discrimination initiatives, takes entirely at face value the French 
constitution's statement that: 'La France est une République indivisible, 
laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous 
les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion.'  SOS's 
position can be contrasted with that of MIR, which sees racial hierarchies 
and discrimination as ingrained within France's republican political 
structures, and which therefore chooses to give the 'racial question' 
primacy over the 'social question'.   
 
Aspects of both these approaches can potentially be questioned.  SOS is 
to some extent representative of the contradiction in mainstream French 
anti-racism identified by Alana Lentin, in that it is 'constantly required to 
reconcile its opposition to discrimination on the grounds of difference with 
the republican principle that advocated a colour-blind approach' (2004: 
117).  That is, because of its rejection of any form of ethnic monitoring, 
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SOS cannot take targeted action against discrimination and cannot 
accurately judge the effectiveness of the measures it does take.  Instead, 
it must rely on what De Rudder at al call 'bricolages' (2000: 15): actions 
which target problems with a significant ethnic or racial dimension, but 
which can only be conceived of on 'socio-territorial' grounds.  In relation 
to MIR, meanwhile, a significant objection is raised by Laurent Lévy, a 
member of the organisation, only to be immediately discounted.  
Discussing objections to MIR from its potential allies in the radical Left, 
Lévy notes that a frequent issue raised was that the movement was 
forgetting 'la “question sociale”, entendue comme “question économique”', 
in favour of 'une “question ethnique”', 'dont certains acceptaient et 
d'autres refusait d'admettre l'existence, mais dont tous s'accordaient à 
dire qu'elle ne pouvait en aucun cas être mise au premier plan.' (2010: 
79)23.   
 
SOS, as has frequently been the case over these comparative chapters, 
has – in its emphasis on practical action against discrimination and in 
favour of social equality – a plan which, if properly supported by those in 
political power, would potentially have numerous social benefits.  It would 
arguably be beneficial, however, if the movement could show more 
                                                 
23 MIR has had a somewhat ambiguous relationship with the radical Left since its 
foundation.  As Gemie notes for example, following the appearance of MIR’s founding 
Appel in 2005 the Trotskyist group Lutte Ouvrière ‘published a stern critique rebuking the 
indigènes for ignoring the importance of class, and for trying to fight racism with 
communautarisme’ (2010: 145).  At the same time however, as may be recalled from 
chapter 3, the movement has made common cause with the Communist Party in its 
memorial claims-making over the events of October 1961 in Paris, and has collaborated 
a number of times with the Nouveau Parti anticapitaliste (Interview with Houria Bouteldja 
9.8.2011), a party which has frequently addressed issues around immigration and 
Islamophobia, and whose selection of a veil-wearing female Muslim candidate in the 
regional elections caused substantial controversy in France (‘Le NPA présente une 
candidate voilée’, Le Figaro 2.2.2010)     
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flexibility in cases such as those identified by Lentin and De Rudder 
above, and it could perhaps give more thought to the question of how to 
reconcile initiatives against discrimination based on race and ethnicity 
with a political ideology which refuses to take race and ethnicity into 
account.  As for MIR, I would be in agreement with the critics addressed 
(and dismissed) by Lévy: it is far too quick to dismiss the class dimension 
of social inequalities.  What is more, as noted earlier in the chapter, the 
movement's presentation of racism as purely systemic implicitly argues 
that nothing, short of a complete rethinking of French society, can be 
done about it: not a particularly useful or realistic position for any 
organisation hoping to effect genuine change in a society.  It must be 
noted, however, that the two movements have very different aims and 
purposes: SOS, for the most part, is a practical and pragmatic movement 
which aims to create its ideal society incrementally, by lobbying those in 
political power to take practical action in favour of republican equality.  
MIR, on the other hand, is more interested in polemics and provocation 
than it is in the practicalities of reform and compromise, but nevertheless 
still has a potential role to play in the French political landscape: the role 
of keeping unwelcome but important issues such as race and colonialism 
in the public eye, when due to the awkward questions they raise, those in 
charge all too often want to forget them.  The movements are 
fundamentally very different, but despite their mutual antipathy and the 
apparent incompatibility of their worldviews, there is no reason why they 
should not co-exist within the field of French anti-racism. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this thesis I have examined two contrasting anti-racist organisations – 
SOS Racisme and the Mouvement des Indigènes de la République – 
within a unique but under-researched political context for the anti-racist 
movement.  The period from 2005 to 2009, I have argued, represents the 
height of the pervasiveness of the conservative and exclusive conception 
of national identity associated with Nicolas Sarkozy, and contains 
numerous key events which placed this discourse in the spotlight: the 
widespread urban disturbances of autumn 2005, during which Sarkozy as 
Interior Minister came to national prominence; the 2007 presidential 
election campaign, within which Sarkozy placed unprecedented emphasis 
on national identity, defined in a way which implicitly served to stigmatise 
immigrants and France’s Muslim population; the announcement in the 
same year of a new ‘Ministry of Immigration and National Identity’, which 
rested on the assumption that these two issues were in opposition to one 
another; and the ‘great debate’ on national identity launched in late 2009, 
a debate which its critics saw as legitimising racist viewpoints24.   
 
This period also saw an apparent consensus on the language of 
republicanism from political actors on almost every part of the ideological 
spectrum – ‘de Jean-Luc Mélenchon à Marine Le Pen’, as Philippe Petit 
                                                 
24 As the Libération / SOS Racisme petition against the debate argues, for example, ‘les 
débats sur l’identité nationale sont apparus comme des espèces de libération d’une 
parole raciste, prompte à remettre en cause de façon insidieuse ou explicite, la légitimité 
de la présence sur le sol national de catégories entières de la population.’ (‘Arrêtez ce 
débat, monsieur le Président!’, 20.12.2009) 
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and Alexis Lacroix put it in Marianne in 2011 (‘République-démocratie: 
reprenons le débat!’, 22.1.2011) – but no equivalent consensus on its 
underlying meaning.  This meant that the inherently flexible idea of 
republicanism could be evoked in support of practically any political 
position (Sieffert 2006, Waters 2012).  Thus, at the same time as Sarkozy 
was indirectly using the Republic as a means of stigmatising minority 
populations, via a discourse which presented it as under threat from 
communautarisme, seen as being to all intents and purposes 
synonymous with Islam (Noiriel 2007a), SOS’s position was that racism 
could only be fought by taking action designed to make the principles of 
the Republic work in reality, via initiatives against discrimination and in 
favour of equality of opportunity.   
 
It should also be noted, finally, that the period saw substantial 
controversy around the legacies of colonialism, a controversy typified by 
the debates sparked by the proposed law of 23rd February 2005, which 
was to evoke ‘le rôle positif de la présence française outre-mer, 
notamment en Afrique du Nord’ (LOI n° 2005-158 du 23 février 2005, 
accessed at http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr).  These debates on the 
legacies of colonialism could be seen in Sarkozy’s discourse on ‘anti-
repentance’, a discourse which rejected any critical examination of 
controversial or shameful periods of French history, and placed suspicion 
on those who questioned his patriotic roman national vision of the 
country’s past, such as left-wing critical historians, or post-colonial 
immigrants and their descendants.   
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This combination of defining factors – a conservative discourse on 
national identity within which immigration is presented as a threat; a 
consensus on the language of republicanism but not its underlying 
meaning; and a rejection as ‘repentance’ of critical analysis of France’s 
colonial past – meant that my chosen period presented particular 
ideological and discursive challenges for both the movements examined 
in this thesis, despite the substantial differences in their respective 
ideologies.  The moderate republican movement SOS, as noted above, 
saw its chosen republican discourse being used as rhetorical cover for 
the stigmatisation of parts of the French population.  The radical anti-
colonial movement MIR, meanwhile, found itself entirely at odds with the 
prevailing political climate, with its emphasis on colonial memory seen as 
‘repentance’, and its support for immigrant populations’ cultural autonomy 
seen as communautarisme.   
 
Over the course of my research, it became clear that the fil conducteur 
running through each chapter in the thesis was the relationship between 
anti-racism and republicanism in the French context.  As noted above, 
republicanism is a central issue in the political context examined in the 
thesis, due to the way in which, because of the existence of a consensus 
on the theme, coupled with its inherent flexibility, it could be used as 
rhetorical cover for almost any political position – a situation which led to 
substantial difficulties for movements like SOS which themselves lay 
claim to ‘republican values’ as an ideological basis for anti-racism.   
 319 
 
More than this, however, it is my argument that contemporary anti-racism 
in France is defined by its relationship with republicanism, and that my 
chosen organisations are illustrative of two opposing conceptions of this 
relationship.  SOS, in keeping with the traditions of mainstream French 
anti-racism, constructs itself with reference to republicanism, drawing on 
the universalist Enlightenment ideals which form the basis of the concept 
(Lentin 2004, Koopmans et al 2005).  MIR, on the other hand, is highly 
critical of the Republic, arguing that despite its rhetoric of universal 
human rights, it has in reality engaged in ‘la colonisation et la répression, 
l’exclusion et le racisme’ (Héricord, Lévy and Khiari, ‘Indigènes de la 
République, réponses à quelques objections...’, 2005).   
 
Although SOS can be defined as being favourable towards the Republic 
and MIR can be defined as being against it, there are however certain 
ambiguities within these relationships.  SOS is frequently critical of 
political actors’ use of the language of republicanism, arguing that using 
such language (for example) to scapegoat immigration and Islam as 
being responsible for a supposed ‘crisis of identity’ only weakens the 
Republic’s perceived legitimacy; and frequently warns against letting 
republican values be reduced to an unthinking recitation, which ignores 
the requirement to take action aimed at making them a reality (Sopo 2005: 
41).  MIR, meanwhile, despite its critical view of the Republic, has itself at 
times laid claim to republican language, seemingly as a means of 
demanding a genuine universalising of its proclaimed principles: in its 
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founding Appel, for example, the movement proclaims the need for ‘une 
démocratie sociale véritablement égalitaire et universelle’ (Mouvement 
des Indigènes de la République, ‘L’appel des indigènes de la république’, 
2005).  Whilst contemporary anti-racism in France is defined by its 
relationship with republicanism, therefore, this relationship works in 
complex and contradictory ways. 
 
The respective relationships with republicanism of the movements 
examined in this thesis have both strengthened and impeded their ability 
to act effectively against racism and discrimination.  To begin with SOS – 
as we have seen, a consistent supporter of republican ideology as an 
ideological basis for French anti-racism – we can say that a benefit of its 
positioning is that in emphasising a discourse based around 
republicanism, it is arguing the case for an ideology that the great 
majority of the French population already support.  Because of this, the 
task of building a consensus around this conception of anti-racism is 
easier than building one around a discourse which calls into question the 
ideologies and structures of republican society, even if the task of 
movements like SOS is complicated by the discriminatory, exclusionary 
conception of republicanism used by figures such as Sarkozy and Marine 
Le Pen.  Similarly, SOS also presents, in its discourse on the République 
métissée, a potentially consensual alternative conception of national 
identity, one compatible with the ‘republican consensus’ and the 
republican centre-left represented by much of the socialist government 
elected in 2012, but one which at the same time rejects Sarkozy’s 
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discourse, in favour of an open vision of French culture combined with a 
literal ‘mixing’ of populations (Qu’est-ce que SOS Racisme 2006, Gibb 
1998, 2003a) 
 
SOS’s emphasis on republicanism also provides ideological grounding for 
numerous practical policy suggestions, many of which have the potential 
to prove highly beneficial to the parts of the French population suffering 
most from the effects of racism and discrimination.  As the self-perceived 
role of SOS is to make the Republic live up to its promises on equality, 
the movement places a substantial amount of emphasis on the 
importance of providing opportunities for social advancement.  Therefore, 
it has frequently called for the government to invest in infrastructure in the 
banlieues, and has frequently proposed action in areas such as 
employment, education and housing, calling for anonymous CVs as a 
means of fighting discrimination, and for significantly increased 
construction of social housing, among other ideas collected in 2007’s 
Manifeste pour l’égalité.  Of similar potential benefit is the organisation’s 
emphasis on the ‘social question’ over the ‘racial question’, another 
republican-inspired position, and one which leads the movement to 
prioritise concrete action favouring socio-economic equality over identity 
politics (Sopo 2007: 44). 
 
At the same time however, this positioning on republicanism on the part 
of SOS has created ideological difficulties and contradictions for the 
movement.  For example, as has been noted throughout the thesis, over 
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my chosen period the language of republicanism was used by political 
actors on every part of the ideological spectrum, meaning that such 
language was frequently used for purposes contrary to those of SOS, as 
can be seen for example in Sarkozy’s 2007 presidential election 
campaign.  This narrow consensus on acceptable political language 
frequently led to SOS finding it difficult to differentiate its discourse from 
that of supposed political adversaries like Sarkozy.  This can be seen, to 
take one example, by considering the term communautarisme, referring 
to the idea of communities organising themselves on an ethnic or 
religious basis, and feeling that their primary loyalty is to these ethnic or 
religious groups, rather than to the Republic.  The practice is seen by 
both SOS and Sarkozy as inherently anti-republican, but while SOS sees 
communautarisme as a self-protecting mechanism which essentially can 
only be fought by challenging discrimination and poverty, for Sarkozy the 
term functions as a code-word, tapping into a semantic field of ‘threats to 
society’ from radical Islam, social disorder and illegal immigration (Rigaud 
2011).   
 
On similar lines, as SOS sees France’s mainstream political culture as 
intrinsically both just, and supportive of anti-racist aims, the movement 
has frequently found it difficult to create a new and memorable alternative 
discourse to challenge that of Sarkozy, the significant differences which 
undoubtedly exist being reduced to arguments over the meaning and 
definition of republicanism.  The contradictions of SOS’s republican 
positioning can also be seen in its action against racial discrimination.  
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While the organisation is justified in conceiving of equality in socio-
economic terms rather than those of ethnic identity, a substantial issue it 
fails to address is how to measure the effectiveness of anti-discrimination 
action without some from of ethnically-based statistics: that is to say, how 
is it possible to fight discrimination based on race and ethnicity using a 
political ideology which refuses to take these factors into account (Simon 
2006, De Rudder et al 2000)?  Finally, as SOS sees universalist 
republicanism as inherently anti-racist, it is unwilling to call the 
fundamental concept into question; questioning only the way it is put into 
practice (or otherwise) by political representatives.  It is also unwilling, 
therefore, to pay too much attention to the use of such universalist 
ideology as a historical justification for colonialism, perhaps explaining the 
movement’s scepticism over the concept of post-colonialism (Sopo 2005).  
Whilst SOS is justified in prioritising racism and discrimination happening 
in the present, and practical measures aimed at ameliorating the problem, 
over historical claims-making, I would argue that it is perhaps too willing 
to play down the continuing influence of colonialism and colonial thinking 
in contemporary French society, and similarly perhaps too willing to see 
the past and the present as two separate issues.  This rejection of post-
colonialism on the part of SOS does not fully take into account the 
possibility (correctly noted by MIR) that racial hierarchies and 
stereotyping, inherited from colonialism, can potentially be hidden behind 
formal republican equality (Blanchard, Bancel and Lemaire (eds.) 2005, 
Bancel et al (eds.) 2010, Khiari 2006, 2009, Silverman 1992, Balibar 
1992). 
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In the case of MIR meanwhile, the movement’s critical positioning on 
republicanism allows it to carve out a unique position within French anti-
racism.  Due to its lack of respect for consensus and its radical, 
subversive and conflictual disposition, the organisation is able to make 
valid critiques of society that are out of bounds to more mainstream, 
consensus-seeking movements.  For example, as an autonomous, anti-
system movement MIR feels free to question France’s political structures, 
and the idea of the nation-state more widely, in a way a movement like 
SOS would not.  It is able to look back into the historical roots of political 
structures and point out how they relate to the creation of stereotypes and 
racial hierarchies whose effects continue to be felt in contemporary 
society.  It is able furthermore to analyse, again taking a historical 
perspective, the links between the supposed universalism of the 
Enlightenment and the ideological justification for the extreme inequality 
represented by colonialism.  Whilst there is nothing to prevent more 
mainstream groups from making similar critiques, such groups are in 
practice prevented from doing so by the viewpoint that the ideology 
underpinning society is essentially just, regardless of the uses it may 
have been put to in the past: if a movement bases its appeal on 
republican values it is unlikely to call into question the structures of a 
state which theoretically embodies such values25.   
 
                                                 
25 As may be recalled from chapter 3, this position that the proclaimed political culture of 
a given state is fundamentally just is seen in Alana Lentin’s useful ‘continuum’ as a 
position of ‘proximity’ to ‘the public political culture of the nation-state’, while the position 
of MIR, which emphasises the links of mainstream political culture with colonialism, 
racism and exclusion, is seen as one of ‘distance’ (2004: 1-3)  
 325 
MIR’s ideological autonomy allows it, in addition, to call into question the 
concepts of nationality and citizenship and their relationship to rights, a 
debate which has not been prominent in mainstream political discussion 
since the peak of the Beur movement in the early-mid 1980s (Balibar 
1992, Bouamama 1994) but one which has yet to be resolved.  What is 
more, the movement’s wide-ranging, internationalist anti-colonial ideology, 
presenting the situation of France’s post-colonial populations, colonial 
history and the ‘neo-colonialism’ associated with unequal relationships 
between the global North and South in the modern geo-political arena as 
part of the same continuum is both intellectually ambitious and unique 
within the French anti-racist movement.  That is to say, it could perhaps 
be argued that MIR is a fully ‘postcolonial’ movement – in the sense that it 
is working in ‘un champ où sont pensées les articulations colonisation / 
postcolonie dans les pays ex-colonisés tout autant que dans les ex-
métropoles’ (Bancel, Blanchard and Lemaire 2005: 14) – in a country 
which has frequently shown evidence of discomfort with the notion of 
postcolonialism (Coquery-Vidrovitch 2009: 85, Bancel et al 2010: 28).  
 
Whilst the question of how this translates into reality is up for debate, it is 
quite possible to see how MIR’s discourse, in particular its questioning of 
republicanism, may appeal to disenfranchised immigrant-origin 
populations who feel that the Republic has not lived up to its promises of 
equality, social opportunity and ‘colour-blindness’.  Moreover, and 
importantly, it analyses problems which undoubtedly do exist, but are 
frequently glossed over in mainstream political debate, for example the 
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discrimination and inequality of treatment faced by post-colonial 
populations in their dealings with the police and the justice system.  In the 
same way, the movement aims to keep awkward questions around 
colonial memory in the public eye, during a period in which political 
representatives have repeatedly encouraged the population to forget 
them, as can be seen in Sarkozy’s discourse on ‘repentance’.  Keeping 
such awkward questions in the political spotlight is potentially a valuable 
role in French society, and one which MIR, rather than campaigning for a 
complete ‘décolonial’ reordering of French society whose outlines are left 
somewhat fuzzy (as can be seen in chapter 5), may be well advised to 
focus on. 
 
MIR’s questioning and broad rejection of republicanism, however, does 
raise a number of issues which the movement is yet to fully resolve.  For 
instance, it could be argued that this rejection is responsible for the lack 
of a coherent and achievable long-term aim in MIR’s discourse.  Whilst 
SOS’s aims are simple and comprehensible – demand practical action to 
make the Republic’s proclaimed principles of liberté, égalité and fraternité 
into a genuine reality – MIR’s discourse, almost without exception, works 
at an abstract and theoretical level, rarely suggesting any concrete 
solutions for the problems its key thinkers (often perceptively) analyse 
(Gemie 2010).  On the occasions where an eventual aim for the 
movement is proposed, it is frequently so vague as to have little meaning, 
or so large-scale as to have little chance of happening.   
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Both of these issues can be seen when thinking about how MIR’s 
presentation of racism as wholly systemic translates into reality: if the 
movement is correct and racism is indeed purely systemic, effectively 
nothing can be done about it, short of a complete reordering of French 
society, whose potential outlines are not addressed to any significant 
effect by the organisation.  In taking this all-or-nothing view, MIR 
seemingly cuts itself off from the possibility of taking practical action – 
legal action, anti-discrimination action, action in favour of equality of 
opportunity – which whilst inevitably imperfect and compromised, has the 
potential to make a genuine difference.   
 
On similar lines, MIR’s rejection of the Republic’s claims to colour-
blindness and its emphasis on the role of republican ideology in the 
justification of colonialism means that the movement seemingly places all 
the blame for social inequalities on race and the legacies of colonialism.  
Although raising questions on these issues is, as noted above, a 
potentially useful role for MIR, this focus leads the organisation to be far 
too willing to dismiss the class-based and economically-based 
dimensions of social inequalities; dimensions which by necessity are 
focused upon by ‘colour-blind’, republican movements like SOS.  I argue 
therefore that MIR has failed to address satisfactorily the question of the 
inter-sectionality of race and class.  That said, with its refusal to take into 
account race, and its view of racism as being not systemic but made up 
of individual acts of discrimination or violence, it could perhaps be argued 
that the same critique could be made of SOS.      
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Finally, although these issues are only partially relevant to an anti-system 
organisation such as MIR, it must be noted that the movement’s calling 
into question of republicanism immediately denies it the possibility of 
large-scale support; and that its emphasis on colonial memory and 
multiculturalism are entirely at odds with the political climate examined in 
the thesis.  While MIR did not during the period of my research show any 
sign of, or inclination towards, becoming a mass movement, it almost 
goes without saying that by choosing to take positions entirely contrary to 
those of the political mainstream, it restricts itself to the status of a small-
scale pressure group, a status which provides gains in autonomy but 
losses in visibility and influence. 
 
Although the ideologies of SOS and MIR are substantially different –
finding themselves almost at opposite ends of what Alana Lentin calls the 
‘continuum of proximity-to-distance from the public political culture of the 
nation-state (2004: 1) – it is my argument that both are defined at least in 
part by their relationship with republicanism26.  In the case of SOS this 
relationship is relatively easily definable: the organisation largely exists to 
support universalist republican values; to fight against their misuse; and 
to lobby for action aimed at making them exist in reality as much as in 
theory.  For MIR meanwhile, this relationship works in a very different 
                                                 
26 In this way the movements are representative of a long tradition: as Jim House argues, 
‘The history of anti-racism in France, a history of a broad range of movements, 
mobilisations, ideas and ideals, affords many perspectives on the question of occidental 
modernity.  Nowhere in Western Europe did a political culture incarnate and embrace 
the modern project with such apparent fervour as republican France.’ (in Anthias and 
Lloyd (eds.) 2002: 111)  And within this context, ‘various strands of anti-racism have [...] 
both appealed to and challenged the ideologies of the republican nation-state’ (ibid) 
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(and somewhat paradoxical) way: its campaigning discourse relies to a 
considerable extent on the existence of republican rhetoric as something 
to define itself against, but at the same time, it does not necessarily 
disagree with the central tenets of republicanism per se, only with the 
uses they have been put to throughout French history and the likelihood 
of them becoming reality.  Therefore, the movement has to fight (for 
example) for equality in a ‘non-republican’ way, whilst strongly and 
publicly rejecting an ideological system – republicanism – which 
proclaims equality as a central component.   
 
The cases of SOS and MIR can perhaps be seen as evidence that 
French anti-racism forms an example of what Maclean and Szarka call 
‘path dependency’ (2008: 3): that is to say, it is shaped by national 
political culture, ideological values and traditions.  This has implications 
for the ability of these movements to transcend the national framework 
and participate in transnational political movements.  Given that 
republicanism – despite its claims to universalism – is anchored in French 
political culture and traditions, it is less able to provide an ideological 
framework for addressing racism outside of France’s borders.  That is to 
say, whether positive (SOS) or negative (MIR) towards the concept, 
movements defined by their relationship with republicanism are likely to 
find that these debates do not fully translate to other contexts, as such 
debates have their roots in French history: as Catherine Lloyd argues, 
‘French anti-racists claim to trace their antecedents back to the 
Enlightenment and the Revolution of 1789’, these historical movements 
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being seen as the backbone of republican ideology (in Anthias and Lloyd 
(eds.) 2002: 67).   
 
What is more, amongst the most republican-based movements there is a 
degree of suspicion of associations and institutions which see anti-racism 
in a different way: as former SOS President Malek Boutih wrote of his 
experience of anti-racist action within the EU, to take an example: 
 “[N]ous sommes en total décalage avec le discours dominant à 
Bruxelles qui est celui du droit à la différence, du droit des communautés 
et de la protection des minorités. [...] Nous ne sommes pas pour 
l’émancipation des communautés, nous sommes pour l’émancipation des 
individus.” (2001: 76) 
That said, despite their ‘path dependency’ related to their links with 
republicanism, elements of the discourses of both the movements 
examined in the thesis are potentially translatable to other contexts: in the 
case of SOS its support for universalist human rights, a cause which has 
been taken up at European and international levels (the UN’s Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights bearing more than a passing resemblance 
to the Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme of 1789); and in the case of 
MIR, anti-colonialism and the link between colonial history and the post-
colonial present, a link arguably theorised to a greater extent in US and 
UK academia than in French (Bancel et al 2010: 29).  Whilst the 
importance of forming transnational networks to address issues of racism 
or immigration is only likely to increase, debates around racism and anti-
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racism remain to some extent nationally defined.  Nevertheless, common 
ground is undoubtedly possible to find.  
 
Before ending this conclusion, I would like to consider two further 
questions: firstly, whether SOS and MIR have had any concrete impact 
on the political climate under discussion in the thesis; and secondly, 
which areas related to the present work offer potential directions for future 
research.  Let us begin with the question of whether the movements have 
had any success in imposing their agendas within mainstream political 
debate over my chosen period.   
 
SOS has had a measure of success in influencing political debate during 
the years examined in the thesis, as can be seen from the following 
examples.  Firstly, the movement succeeded in getting its policy of 
anonymous CVs discussed in the Senate (Qu’est-ce que SOS Racisme 
2006: 109).  Although the proposed law on the issue was not in the event 
applied, the fact that SOS was able to have the issue debated at all can 
be seen as evidence that the organisation has at times been able to get 
its voice heard at the highest levels, even in an apparently unsympathetic 
national political climate.  Secondly, SOS arguably played a role in the 
political failure of the ‘identity debate’ of late 2009, following which the 
UMP was comprehensively defeated in the January 2010 regional 
elections, with the publication of a petition in conjunction with Libération 
which received tens of thousands of signatures, including those of well-
known political figures such as François Hollande, Lionel Jospin, Martine 
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Aubry, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Laurent Fabius, Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Cécile 
Duflot, Jack Lang and Manuel Valls, alongside numerous celebrities and 
academics (http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101609703-arretez-ce-debat-
monsieur-le-president, 20.12.2009).  And thirdly, SOS claims to have led 
opposition to Sarkozy’s 2007 plans for DNA testing of immigrants, 
claimed to be necessary to verify birth and marriage certificates, setting 
up a website, a petition, and a large-scale meeting at the Zénith in Paris, 
organised in association with Libération and Charlie Hebdo (‘Affiche 
éclectique contre les tests ADN au Zénith à Paris’, Le Monde, 
15.10.2007).  Again, SOS’s ability to make its voice heard is clear.  Even 
if its public profile is lower than it was in the mid 1980s, as a group with a 
well known name, consensual, republican-based demands and an 
extensive list of influential contacts, it is able to rally politicians, celebrities 
and sympathetic newspapers to its cause to an extent matched by few 
other social movements. 
 
In contrast, the success or otherwise of MIR is very difficult to judge.  
Whereas SOS, as can be seen above, frequently makes specific 
demands (bring in anonymous CVs as an anti-discrimination measure, 
end the identity debate, fight DNA testing of immigrants), what MIR 
claims to want is, almost without exception, vague and intangible.  
Certainly, the group has succeeded in making itself known, in the sense 
that its positions have caused controversy and led to virulent rebuttals 
from the ‘republican’ media (Gemie 2010: 134).  What is more, it has 
arguably succeeded in keeping awkward questions of colonial memory in 
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the spotlight, via its annual marches on the anniversary of the Sétif 
massacre and its participation in a further march commemorating the 
killing of Algerian demonstrators in Paris in October 1961.  It may well be 
the case that MIR’s aims are ultimately unmeasurable.  Nevertheless, this 
is not necessarily to say that they are without value.  As Sharif Gemie 
argues,  
 “[T]o date, very, very few French voices have dared to question the 
basic conceptual framework created by republic, anti-communautarisme 
and laïcité. [...]  The political importance of the Mouvement des Indigènes 
de la République is that, cautiously and gradually, they have begun the 
process of breaking this political consensus.” (2010: 141) 
That is to say, even if the complete anti-colonial reordering of French 
society proclaimed as the movement’s eventual goal is highly unlikely to 
take place in the foreseeable future, MIR has been able to introduce into 
public debate the controversial and (to mainstream republican thought) 
counter-intuitive idea of the ‘République coloniale’; questioning, as Gemie 
notes, the ‘republican consensus’ and the narrowness of permissible 
positions in mainstream French politics, and challenging the complacent 
recital of abstract principles in favour of a critical examination of the 
history of republican ideas and a demand for genuinely universal equality. 
 
This thesis has examined the reactions of two contrasting anti-racist 
organisations to what I argue is a unique context for the movement in 
France, using where possible their own words, from press releases, 
interviews, petitions, appeals, manifestos and official publications.  
 334 
Inevitably however, this focus has left certain relevant questions 
unanswered, questions which could usefully form the basis of future 
research. 
 
Firstly, it must be noted that there are other organisations which I have 
not had the time and space to analyse, but which could also be profitably 
examined in relation to their positions on republicanism and their 
reactions to the timeframe examined in the thesis.  SOS and MIR were 
chosen because they represent opposing conceptions of French anti-
racism, the former republican-based, consensus-seeking and working 
broadly within the political system; and the other anti-republican, radical 
and autonomous.  They do not, however, represent the entire spectrum of 
French anti-racist opinion.  A study of the contemporary positions of 
MRAP (Mouvement contre le racisme et pour l'amitié entre les peuples) – 
a long-established and relatively mainstream movement, but one with 
origins in the radical rather than the parliamentary Left, and one which 
embraces anti-colonialism and the fight against Islamophobia – would for 
instance provide a useful alternative perspective27. 
 
Secondly, a study of the demographics of anti-racist groups in 
contemporary France would provide valuable context for future analysis 
of the field.  While this was not the main focus of the current work, the 
                                                 
27 Certainly, academic studies have been made of MRAP (see Lloyd 1998, for example), 
but these do not cover what I have argued is the unique context examined in this thesis, 
a context made up, as we have seen, of a combination of factors: the prevalence in 
political and media discourse of a conservative and arguably exclusionary discourse on 
national identity, the explicit rejection of post-colonialism and critical history, and a 
consensus on the language (but not necessarily the meaning) of republicanism across 
the political spectrum  
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impression gained from my research was that although many different 
ethnicities are represented in SOS’s leadership and membership, its 
constituency is quite a narrow one, representing the middle-class, liberal, 
republican centre-left, rather than France’s poorest and most disfavoured 
populations.  Similarly, it appears that as with SOS, MIR’s activists are 
not representative of the poor, immigrant-origin youth most threatened by 
racism and discrimination.  Rather, they tend to be drawn from the 
middle-class, intellectual section of the French post-colonial population.  
As Sharif Gemie puts it, 
 “[I]n a ghostly echo of the colonial experience, in which national 
liberation movements were largely led by frustrated sub-elites who were 
never allowed access to the structures of metropolitan power, so the MIR 
also seems to be based on a type of educated banlieues petty-
bourgeoisie, similarly denied access to jobs and positions.” (2010: 148) 
These, however, are only impressions.  A full quantitative examination of 
this question would provide important insights into the issues of who 
different groups can legitimately claim to represent, and the credibility of 
such groups amongst those in whose name they claim to act.  Aspects of 
this question have been answered in existing works.  Robert Gibb’s 2001 
PhD thesis, for instance, provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
structures of SOS, as well as first-hand accounts of local committee 
meetings:  
 “For the most part, committee activists were in their late 20s or 
early 30s (although a few were older), professionals or white-collar 
workers (teachers, clerical assistants, employees in state-owned or 
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partially privatised industries), and white, French nationals (although one 
member was from North Africa and another from sub-Saharan Africa.” 
(2001: 56) 
This, however, does not answer the wider questions: how many members 
do different groups have, for example?  Who are they, where are they 
from, and what does their activism involve? 
 
Finally, it is perhaps a valid question to ask whether the anti-racist 
movement is in fact best placed to fight issues such as racism and 
discrimination.  That is to say, would this fight be best served by action 
(almost certainly on the part of the State, due to the scale of the task and 
the co-ordination which would be required) against the socio-economic 
conditions which encourage racism – unemployment, insecure 
employment, poverty, lack of opportunities for social advancement, 
segregation of minority populations, and so on – rather than against 
racism per se?  And is action against racism therefore treating symptoms 
rather than causes?  Whilst it is certainly possible, as we saw in chapter 1, 
to criticise Pierre André Taguieff’s frequent use of abstract theories and 
lack of illustrative examples of how anti-racist groups work in reality, I 
would argue that he is correct to argue that ‘La lutte contre le racisme 
apparaît dès lors comme inséparable de la réduction des mécanismes 
producteurs de ségrégation des populations pauvres d’origine étrangère’ 
(in Wieviorka (ed.), 1993: 389), and that ‘la ségrégation sur des bases à 
la fois socio-économiques et ethniques: voilà précisément le processus 
complexe qu’un antiracisme repensé doit se proposer à la fois d’analyser 
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et de stopper’ (ibid).  Although it would inevitably contain elements of 
subjectivity and speculation, any work which could bring together in the 
French context unemployment, insecurity and social/spatial segregation, 
the link between these factors and racism, and what could be done to 
ameliorate these problems would be at least intriguing and at most 
exceptionally valuable. 
 
Whilst it may indeed turn out to be the case that a large-scale, State-led 
programme favouring job creation and social mixing is the best way of 
fighting racism, in the absence of such a programme the anti-racist 
movement continues to play an important role.  A mainstream movement 
like SOS, operating within the system, is able to lobby political 
representatives to take action aimed at making the principles of 
universalist republicanism a reality; while an anti-colonial, anti-system 
movement like MIR potentially has the role of holding representatives to 
account for France’s colonial history, a history which needs to be 
acknowledged and remembered if the country is to move on from it.  
Although the ideologies and worldviews of my chosen movements are 
very different, and in many ways seemingly incompatible, both 
fundamentally claim to demand equality: as even MIR notes, 
‘L’expression ‘Indigène de la République’ [...] a vocation à disparaître 
lorsque l’égalité deviendra réalité dans notre pays’ (‘Qui sommes nous’, 
2005).  The process of attempting to gain equality can only ever be long, 
arduous, difficult, frustrating and eternally incomplete.  This does not 
mean, however, that the work of anti-racism is without value.  After all, as 
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Edmund Burke famously (if perhaps apocryphally) said, ‘nobody made a 
greater mistake than he who did nothing because he could do only a little’. 
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